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ABSTRACT 
Yinghong (Susan) Wei: Market Orientation and Successful New Product 
Innovation: The Role of Competency Traps 
(under the direction of Hugh O’Neill) 
 
 This study seeks to enhance understanding of successful new product innovation by 
developing and testing a new theory framework for explaining the market orientation–
product innovation relationship in the context of firms’ new product development (NPD) 
processes. Drawing on and adapting key concepts from organizational learning theory, and 
particularly in the area of capability-rigidity theory, the study investigates how market 
orientation may create rigidity, known as competency traps, that reduce innovation 
performance. 
 Competency traps concern the propensity of a firm to continue relying on processes 
that have been successful in the past even though they are no longer optimal. Although the 
concept of competency traps was introduced in management literature more than a decade 
ago, it has been the focus of little conceptual development and no empirical research. Given 
the potential adverse consequences of competency traps in NPD, it is important that we 
understand the sources and impact of competency traps. This study develops an integrated 
conceptual framework to help researchers and managers identify and reduce the effect of 
competency traps on NPD. The development of a valid measure of competency traps should 
enable researchers and managers to better diagnose competency traps. Entrepreneurial 
 iii
 orientation and network learning are suggested as the remedy to manage the possible adverse 
effects. 
 The study includes a major survey of the responses of 113 marketing managers from 
a high-technology industrial zone in China. Structural equation modeling and reliability tests 
are used for data analysis. Three types of competency traps are identified: (1) vision traps, (2) 
technology traps, and (3) routinization traps. The newly developed scales demonstrate 
reasonably good validity and reliability. The findings show that customer orientation leads to 
a routinization trap. However, routinization traps are positively associated with NPD 
creativity and NPD efficiency. Vision traps are negatively associated with NPD creativity. 
The relationship between technology traps and new product innovation is indirect and 
moderated by entrepreneurial orientation and network learning. Entrepreneurial orientation 
but not network learning is the remedy for highly market-oriented firms to reduce technology 
traps. The implications, limitations, and future research directions are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 Enhanced understanding of successful new product innovation in business markets is 
important for both academic research and business practice. However, the management and 
marketing literatures offer very different viewpoints on this key issue. In the management 
literature, Christensen and Bower (1996) argue that proximity to customers may harm firms 
during a period of industry discontinuity, because close customer ties deter product or service 
innovation. Some scholars argue that customers lack foresight and do not know what they 
want, with the result that customer orientation encourages product imitation rather than 
product creativity and conservative product development rather than radical innovation (e.g., 
Bennett and Cooper 1979, 1981). A focus on current markets can therefore lead to a bias 
against radical new product innovations and product cannibalization (Chandy and Tellis 
1998; Tauber 1974). 
These views contradict market orientation (MO) theory in the marketing literature 
(Slater and Narver 1998). The literature suggests that customer orientation, competitor 
orientation, and interfunctional coordination are components of MO (Narver and Slater 
1990). Market-oriented firms are viewed as being concerned with both express and latent 
customer needs and not simply as being customer led (Slater and Narver 1999). Slater and 
Narver (1995, 1998) argue that MO can lead to generative as well as adaptive learning in 
 firms’ new product development (NPD) efforts. The marketing literature therefore indicates 
that as a component of MO, customer orientation provides valuable insights to the NPD 
process. Learning from lead users or customers is considered a valuable source of novel 
product concepts (von Hippel 1989). Indeed, according to von Hippel (1989), users 
developed 77 percent of innovations in scientific instruments and 67 percent of those in 
semiconductors. In support of this viewpoint, a number of empirical studies have shown a 
positive relationship between MO and new product success (Agarwal, Erramilli, and Dev 
2003; Atuahene-Gima 1995; Baker and Sinkula 1999a, b; Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998; 
Matear et al. 2002; Pelham and Wilson 1996; Slater and Narver 1994). However, a number 
of studies show no direct impact of MO on new product success (Appiah-Adu and Ranchhod 
1998; Atuahene-Gima 1996; Greenley 1995; Im and Workman 2004; Langerak, Hultink, and 
Robben 2004). 
This dissertation seeks to resolve the controversies in this debate. From the 
management side, the work of Christensen and Bower (1996) adopts a specific focus on 
discontinuous innovation. From the marketing side, most studies do not explicitly specify 
whether the focus on new product improvement is based on incremental or radical 
innovation. Furthermore, the mixed empirical results concerning the relationship between 
MO and new product performance suggest that MO, by itself, does not explain variance in 
new product success. Research is clearly needed to identify the key variables that moderate 
or mediate the relationship between MO and successful new product innovation, and thus 
explain the conflicting findings and arguments about the benefits and limitations of MO as it 
pertains to successful new product innovation in business markets. 
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 From an organizational learning perspective, MO may be considered a market 
learning capability, which has a positive effect on NPD. However, the literature shows that 
organizational learning is not always beneficial for firms. Organizational learning sometimes 
leads to dysfunctional behavior and can create negative effects (Crossan, Lane, and White 
1999; Foil and Lyles 1985). Leonard-Barton (1992) argues that organizational capabilities 
have a downside that inhibits innovation: when capabilities become rigidities. Organizations 
have to struggle with whether to maintain, renew, or replace organizational capabilities, 
because such capabilities simultaneously enhance and inhibit development. 
This struggle is described as a balance between exploration and exploitation in the 
organizational learning process (March 1991). Exploration learning focuses on 
experimentation with new alternatives. Exploitation learning emphasizes the refinement and 
extension of existing competences, technologies, and paradigms (March 1991). As a result of 
“learning myopia,” organizations are more likely to engage in exploitation activities rather 
than exploration activities, because returns from exploitation are systematically more certain 
and less remote in time than are returns from exploration. In such adaptive learning 
processes, the advantages of exploitation cumulate more rapidly than those of exploration. 
These tendencies to increase exploitation and to reduce exploration make the learning 
process potentially self-destructive are called learning traps (March 1991). Learning traps 
can make firms so blind that not only can they not see the importance of a new routine or 
new technology, but they also try to ignore other potential possibilities (King and West 
2002). 
The literature indicates that among various types of learning traps, competency traps 
may be the most common and also potentially the most dangerous. Levitt and March (1988) 
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 and Levinthal and March (1993) define competency traps as the persistence of inferior 
procedures. With a history of favorable performance, an organization tends to accumulate 
experience with a legacy procedure and avoids experience with a newly emerging procedures 
(Levinthal and March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). This inertia or rigidity in organizational 
learning keeps firms from identifying the need for and from developing adequate experience 
with a superior procedure. A competency trap is the likeliest explanation for the failure of 
market leaders (King and West 2002). Market-oriented firms are confident in their existing 
technology and established processes because they provide favorable outcomes, which leads 
to blindness to new concepts, new approaches, and the potential for radical innovation. 
Therefore, this dissertation argues that competency traps are an important mediator of 
the link between MO and new product innovation. Market orientation as a capability may 
improve new product efficiency and incremental innovation. However, MO may also 
constrain innovative NPD to become a rigidity, manifest in the form of competency traps that 
inhibit new product creativity and radical innovation. Because of a lack of mature 
measurements for radical innovation and incremental innovation, this study examines 
innovation by focusing only on new product creativity and NPD efficiency. In order to 
reduce competency traps and enhance a firm’s ability to develop innovative new products, the 
literature suggests that market-oriented organizations must conduct double-loop or generative 
learning by developing and leveraging both complementary assets, such as entrepreneurship, 
and appropriate organizational structures and processes (Slater and Narver 1995). This 
dissertation proposes that entrepreneurial orientation and network learning may help reduce 
the tendency of MO to create competency traps by enhancing a firm’s ability to recognize 
new opportunities and create novel perspectives. 
 4
  
1.2 Research Gap and Questions 
 This study seeks to enhance understanding of successful new product innovation by 
developing and testing a new theory framework for explaining the MO–product innovation 
relationship in the context of firms’ NPD processes. Drawing on and adapting key concepts 
from organizational learning theory, particularly in the area of capability-rigidity theory, this 
dissertation posits that the key construct of competency traps mediate the relationship 
between MO and new product innovation. Competency traps concern the propensity of a firm 
to continue relying on processes that have been successful in the past even though they are no 
longer optimal. Although the concept of competency traps was introduced in management 
literature more than a decade ago, it has been the focus of little conceptual development and 
no empirical research. Given the potential adverse consequences of competency traps in 
NPD, it is important that we understand the sources and impact of competency traps. An 
integrated conceptual framework is needed to help researchers and managers identify and 
reduce the effect of competency traps on NPD. Furthermore, the development of a valid 
measure of competency traps should enable researchers and managers to better diagnose 
competency traps and remedy their possible adverse effects. This study develops an 
integrated model to bridge the marketing and management literatures with data from the 
business-to-business arena. 
 Specifically, this dissertation seeks answers to the following questions: 
1. What are competency traps? How can we define and measure them? 
2. What kind of relationship exists among MO, competency traps, and new product 
innovation? Why and how does a firm competence such as MO lead to competency 
traps? What are the consequences of competency traps for new product innovation? 
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 3. How can firms reduce the occurrence and negative consequences of competency 
traps? Why and how does this work? 
 
1.3 Potential Contributions 
 Competency traps can lead firms into a vicious cycle of adherence to inferior routines 
and denial of the need for change (Fiol and Lyles 1985; King and West 2002; Levinthal and 
March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). Both academic research and practice in business 
markets can greatly benefit from this dissertation by understanding how firms can identify 
and reduce the level and negative consequences of competency traps in their NPD efforts. 
This dissertation will contribute to the literature and management practice in three ways. 
First, this study will clarify and specify the domain of competency traps and develop new 
measures to help firms diagnose the existence and level of competency traps. Second, this 
dissertation will provide empirical evidence concerning capability-rigidity theory. To date, 
the upsides of an MO as an organizational capability have been the sole focus of attention in 
the literature to date. This dissertation will assist managers in recognizing that the potential 
downsides of MO may cause rigidity in a firm’s competency traps, which may reduce new 
product creativity and inhibit radical innovation in NPD. Third, by identifying important 
antecedents of competency traps and factors that affect their relationships with NPD 
performance, this dissertation will help managers manage the level and negative impact of 
such competency traps. This dissertation suggests entrepreneurial orientation and network 
learning as potentially important complementary assets to MO that can be used to remedy 
competency traps in the NPD process. 
 In general, I expect that my findings will be applicable to many firms. If the 
framework is supported, the findings of this dissertation should provide an answer to the 
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 debate about whether customer power has adverse effects on innovation. Consistent with 
Christensen and Bower (1996), I argue that customer orientation alone is insufficient as a 
precursor of radical innovation in NPD. In extending the work of Slater and Narver (1998, 
1999), this dissertation will show how complements to MO may minimize competency traps 
and encourage new product innovation. The creation of double-loop learning opportunities 
by means of the fostering of entrepreneurial orientation and network learning helps firms 
reduce competency traps and thereby increase innovation and creativity. 
 
1.4 Study Outline 
 This dissertation is organized into six chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1, the current chapter, provides a general overview of the study, including the 
research background, research questions, and potential contribution; 
Chapter 2 presents a review of the empirical and theoretical literature; 
Chapter 3 addresses the theoretical framework and hypotheses; 
Chapter 4 describes the research design and methodology, including the sample, data-
collection procedure, measurement, and data-analysis methods; 
Chapter 5 analyzes and discusses the findings of the study; and 
Chapter 6 discusses the implications, limitations, and directions for future research. 
 
 This chapter is the introductory chapter. Relevant research background was examined 
in order to isolate the main research issue. A debate about the relationship between market 
orientation and innovation was introduced first. After that, the research questions were 
described. Then, research gaps and potential contributions were identified. At the end, the 
outline of this study was addressed. In the next chapter, a detailed literature review will be 
presented. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter examines the relevant literature on NPD, market orientation, 
organizational learning (including competency traps and network learning), and 
entrepreneurial orientation. The development of this chapter is therefore geared to present and 
discuss the most relevant literature to the research questions under examination and to build a 
theoretical rationale for the selection of the dependent and independent variables applied in 
this dissertation. 
 
2.1 Literature Review on New Product Innovation 
 The Marketing Science Institute (2002–2004) has named new product development 
(NPD) and innovation a top-tier priority topic. New product development is the most common 
form of innovation (Hlavacek and Thompson 1973) and is not only risky but also costly. 
More than 50 percent of new products fail in the marketplace (Christensen and Raynor 2003a, 
b; Golder and Tellis 1993). The term innovation has a broad meaning in the literature and has 
been used to cover numerous concepts and variables, including new idea, new concepts, new 
invention, new technology, new program, new products, and so on. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, I consider innovation and new products interchangeable and combine 
them in the term new product innovation. When Wind and Mahajan (1997) discuss the 
research issues and opportunities in NPD, how to help management improve the probability 
 of successful NPD is revealed as one of the most important questions for both researchers and 
practitioners. 
 
2.1.1 Defining New Product Innovation 
 Academic researchers and practitioners have been interested in understanding the 
meaning and manifestations of innovation for many decades. An examination of the literature 
on innovation shows that scholars have classified innovations on the basis of the specific 
context of the research setting, such as product, technology, and organizational innovation. In 
this section, I first review the different definitions of innovation. 
Van de Ven (1986) defines innovation as “the development and implementation of 
new ideas by people who engage in transactions with others within an institutional order 
(p590)”. This definition focuses on four basic factors: new ideas, people, transactions, and 
institutional context. 
Roberts (1988) considers innovation as having two parts: (1) the generation of an idea 
or invention and (2) the conversion of that invention into a business or other useful 
application. Therefore, innovation includes all stages from the actual invention to the final 
commercialization, or innovation equals the sum of invention and exploitation. The overall 
management of technological innovation therefore includes the organization and direction of 
human and capital resources toward effectively (1) creating new knowledge; (2) generating 
technical ideas aimed at new and enhanced products, manufacturing processes, and services; 
(3) developing those ideas into working prototypes; and (4) translating them into 
manufacturing, distribution, and use. Technological innovation outcomes may come in many 
forms, incremental or radical in degree. Whereas invention is marked by discovery or a state 
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 of new existence, usually at the lab or the bench, innovation is marked by first use in 
manufacturing or in a market (Roberts 1988). 
Ettlie, Bridges, and O’Keefe (1984) suggest that radical innovation and incremental 
innovation differ in whether the technology of the innovation is a clear, risky departure from 
existing practice. If the innovation requires both throughput (process) as well as output 
(production or service) change, perhaps the magnitude or cost required of the organization is 
sufficient to warrant the designation of rare and radical, rather than incremental, innovation. 
Radical and incremental describe different types of technological process innovations (Dewar 
and Dutton 1986). Radical innovations are fundamental changes that represent revolutionary 
change in technology. They represent significant departures from existing practice. Radical 
innovations create a dramatic change in products, processes, or services such that they 
transform existing markets or industries, or create new ones. Incremental innovations are 
minor improvements or simple adjustments in current technology. Examples of radical 
innovation include computerized tomography, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in the field 
of diagnostic imaging, personal computers in computing, and pagers and cellular telephones 
in mobile communications (Leifer, McDermott, O’Connor, Peters, Rice, and Veryzer 2000). 
Cardinal (2001) defines radical innovation and incremental innovation from a 
knowledge perspective. Radical innovations are major changes in technology that involve the 
discovery of new knowledge, substantial technical risk, time, and cost. Incremental 
innovations are minor changes to existing technology that involve small advances based on an 
established foundation of knowledge. 
Henderson and Clark (1990) use the traditional definition of innovation. They view the 
product as a system and as a set of components. Innovation is classified along two 
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 dimensions: (1) horizontal (components) and (2) vertical (linkage among components). 
Radical innovation establishes a new dominant design and a new set of design concepts 
embodied in components that are linked together in a new architecture. Incremental 
innovation refines and extends an established design. Improvement occurs in individual 
components, but the underlying core design concepts and the links between them remain the 
same. A modular innovation changes a core design concept without changing the product’s 
architecture. Architectural innovation is the reconfiguration of an established system to link 
together existing components in a new way. 
In this dissertation, I view innovation from the new product management perspective. 
According to Crawford and Di Benedetto (2000), innovation is (1) the act of creating a new 
product or process, including invention as well as the work required to bring an idea or 
concept into final form, and (2) a particular new product or process outcome. An innovation 
may have various degrees of newness, from very little to highly discontinuous, but the 
innovation must include at least some degree of newness to the market and not just to the firm 
(Crawford and Di Benedetto 2000). 
 
2.1.2 Radical and Incremental Product Innovation 
 According to Leifer and colleagues (2000), it is very important to understand radical 
innovation because it transforms the relationship between customers and suppliers, 
restructures marketplace economics, displaces current products, and often creates entirely new 
product categories. It may provide a platform for the long-term growth that corporate leaders 
desperately seek. Radical innovation concerns the development of new business or product 
lines that are based on new ideas, technologies, or substantial cost reductions. Therefore, it 
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 requires exploration competencies (Leifer et al. 2000). Incremental innovation usually 
emphasizes cost or feature improvements in existing products or services, and it requires 
competencies in the exploitation of existing knowledge. 
Gersick (1991) applies the concept of punctuated equilibrium to explain the balancing 
process of radical and incremental innovation. Punctuated equilibrium is an alternation 
between long periods in which stable infrastructures permit only incremental adaptations and 
brief periods of revolutionary upheaval. In Gersick’s study, most organizational 
transformations were accomplished by means of rapid and discontinuous change over most or 
all domains of organizational activity. Small changes in strategies, structures, and power 
distributions did not accumulate to produce fundamental transformations. Therefore, it 
appears that firms evolve through relatively long periods of stability or equilibrium in their 
basic patterns of activity but relatively short periods of fundamental or revolutionary change 
punctuate this activity (Romanelli and Tushman 1994). 
Scholars generally consider radical innovations engines of economic growth (Sorescu, 
Chandy, and Prabhu 2003). Many researchers and practitioners are interested in why some 
firms are more successful at introducing radical product innovations than others. Chandy and 
Tellis (1998) identify a firm’s willingness to cannibalize as the key variable for differentiating 
firms with and without strong radical products. Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu (2003) collect 
information from the pharmaceutical industry to study the sources and consequences of 
radical innovation. Their results indicate that most radical innovations come from a minority 
of firms. Firms with higher per-product levels of marketing and technology support obtain 
much greater financial rewards from their radical innovations than do other firms. Firms with 
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 greater depth and breadth in their product portfolio also gain more from their radical 
innovations. 
Song and Montoya-Weiss (1998) examine whether the development of really new 
products requires a different approach from that of the development of incremental new 
products. Their empirical study suggests that strategic planning, market analysis, technical 
development, and product commercialization are key determinants of new product success for 
both really new products and incremental products. However, strategic planning and business- 
and market-opportunity analysis activities play contrasting roles for the two types of products. 
Proficiency in business and market opportunities analysis may be negatively related for really 
new products, but it can increase the profitability of incremental products. Conversely, 
improving the proficiency of strategic planning activities is positively related to the 
profitability of really new products but negatively related to that of incremental products. 
Overall, in this study, really new products surpass incremental products in meeting profit 
objectives. 
 O’Connor (1998) examines whether customer input plays the same key role in every 
successful NPD project. Breakthrough new products require firms to visualize the market and 
build and create demand for the product, whereas incremental new products require firms to 
listen to the market and effectively and efficiently address existing demand. Since a radical 
innovation creates a line of business that is new not only for the firm but also for the 
marketplace, customers are highly likely to be unable to describe their requirements for a 
product that opens up entirely new markets and applications. O’Connor (1998) therefore 
suggests that internal data and informal networks of people throughout relevant business units 
provide the means for learning about the hurdles that the innovation faces and the markets that 
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 are unfamiliar to the development group. Offering the product to the most familiar market and 
using a strategic ally who is familiar with the market as an intermediary between the project 
team and the marketplace can reduce market uncertainty. 
 Booz Allen Hamilton (1982) examines new product introductions to find that only a 
small percentage of all new products are “new-to-to-the-world products.” To keep the balance 
between incremental and breakthrough innovation, as well as between short- and long-term 
innovation, Booz Allen Hamilton argues that organizations should include breakthrough 
innovation as one of the objectives of NPD. They also should ensure that the organizational 
architecture—which includes the process, culture, structure, people, resources, technology, 
and incentives for NPD—is capable of developing breakthrough innovations. In order to 
understand the determinants of radical innovation, I review knowledge about the determinants 
of general new product success in the following section. 
 To summarize the literature, in this dissertation, I consider that radical new products 
are much more creative than incremental new products. But incremental NPD is much more 
efficient than radical NPD because it takes less time, fewer resources, and less risk to develop 
them. 
 
2.1.3 Determinants of New Product Success 
 Because of the importance of new product innovation to firm performance, there have 
been many studies that focus on the determinants of new product performance (NPP). 
Montoya-Weiss and Calantone (1994) and Henard and Szymanski (2001) conducted two 
important meta-analyses that synthesize the results of the numerous empirical studies of the 
determinants of NPP. 
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 Montoya-Weiss and Calantone (1994) review 47 new product studies and developed 
quantitative comparisons of their results. They suggest 18 factors that capture the essence of 
research on the determinants of NPP in four major categories: (1) new product strategy, (2) 
market environment, (3) product-development process execution, and (4) the organization. 
New product strategic factors include product advantage, market synergy, strategy, and 
company resources, where product advantage is the product’s superiority with respect to 
quality, cost–benefit ratio, or function over competitors’ products. Technological synergy 
occurs when engineering resources required by new product projects are available in the firm. 
Market synergy refers to the marketing skills and resources required by the new product 
compared with the firm’s existing skills and resources in sales, customer service, marketing 
research, and advertising and promotions. Strategy refers to the strategic motivation for the 
project development, such as defensive, reactive, proactive, or imitative. Company resources 
indicate compatibility of the firm’s resource base with the project requirements, such as 
capital, manufacturing, and workforce requirements. 
Market environment factors include market potential, market competitiveness, and 
environment, where market potential is the size and growth of the market, market 
competitiveness is the intensity of competition in the marketplace, and environment is risk or 
uncertainty and the regulatory environment. 
Product-development process factors include the following eight new product process 
activities: (1) protocol; (2) proficiency of predevelopment, market-related, and technological 
activities; (3) top management support; (4) control and skills; (5) speed to market; (6) cost; 
and (7) financial analysis. Proficiency of technical activities is the proficiency of product 
development, in-house testing of the product or prototype, production start-up, and the 
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 obtaining of necessary technology. Proficiency of marketing activities is the proficiency of 
marketing research, customer tests of prototypes and samples, test markets, service, 
advertising, distribution, and market launch. Proficiency of predevelopment activities is the 
efficiency with which the firm performs preliminary market and technical assessment, market 
study, market research, initial screening, and preliminary business analysis. 
Organizational factors include internal and external communication and other 
organizational structure factors. Internal and external communication is the coordination and 
cooperation within the firm and between firms. Organizational structure factors include 
measures of organizational climate, size, centralization, reward structure, and job design. 
In summary, Montoya-Weiss and Calantone’s (1994) meta-analysis suggests that new 
product strategy, market environment, product-development process execution, and 
organizational factors are significant for new product success. 
 Seven years later, Henard and Szymanski (2001) conducted another meta-analysis of 
new product management. They identify 24 variables in four different categories: (1) product, 
(2) strategy, (3) process, and (4) marketplace. Product characteristics are the elements 
pertaining to the products and services, including product advantage (i.e., the superiority 
and/or differentiation of the product over competitive offerings), whether the product meets 
customer needs (i.e., extent to which the product satisfies customers’ desires or needs), 
product price (i.e., perceived performance congruency), product technological sophistication 
(i.e., high-tech or low-tech), and product innovativeness (i.e., perceived newness, originality, 
uniqueness, or radicalness of the product). 
 Firm strategy characteristics are a firm’s planned actions that can potentially provide 
competitive advantage in the marketplace separate from any factors associated with the NPD 
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 process. These characteristics include marketing synergy (congruency between the existing 
marketing skills of the firm and the marketing skills needed to execute a new product 
initiative successfully), technological synergy (congruency between the existing technological 
skills of the firm and the technological skills needed to execute a new product initiative 
successfully), order of entry (timing of marketplace entry for a product or service), dedicated 
human resources (focused commitment of personnel resources to a new product initiative), 
and dedicated research and development (R&D) resources (focused commitment of R&D 
resources to a new product initiative) 
 Firm process characteristics refer to the elements associated with the NPD process and 
its execution in a new product initiative. They include structured approach (employment of 
formalized product-development procedures), predevelopment task proficiency (execution of 
prelaunch activities, e.g., idea generation and screening, market research, and financial 
analyses), marketing task proficiency (conduct in marketing activities), technological 
proficiency (use of technology), launch proficiency (launch of product or service), reduced 
cycle time (i.e., in concept-to-introduction time line), market orientation (degree of orientation 
to internal, competitor, and customer environments), customer input (incorporation of 
customer specifications), cross-functional integration (degree of multiple-department 
participation), cross-functional communication (level of communication among departments), 
senior management support (degree of senior management support). 
 Marketplace characteristics pertain to target-market elements in a new product 
introduction, including likelihood of competitive response, competitive response intensity and 
turbulence, and market potential (i.e., anticipated growth in customers and/or customer 
demand). 
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  In summary, Henard and Szymanski’s (2001) meta-analysis suggests that product, 
strategy, process, and marketplace are the significant factors that impact NPP. 
Although these two meta-analyses provide good pictures of the determinants of new 
product success, they do not differentiate radical new product success from incremental new 
product success. Most of the determinants are suitable for incremental new product success 
and emphasize the efficiency aspect of NPP rather than the effectiveness or creativeness 
aspect, which is important for radical new product success. 
 
2.1.4 Research Setting 
 In this dissertation, I argue that some firms’ process characteristics, such as MO, may 
lead to rigidity or inertia. This rigidity or inertia may enhance incremental NPD and NPD 
efficiency, but it may block radical NPD and decrease new product creativity. For this study, I 
have selected the impact of market orientation (MO) on new product innovation. In addition, I 
will suggest two important variables in firm characteristics that work against rigidity or 
inertia: (1) entrepreneurial orientation and (2) network learning. 
 In the following section, I review the literature on MO and illustrate in detail the 
relationship between MO and new product innovation. 
 
2.2 Literature Review on Market Orientation 
 Market orientation has been an important Marketing Science Institute research area for 
more than ten years (Noble, Sinha, and Kumar 2002). It is one of the most important topics 
for research focusing on organizational-level phenomena that affect marketing strategy and 
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 management (Varadarajan and Jayachandran 1999). Academicians and practitioners consider 
MO the very heart of modern marketing management and strategy (Narver and Slater 1990). 
Previous researchers have studied market orientation from many different perspectives 
(Deshpandé and Farley 1999) and in three distinct research streams. The first stream focuses 
on definitions of the MO construct and its measurement (Bigne, Kuster, and Toran 2003; 
Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993; Harris 2002). The second research stream investigates 
the relationship between MO and business performance (Grewal, Comer, and Mehta 2001; 
Noble, Sinha, and Kumar 2002) Although some researchers have demonstrated that MO 
significantly affects new product success and firm performance (Atuahene-Gima 1995; 
Cooper 1994; Pelham and Wilson 1996; Slater and Narver 1994), other studies do not support 
this relationship (Appiah-Adu and Ranchhod 1998; Greenley 1995). The third research stream 
pertains to the implementation or configuration of MO in complex management practices 
(Jaworski and Kohli 1993). In the following sections, I review the literature from each stream. 
 
2.2.1 Definition and Measurement of Market Orientation 
 In this section, I review the first research stream, which defines and measures MO. 
Studies that define MO include those of Day (1990, 1994); Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 
(1993); Kohli and Jaworski (1990); Narver and Slater (1990); Siguaw, Brown, and Widing 
(1994); and Wrenn (1997). Studies concerning MO measurement include those of Bigne, 
Kuster, and Toran (2003); Deng and Dart (1994); Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster (1993); 
Deshpandé and Farley (1998); Gray, Matear, Boshoff, and Matheson (1998); Harris (2002); 
Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar (1993); Narver and Slater (1990); Siguaw and Diamantopoulos 
(1995); and Wrenn (1997). 
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 In the literature, MO has been defined from three perspectives: (1) organizational 
culture (Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993; Homburg and Pflesser 2000; Narver and 
Slater 1990), (2) organizational behavior (Kohli and Jaworski 1990), and (3) system based. 
After several years of debate on MO, only two perspectives are widely adopted in the market 
strategy literature. 
The first is Narver and Slater’s (1990) cultural perspective. They define MO as “the 
organization culture that most effectively and efficiently creates the necessary behaviors for 
the creation of superior value for buyers and, thus, continuous superior performance for the 
business” (p. 21). They conceptualize MO in terms of three dimensions: (1) customer 
orientation, (2) competitor orientation, and (3) interfunctional coordination. Customer 
orientation means that the firms understand their buyers in order to create superior value for 
them continuously. Competitor orientation is firms’ understanding of the short-term strengths 
and weaknesses and long-term capabilities and strategies of both the key current and the key 
potential competitors. Interfunctional coordination is the coordinated use of company 
resources to create superior value for target customers. Long-term focus is related to profits 
and implementation of each of three behavioral components from a long-term perspective in 
order to achieve long-term survival. Profitability is the overriding objective of MO. 
The second is Kohli and Jaworski’s (1990) behavioral perspective. They define MO as 
“the organization-wide generation of market intelligence pertaining to current and future 
customer needs, dissemination of the intelligence across departments, and organization-wide 
responsiveness to it” (p. 6). This definition reflects three components of marketing information 
processing: (1) marketing intelligence generation, (2) dissemination, and (3) responsiveness in 
a learning organization. Intelligence generation includes an analysis of exogenous factors that 
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 influence those needs and preferences and the changing needs of customers throughout the 
whole organization. Intelligence dissemination is the communication or dissemination of 
market information to relevant departments and individuals in the organization. 
Responsiveness is the action taken in response to market intelligence that is generated and 
disseminated. 
Kohli and Jaworski’s (1990) definition is related to that of Narver and Slater (1990). 
An organization with customer orientation and competitor orientation is involved in all of the 
activities of acquiring information about buyers and competitors in the target market and 
disseminating it throughout the business (Narver and Slater 1990). Moreover, the organization 
must involve the business’s coordinated efforts beyond the marketing department in order to 
create superior value for buyers (Narver and Slater 1990). Market orientation is a system of 
processing marketing information that pertains to customers and competitors through 
coordinated efforts across different functional departments in the firm (Jaworski and Kohli 
1993; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Sinkula 1994). Therefore, Narver and Slater’s (1990) 
behavioral conceptualization is consistent with the propositions of Kohli and Jaworski (1990). 
We should distinguish MO from other similar concepts, such as customer 
orientation—or the set of beliefs that, in order to develop a long-term profitable enterprise, the 
customer’s interest comes first, without excluding those of all other stakeholders, such as 
owners, managers, and employees (Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster 1993); marketing 
orientation, or the implementation of the marketing concept (McCarthy and Perreault 1990); 
and the marketing concept, or customer philosophy, goal attainment, and integration of effort 
(Houston 1986). 
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 In summary, there are two definitions that introduce the concept of MO from different 
perspectives. Kohli and Jaworski (1990) emphasize the process of implementing the concept, 
and Narver and Slater (1990) focus on behavior. Both definitions are very useful in studying 
MO from different angles. In this dissertation, I adopt the definition of Narver and Slater 
(1990) to study MO because most extant empirical studies of MO and innovation (Han, Kim, 
and Srivastava 1998; Im and Workman 2004; Lukas and Ferrell 2000) have used this 
conceptualization and its associated operationalization. Therefore, to be able to compare and 
contrast my results with previous findings, I also have decided to use Narver and Slater’s 
(1990) definition. 
After the debate concerning the definition of MO, marketing researchers devoted 
considerable attention to the development of a valid and reliable measurement scale for MO. 
Examples of scales that measure MO include those of Narver and Slater (1990); Kohli, 
Jaworski, and Kumar (1993); Wrenn (1997); and Deshpandé and Farley (1998). Narver and 
Slater (1990) and Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar (1993) initiated the research effort in this 
research stream. 
Narver and Slater (1990) surveyed 140 strategic business units (SBUs) across 
commodity businesses, noncommodity businesses, and businesses within a single corporation. 
According to their analysis of MO, three behavioral components (customer orientation, 
competitor orientation, and interfunctional coordination) and two decision criteria (long-term 
focus and profitability) form a one-dimensional construct. They examined face validity, 
reliability analysis, and construct validity (including convergent validity, discriminant 
validity, and concurrent validity) to find results that indicate support for the construct 
reliability and validity of the three components, but they did not find support for the construct 
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 reliability of long-term orientation and profit objective. Using nonlinear factor analysis of 
matched samples of senior marketing and nonmarketing executives from 222 SBUs, Kohli, 
Jaworski, and Kumar (1993) developed a freestanding 20-item scale. 
More empirical efforts have emerged in the literature in order to test the relationship 
between the scales of Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Narver and Slater (1990). Deshpandé, 
Farley, and Webster’s (1993) study of 138 Japanese executives developed a customer 
orientation scale based on extensive qualitative personal interviewing; a detailed survey of 
available literature, including the work of Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Narver and Slater 
(1990); and pretesting in a small sample of firms. The reliability coefficients was greater than 
.65. 
In order to assess the robustness and generalizability of the existing work on MO, 
Deshpandé and Farley (1998) used a sample of 82 managers in 27 European and U.S. 
companies in their integrative, cross-national study, in which they synthesized and retested 
measurements of Narver and Slater (1990), Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar (1993), and 
Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster. (1993). The results of reliability, independent validity 
check, predictive validity, and discriminant validity tests indicated that all three scales are 
reliable and valid. In addition, the scales generalize well internationally in terms of reliability 
and prediction of performance. Furthermore, they tested the interrelationship of all three 
scales using correlation of the scales and within-firm interrater scale reliabilities. The results 
showed great confidence in the correlations from multiple respondents in various companies, 
and the three scales are interchangeable in practice. 
In summary, Narver and Slater (1990) and Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar (1993) have 
provided valid measures for MO. The reliable and valid MO measurements from their studies 
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 led to the second research stream and provided the solid foundation for many further issues. 
In the following section, I review literature relating to assessment of both the antecedents and 
the consequences of MO. 
 
2.2.2 Antecedents and Consequences of Market Orientation 
 The second research stream in MO is the debate about the relationship between MO 
and business performance. 
Following the development of comprehensive definitions and valid and reliable 
operationalizations of MO, much research attention has focused on examining the 
antecedents and consequences of MO (for a review of MO research, see Jaworski and Kohli 
1996). Theoretical and empirical studies in the United States include those of Day and 
Wensley (1988); Kohli and Jaworski (1990); Narver and Slater (1990); Ruekert (1992); 
Deshpandé, Farley, and Webster (1993); Jaworski and Kohli (1993); Slater and Narver 
(1994); Pelham and Wilson (1996); and Pelham (1997a, b); Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker 
(1998); Baker and Sinkula (1999a); Steinman, Deshpandé, and Farley (2000); and Noble, 
Sinha, and Kumar (2002). 
International MO studies include those from continental Europe (Hooley et al. 2003; 
Pitt, Caruana, and Berthon 1996), the United Kingdom (Appiah-Adu 1997; Appiah-Adu and 
Ranchhod 1998; Greenley 1995), Australia (Atuahene-Gima 1995, 1996; Farrelly and Pascale 
2003; Pulendran, Speed, and Widing 2003), New Zealand (Gray et al. 1998; Matear et al. 
2002), the Netherlands (Langerak 2001), Taiwan (Chang and Chen 1998; Horng and Chen 
1998), Thailand (Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001), China and Hong Kong (Sin et al. 2003, 2005; 
Wei and Morgan 2004), and Saudi Arabia (Bhuian 1997). 
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 More recently, nonprofit organizations (Gainer and Padanyi 2002; Siu and Wilson 
1998; Vazquez, Alvarez, and Santos 2002), public organizations (Cervera, Molla, and 
Sanchez 2001), and political parties (Lees-Marshment 2001; O’Cass 2001a, b) have also been 
a focus of MO research. 
The existing empirical evidence regarding the effects of MO on performance is mixed 
(see table 2.1). Some studies have linked MO to favorable performance (e.g., Appiah-Adu 
1997; Atuahene-Gima 1995, 1996; Egeren and O’Conner 1998; Homburg and Pflesser 2000; 
Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Narver and Slater 1990; Pitt, Caruana, and Berthon 1996; Slater 
and Narver 1994). Some studies have linked MO to unfavorable performance (e.g., Bhuian 
1997; Gray et al. 1998; Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001). Still others have found that MO has no 
effect on firm performance (e.g., Greenley 1995; Han, Kim, and Sirvastava 1998; Langerak, 
Hultink, and Robben 2004; Perry and Shao 2002; Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker 1998). The 
relationship between MO and performance is surprisingly more complex than has been 
previously thought. In the following section, I briefly review the most influential studies about 
the relationship between MO and firm performance from Journal of Marketing and Journal of 
Marketing Research. 
Narver and Slater (1990) use a sample of 140 business units (both commodity and 
noncommodity) to study the MO–firm performance relationship. They use subjective return 
on assets (ROA) to measure firm performance, and the results show a substantial positive 
effect of MO on the profitability of both types of business. 
Kohli and Jaworski (1993) use two national samples to study the antecedents and 
consequences. Their findings suggest that MO is related to top management’s emphasis on the 
orientation, risk aversion of top managers, interdepartmental conflict and connectedness, 
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 centralization, and reward system orientation. It is also positively related to organizational 
commitment, esprit de corps, and overall business subjective performance, but it is not 
positively related to objective market share. 
Slater and Narver (1994) investigate the moderating role of the competitive 
environment in the MO–firm performance relationship. Although there is very limited support 
for the moderator role of environment, MO is still positively related to subjective ROA, sales 
growth, and new product success. Therefore, they suggest that it is better for companies to 
invest in becoming market oriented while the environment is somewhat munificent than to 
wait until the environment has grown hostile, if it is not pertinent. 
Homburg and Pflesser (2000) develop a multilayer scale to measure the different 
layers of market-oriented organizational culture. They also analyze relationships among the 
different components of market-oriented culture. The results show a positive effect of market-
oriented culture on subjective market performance and a stronger relationship in highly 
dynamic markets. 
Matsuno and Mentzer (2000) empirically examine the role of business types as a 
moderator in the MO–firm performance relationship. The findings support the moderating 
effect of business strategy types on the strength of the relationship between MO and business 
performance. They measure business performance by subjective market-share growth, relative 
sales growth, new product sales as a percentage of total sales, and return on investment (ROI). 
Grewal and Tansuhaj (2001) investigate the role of MO and strategic flexibility in 
helping Thai firms manage the Asian economic crises. The results show that after crisis, MO 
has an adverse effect on firm performance, which they measure by subjective satisfaction with 
the goals of ROI, sales, profits, and growth. Demand and technological uncertainty moderate 
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 the MO–performance relationship. In contrast, strategic flexibility has a positive influence on 
firm performance after a crisis, which is also moderated by environmental variables, including 
competitive intensity, demand, and technological uncertainty. Therefore, MO and strategic 
flexibility complement each other in their ability to help firms manage various environmental 
conditions. 
Matsuno, Mentzer, and Özsomer (2002) study the direct and indirect structural 
influences of entrepreneurial proclivity and MO on business performance. The findings 
indicate that entrepreneurial proclivity has not only a positive, direct relationship on MO but 
also an indirect, positive effect on MO by reducing departmentalization. Entrepreneurial 
proclivity’s performance influence is positive when mediated by MO but is negative or 
nonsignificant when unmediated by MO. 
Noble, Sinha, and Kumar (2002) explore the relative performance effects of MO by 
using a longitudinal approach based on letters to shareholders in corporate annual reports. At 
the same time, the relative effects of alternative strategic orientations, such as production and 
selling orientation, reflect different managerial priorities for the firm. The findings suggest 
that competition orientation and national brand focus are positively related to objective ROA 
and return on sales (ROS). 
The unclear relationship between MO and performance has lead many scholars to 
search for potential mediators and moderators in order to explain the unstable relationship. 
This search has brought about the third MO research stream. 
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 2.2.3 Implementation of Market Orientation 
 The third research stream addresses how to implement or configure MO in complex 
management practices. Theoretically, firms should implement MO to fit with the external and 
internal environments in order to achieve superior firm performance. Fit between the 
marketing strategy and external environment means that firms should design the marketing 
strategy or a set of marketing activities to match with the general, industry, and firm 
environments (e.g., Appiah-Adu 1997; Cadogan, Diamantopoulos, and Siguaw 2002; 
Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Pelham 1997b; Perry and Shao 2002). Fit between MO and internal 
environment means that marketing strategy and market activities should be congruent with 
business strategy (e.g., Mavondo 1999); corporate strategy type (Matsuno and Mentzer 2000; 
Noble, Sinha, and Kumar 2002); organizational strategy (Ruekert 1992); strategy flexibility 
(Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001); strategy formulation (Arnould and Wallendorf 1994); marketing 
strategy process (Tadepalli and Avila 1999); implementation strategies (Cravens 1998); 
market and firm structure (Pelham and Wilson 1996); and functional strategies, such as 
human resource management strategy (Harris and Ogbonna 2001), technology strategy, 
administration strategy, manufacture strategy, and distribution channel (Baker, Simpson, and 
Siguaw 1999; Langerak 2001; Siguaw, Simpson, and Baker 1998) (see table 2.2). 
In the third research stream, the most recent influential research is from the innovation 
perspective (Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001; Han, Kim, and Sirvastava 1998; Hurley and Hult 
1998) and the learning perspective (Baker and Sinkula 1999a, b; Baker and Sinkula 2002; 
Celuch, Kasouf, and Peruvemba 2002; Farrell 2000; Farrell and Oczkowski 2002; Slater and 
Narver 1995). In the following section, I review the literature about MO and new product 
innovation. 
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2.2.4 The Relationship Between Market Orientation and New Product 
Innovation 
 Among the literature on the MO–performance relationship, studies typically link MO 
with either new product success (e.g., Atuahene-Gima 1995, 1996; Im and Workman 2004; 
Lukas and Ferrell 2000) or firm performance (e.g., Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001; Homburg and 
Pflesser 2000; Jaworski and Kohli 1993). Although some studies examine the links between 
MO and new product success and between MO and firm performance at the same time (e.g., 
Appiah-Adu 1997; Appiah-Adu and Ranchhod 1998; Greenley 1995; Pelham and Wilson 
1996; Slater and Narver 1994), few studies specify the relationship between new product 
success and firm performance. The relationship among MO, new product success, and firm 
performance may be explained by the source–position–performance framework of Day and 
Wensley (1988). Some studies suggest that MO may lead to business position advantage 
through new product success, and in turn new product success may positively influence firms’ 
sales growth and market share (Langerak, Hultink, and Robben 2004; Pelham and Wilson 1996). 
Several other studies also provide evidence from the innovation perspective, arguing that 
innovation may link MO with firm performance as a mediator (Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998; 
Matear et al. 2002; Noble, Sinha, and Kumar 2002). If new product success is the key mediator 
for providing a positional advantage to link MO with firm performance, it is very important to 
first understand the relationship between MO and new product success. 
Although it has been suggested that MO is a mechanism for providing new ideas and 
motivation to respond to the environment (Hurley and Hult 1998), the empirical results about 
the MO–new product innovation relationship are mixed (see tables 2.1 and 2.3). Some studies 
Table 2. 1 Summary of Empirical Studies on the Relationship Between MO and Business Performance 
 
Dependent Variable 
Findings of MO on Performance 
Empirical 
Study 
Independent Variables 
Findings of 
MO on 
Attitude  
Subjective Measures Objective 
Measures 
Narver and 
Slater (1990), 
U.S. 
MO→ firm performance  ROA: 
Commodity business: ROA (U-
Shape relationship), 
Noncommodity business: ROA (+) 
 
Jaworski and 
Kohli (1993), 
U.S. 
Antecedents → MO, MO X moderators → 
consequences → firm performance 
MO antecedents: Top management emphasis, top 
management risk aversion, interdepartmental conflict, 
interdepartmental connectedness, formalization, 
centralization, departmentalization, reward system 
orientation 
MO consequences: product quality, competitive 
intensity, buyer power, supplier power, entry barriers, 
substitutes 
Moderators: market turbulence (0), competitive 
intensity (0), and technological turbulence (0) 
Organizational 
commitment (+) 
 
Esprit de corps 
(+) 
Overall performance (+): 2 items Market share 
(0) 
Siguaw, Brown, 
and Widing 
(1994), U.S. 
MO, customer orientation, difference between MO and 
customer orientation → role conflict, role ambiguity → 
job satisfaction and organizational commitment 
Sales behavior:  
customer 
orientation (+), 
role conflict (–), 
role ambiguity 
(–), job 
satisfaction (–), 
organizational 
commitment (–) 
  
Slater and 
Narver (1994), 
U.S. 
MO, MO × moderators → firm performance 
Emphasis moderators: market growth, buyer power, 
competitor concentration, competitor hostility 
Strength moderators: market turbulence (– on ROA), 
technological turbulence (– on new product success), 
competitive hostility, market growth (– on sales growth) 
 ROA (+)  
 
Sales growth (+) 
 
New product success (+) 
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Atuahene-Gima 
(1995), Australia 
MO, MO × moderators → NPD process activities, 
New product performance 
Moderators: degree of product newness to customers 
and the firm (–), intensity of market competition 
(+),hostility of industry environment (+),stage of 
product life cycle at which new product was 
introduced (–) 
 NPD activities (+): proficiency of 
product development activity, 
proficiency of launch activity, 
service quality, product advantage, 
marketing synergy and teamwork;  
NPP: Market level (+), project 
level (+) 
 
Greenley (1995), 
U.K. 
Antecedents →MO, MO × moderators → firm 
performance 
Antecedents: Relative size, relative cost, ease of 
market entry, customer power, competitor 
concentration, competitor hostility  
Moderators: market turbulence (– on ROI), market 
growth (0), technological change (– on new product 
success rate), 
   ROI (0)
 
New product success rate (0)  
 
Sales growth (0) 
 
Atuahene-Gima 
(1996), Australia 
MO→ innovation consequences → firm performance 
Consequences: product newness to customers (–), 
product newness to firm (0), product advantage (+), 
innovation-marketing fit (+), innovation-technology fit 
(0), teamwork (+) 
 Market success of product 
innovation: 4 items (0) 
 
Project impact performance: 3 
items (+) 
 
Pelham and Wilson 
(1996), U.S. 
Antecedents → MO→ business position → 
profitability 
Antecedents: strategy: Innovation /differentiation 
strategy, low-cost strategy; firm structure: 
decentralization, formalization, coordination, product 
differentiation, control systems; market 
environment: market dynamism, competitive 
intensity. 
 Business position variables:  
Relative product quality: 1 item 
(+) 
New product success: 2 items (+) 
Growth/share: 3 items (0), 
Profitability: 5 items (+). 
 
Pitt, Caruana, and 
Berthon (1996), 
Europe 
MO→ business performance  Overall impression (+) 
Business performance (+) 
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Appiah-Adu 
(1997), U.K. 
MO→ business performance 
Moderators: market turbulence (– on ROI), 
technological turbulence (0), competitive intensity (– on 
new product success rate), market growth (– on sales 
growth) 
Control variables: relative product quality, relative size, 
relative operating cost 
 New product success (+) 
Sales growth (+) 
ROI (+) 
 
Bhuian (1997), 
Saudi Arabia 
MO→ business performance   Three objective 
performances: 
ROA (–), ROE 
(–), sales per 
employee (–) 
Appiah-Adu and 
Ranchhod (1998), 
U.K. 
MO→ business performance 
Control variables: relative size, relative cost, relative 
product/service quality, time of market entry, competitor 
concentration, market turbulence, competitive intensity, 
technological turbulence 
 New product success (0) 
Market share (+) 
Profit margins (+) 
Overall performance (+) 
 
Chang and Chen 
(1998), Taiwan 
MO→ service quality → business performance 
Mediator: service quality 
Control variables: conglomerate status, respondent 
seniority, market size, market share, sales volume 
  Relative business
profitability (+) 
 
Egeren and 
O’Connor (1998), 
U.S. 
Antecedents →MO→ business performance 
Antecedents: Cohesiveness (+), communications (-), 
munificence (+), dynamism (+), heterogeneity (–) 
 Organizational performance
(+) 
 Mentioned, but 
not clear what it 
is. 
Gray et al. (1998), 
New Zealand 
MO → company performance 
Control variables: production orientation, sales 
orientation, marketing orientation, societal orientation 
 Brand awareness (+) 
Customer satisfaction (+) 
Loyalty (+) 
ROI (–) 
Han, Kim, and 
Sirvastava (1998), 
U.S. 
MO, MO × moderators → innovation → organizational 
performance 
Mediator: innovation (wrong conclusion, should be 0) 
Moderators: market turbulence (partial + on innovation), 
technological turbulence (+ on innovation) 
   Innovation (+)
 
Relative growth (0) 
Profitability (0) 
Net income 
growth (0) 
ROA (0) 
Horng and Chen 
(1998), Taiwan 
MO→ business performance 
Antecedents: Top management variables: marketing 
experience/education, leadership style, emphasis on 
market orientation, organizational system variables: 
reward system, management’s capability, training 
Organizationa
l commitment 
(+), 
Esprit Corps 
(+) 
Overall performance (+)  
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Siguaw, 
Simpson, and 
Baker (1998), 
U.S. 
Supplier’s MO, distributor’s MO → distributor 
trust, relationship cooperative norms, distributor 
commitment → distributor satisfaction with 
financial performance 
Distributor trust 
(supplier: 0, 
distributor: +), 
relationship 
cooperative norms 
(supplier: 0, 
distributor: +), 
distributor 
commitment 
(supplier: +, 
distributor: 0) 
Performance (0): Cash flow, return on 
shareholder equity, gross profit margin, 
net profit margin, net profit from 
operations, profits from operations, 
profits to sales ratio, ROI, ability to fund 
business growth from profits 
 
Baker and 
Sinkula 
(1999a), U.S. 
MO, learning orientation → product innovation → 
organizational performance 
 Product innovation (new product 
success): (+) 
Organizational performance: 3 items (0) 
 
 
Baker and 
Sinkula 
(1999b), U.S. 
MO, learning orientation, MO × learning 
orientation → organizational performance 
Control variables: market growth, supplier power, 
seller concentration, ease of entry, technological 
change, competitive intensity, market dynamism, 
government regulation 
Moderator: learning orientation (+ on change in 
relative market share, – on new product success, 0 
overall performance) 
 Organizational performance: change in 
relative market share: 1 item (+), new 
product success: 5 items (+), overall 
performance: 2 items (+) 
 
Homburg and 
Pflesser 
(2000), U.S. 
MO, MO × market dynamism → market 
performance → financial performance 
Moderator: market dynamism (+) 
 Market performance: 3 items (+) 
 
 
Lukas and 
Ferrell (2000), 
U.S. 
MO → product innovation  Product innovation: Line extensions (0 
on customer orientation, – on competitor 
orientation, + on interfunctional 
coordination) me-too product (– on 
customer orientation, + on competitor 
orientation, – on interfunctional 
coordination), new-to-the-world 
products (+ on customer orientation, – 
on competitor orientation, 0 on 
interfunctional coordination). 
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Matsuno and 
Mentzer 
(2000), U.S. 
MO, MO × moderators → business performance 
Moderator: business strategy type (+): 
prospectors, analyzers, reactors  
 Business performance: market share growth, 
relative sales growth, new product sales as a 
percentage of total sales, ROI 
 
Grewal and 
Tansuhaj 
(2001), 
Thailand 
MO, strategic flexibility (SF), MO × moderators, 
SF × moderators → performance after crisis 
Moderators: competitive dynamism (– for MO, + 
for SF), demand uncertainty (+ for MO, – for SF), 
technological uncertainty (– for MO, – for SF) 
 Performance (–): Satisfaction with ROI goals, 
sales goals, profit goals, and growth goals.  
 
Hult and 
Ketchen 
(2001), U.S. 
MO, entrepreneurship, innovativeness, 
organizational learning → positional advantage → 
performance 
   5-year average
change in ROI 
(+), 5-year 
percentage 
change in 
income (+), 5-
year percentage 
change in stock 
(+) 
Kahn (2001), 
U.S. 
MO, interdepartmental integration → Performance  Product development performance (+ marketing 
managers; 0 for manufacturing and R&D 
managers) 
Product management performance (+ for 
marketing and manufacturing managers, 0 for 
R&D managers) 
 
Langerak 
(2001), the 
Netherlands 
Self-reports downstream MO, customer reports 
downstream MO, self-reports upstream MO, 
supplier upstream MO → self-reports business 
performance 
Control variables: 27 items 
 Sales growth (+), profit (+), NPD success (+), 
ROI (+) 
 
Raju and 
Lonial (2001), 
U.S. 
Quality context → MO → performance  Performance (+): Financial performance: new 
profits, ROI, cash flow from operations, ROA, 
profit-to-revenue ratio; Market/product 
development: new product/service 
development, investments in R&D aimed at new 
innovation, capacity to develop a unique 
competitive profile, market development; 
quality outcomes: mortality and morbidity rate, 
service quality as perceived by customers, cost 
per adjusted discharge, employee turnover 
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Gainer and 
Padanyi 
(2002), 
Canada 
MO activities → MO culture → growth in 
customer satisfaction, growth in reputation → 
growth in resources (+) 
 
 Nonprofit organizational effectiveness: 
Market-oriented culture (+), growth in customer 
satisfaction (+), growth in reputation (+), 
 
Matear et al. 
(2002), 
New Zealand 
MO → innovation → performance 
Or: MO × innovation (0) → performance 
 Innovation: (+) 
Performance: 2 items: financial performance 
(+), market performance (+) 
 
Matsuno, 
Mentzer, and 
Özsomer 
(2002), U.S. 
Entrepreneurial proclivity → organizational 
structure → MO → business performance 
Antecedents: Entrepreneurial proclivity 
 Market share (+), percentage of new product 
sales to total sales (+), ROI (+) 
 
Noble, Sinha, 
and Kumar 
(2002), U.S. 
MO, strategic orientation → organizational 
learning, innovativeness → firm performance 
 
Mediators: organizational learning, innovativeness 
  ROA (+ only for 
competitor 
orientation 
dimension), ROS 
(+only for 
competitor 
orientation 
dimension) 
Perry and Shao 
(2002), U.S. 
MO, MO × moderators → market performance → 
financial performance 
Control variables: competitive dynamism, country 
economic group, traditional competition, specialty 
competition. 
Moderators: competitive dynamism (0), trading 
competition 
(+ on qualitative performance), specialty 
competition (0) 
  Qualitative performance (0)
 
Quantitative performance (0) 
 
Agarwal, 
Erramilli, and 
Dev (2003), 
U.S. 
MO → innovation → judgmental performance 
→ objective performance 
 
Mediators: innovation, judgmental performance 
  Innovation: (+)
Judgmental performance (+): service quality, 
customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction 
Objective 
performance (0 
direct, + 
indirect): 
Occupancy rate, 
gross operating 
profit, market 
share 
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Farrelly and 
Quester (2003), 
Australia 
Property MO → collaborative communication → property 
MO perceived by sponsor, sponsor MO → sponsor trust 
→ sponsor commitment 
sponsor trust 
(+), sponsor 
commitment (+) 
  
Hooley et al. 
(2003), Central 
Europe 
Market life-cycle stage, changing customer requirements, 
technological change, degree of competition, strategic 
priorities business approach, marketing strategy variables 
(market targeting approach, service positioning, price 
positioning, strategy elements → MO → performance  
Customer 
satisfaction  
Performance (+): profit, sales volume, 
market share, ROI 
ROI (+) 
Krepapa et al. 
(2003), country 
not clear 
MO perceived by customer, gap of MO between service 
provider perception and customer perception → 
satisfaction 
Customer 
satisfaction (+ 
for 
MO_customer, 
– for MO_Gap) 
  
Pulendran, 
Speed, and 
Widing (2003), 
Australia 
Marketing planning =MP (comprehensiveness, rationality, 
politicality, interaction, formalization), MP × market 
turbulence (+), MP × technological turbulence (+), MP × 
competitive intensity (0) → MO → performance 
Mediator: MO 
 Performance: 5 items (+)  
Sin et al. 
(2003), China 
and Hong Kong 
Economic ideology → MO → performance   Overall performance: (+): sales 
growth, customer retention, ROI, 
market share 
 
Im and 
Workman 
(2004), U.S. 
MO → NP and MP creativity → NPP 
Mediator: NP and MP creativity 
 New product creativity (+): novelty 
and meaningfulness; Marketing 
program creativity (+): novelty and 
meaningfulness; NPP (0): market, 
financial, and overall assessment 
measures 
 
Langerak, 
Hultink, and 
Robben (2004), 
the Netherlands 
MO → product advantage, market testing, launch 
budgeting, launch strategy, launch tactics → NPP → firm 
performance 
 A second-order scale with 5 subscales 
(0): market level, financial, customer 
acceptance, product level, timing 
measures of NPD success. 
 
Zhou, Yim, and 
Tse (2005), 
China 
MO, technology orientation, EO → technology-based 
innovation, market-based innovation → firm performance, 
product performance 
Mediator: technology-based innovation, market-based 
innovation 
 Technology-based innovation (+), 
market-based innovation (–), 
innovations on firm performance (+), 
innovations on product performance 
(+) 
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Table 2. 2 Summary of Previous Literature on MO Implementation 
 
Topic     Article Name Content
Organization 
strategy 
Ruekert (1992) Individual attitudes toward jobs; broader organizational processes (e.g., recruiting, 
training, compensation) 
Business strategy Appiah-Adu and 
Blankson (1998) 
African study; a positive influence of SAP induces strategies on the MO level 
Strategic type  Lukas (1999) Differences in MO degree reveal a distinctive pattern of strategy 
Organization 
ability 
Day (1994) Organizational capabilities 
Accounting 
systems 
Goebel, Marshall 
and Locander 
(1998) 
U.S.; actively based costing is useful to marketers at various levels of decision 
making in market-oriented activities 
Innovation Atuahene-Gima
(1996); Hurley and 
Hult (1998) 
 MO–innovation 
Innovation   Han, Kim, and
Srivastava (1998); 
Mediating role of innovation in the MO–performance relationship 
Organizational 
learning  
Slater and Narver 
(1995); Hurley and 
Hult (1998); 
Morgan, Katsikeas, 
and Appiah-Adu 
(1998) 
 
Organization 
commitment 
Caruana, 
Ramaseshan, and 
Ewing (1999) 
Australian sample from public sector; the mediating role of organization 
commitment in the MO–performance relationship 
Marketing strategy 
process 
Tadepalli and 
Avila (1999) 
Conceptual paper; how marketing strategy is put together in an organizational 
environment 
Developing an MO 
culture 
Harris and 
Ogbonna (1999; 
2000) 
Five principal areas ignored or insufficiently addressed 
Creating an MO Narver, Slater, and 
Tietje (1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to develop 
or implement MO 
Barriers to develop 
MO 
Harris (1999) Conceptual paper; capabilities of employees, organizational structure and systems, 
people-led approach: belief, understanding and organizational members on MO, the 
moderating role of power and control 
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Corporate culture  Deshpandé and 
Farley (1999) 
Comparison of Indian and Japanese firms; MO, organization climate and cooperate 
culture are key determinants of organizational success 
Organization 
culture 
Appiah-Adu and 
Blankson (1998) 
African study; a positive influence of organization culture on the MO level 
Culture  
National culture Stan, Evans, and 
Cernusca (2000) 
While retailers are more collectivist than individualistic, they exhibit strong 
competitiveness. Managers with a strong customer orientation tend to be more 
collectivist and enjoy more growth and customer retention, while those with a 
strong competitor orientation tend to be more competitive and enjoy profit and 
leadership in the retailing community. 
Employee Jaworski and Kohli
(1993) 
 Employee commitment 
Employee 
Involvement 
Martin, Martin, and 
Grbac (1998) 
Interviews from Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy; employee involvement is a critical 
factor for effective implementation of MO in Croatia and Slovenia 
Sales force Siguaw, Brown, 
and Widing (1994); 
Menguc (1996) 
Sales force behavior 
Effects of MO to 
people in a firm 
 
Leadership Cravens et al. 
(1998) 
Becoming market-oriented, leveraging value opportunities, positioning with 
distinctive competencies, relationship strategy, organizational change 
Supplier, 
distributor, and 
channel 
Siguaw, Simpson, 
and Baker (1998) 
U.S.; supplier’s MO directly or indirectly affect distributor’s MO, trust, cooperative 
norms, commitment, and satisfaction with financial performance 
Supplier 
perceptions of 
reseller MO 
Baker, Simpson, 
and Siguaw (1999) 
(380 suppliers) Positive effects would indicate that a supplier that perceives its 
reseller as market-oriented is more likely to remain in a long-term relationship with 
that reseller 
Effects of MO on 
relationship 
market 
Customer–supplier 
relationship 
Steinman, 
Desphandé, and 
Farley (2000) 
Japanese and U.S. samples; the gap, which shows self-assessments of suppliers to 
be higher than those of customers, should be managed by training, reward, and 
performance programs 
The marketing 
function—the role 
of marketing 
Moorman and Rust 
(1999) 
The marketing function (including customer-product, customer-financial 
accountability, customer-service quality, connection knowledge and skills) 
contributes to perceptions of a firm’s financial performance, customer relationship 
performance, and NPP beyond that explained by its MO 
Philosophy and 
future direction 
Refine the notion 
of MO: market-
driven versus 
driving markets 
Jaworski, Kohli, 
and Sahay (2000) 
Market driven: a business orientation that is based on understanding and reacting to 
the preferences and behavior(s) of players within a given market structure. Driving 
markets: influencing the structure of the market and/or the behavior(s) of market 
players in a direction that enhances the competitive position of the business. 
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Table 2. 3 Summary of Empirical Studies on the Relationship Between MO and Innovation/NPP 
 
Dependent Variable 
Findings of MO on Performance 
Empirical Study Independent Variables 
Findings of 
MO on 
Attitude  
Subjective Measures Objective 
Measures 
Slater and Narver 
(1994), U.S. 
MO, MO × moderators → firm performance 
Emphasis moderators: market growth, buyer 
power, competitor concentration, competitor 
hostility 
Strength moderators: market turbulence (– on 
ROA), technological turbulence (– on new 
product success), competitive hostility, market 
growth (– on sales growth) 
 ROA (+)  
 
Sales growth (+) 
 
New product success (+) 
 
Atuahene-Gima 
(1995), Australia 
MO, MO × moderators → NPD process 
activities, NPP 
Moderators: degree of product newness to 
customers and firm (–),intensity of market 
competition (+) and hostility of industry 
environment (+),stage of product life cycle at 
which new product was introduced (–) 
 NPD activities (+): proficiency of product 
development activity, proficiency of launch 
activity, service quality, product advantage, 
marketing synergy and teamwork; 
NPP: market level (+), project level (+) 
 
Greenley (1995), 
U.K. 
Antecedents → MO, MO × moderators → 
firm performance 
Antecedents: relative size, relative cost, ease 
of market entry, customer power, competitor 
concentration, competitor hostility 
Moderators: market turbulence (– on ROI), 
market growth (0), technological change (– on 
new product success rate), 
   ROI (0)
 
New product success rate (0) 
 
Sales growth (0) 
 
Atuahene-Gima 
(1996), Australia 
MO→ consequences → firm performance 
Consequences: product newness to customers 
(–), product newness to firm (0), product 
advantage (+), innovation-marketing fit (+),
innovation-technology fit (0), teamwork (+)
 Market success of product innovation: 4 
items (0) 
 
Project impact performance: 3 items (+) 
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Pelham and Wilson 
(1996), U.S. 
Antecedents →MO→ business position → profitability 
Antecedents: strategy: innovation/differentiation 
strategy, low-cost strategy; firm structure: 
decentralization, formalization, coordination, product 
differentiation, control systems; market environment: 
market dynamism, competitive intensity 
 Business position variables: relative 
product quality: 1 item (+) 
New product success: 2 items (+) 
Growth/share: 3 items (0), 
Profitability: 5 items (+). 
 
Appiah-Adu 
(1997), U.K. 
MO→ business performance 
Moderators: Market turbulence (– on ROI), technological 
turbulence (0), competitive intensity 
(– on new product success rate), market growth (– on 
sales growth) 
Control variables: relative product quality, relative size, 
relative operating cost 
 New product success (+) 
Sales growth (+) 
ROI (+) 
 
Appiah-Adu and 
Ranchhod (1998), 
U.K. 
MO→ business performance 
Control variables: relative size, relative cost, relative 
product/service quality, time of market entry, competitor 
concentration, market turbulence, competitive intensity, 
technological turbulence 
 New product success (0) 
Market share (+) 
Profit margins (+) 
Overall performance (+) 
 
Han, Kim, and 
Srivastava (1998), 
U.S. 
MO, MO × moderators → innovation → organizational 
performance 
Mediator: innovation (wrong conclusion, should be 0) 
Moderators: market turbulence (partial + on innovation), 
technological turbulence (+ on innovation) 
   Innovation (+)
 
Relative growth (0) 
Profitability (0) 
 
Net 
income 
growth (0) 
ROA (0) 
Baker and Sinkula 
(1999a), U.S. 
MO, learning orientation → product innovation → 
organizational performance 
 Product innovation (new product 
success): (+) 
Organizational performance: 3 items (0) 
 
 
Baker and Sinkula 
(1999b), U.S. 
MO, learning orientation, MO × learning orientation → 
organizational performance 
Control variables: market growth, supplier power, seller 
concentration, ease of entry, technological change, 
competitive intensity, market dynamism, government 
regulation 
Moderator: learning orientation (+ on change in relative 
market share, – on new product success, 0 overall 
performance) 
 Organizational performance: change in 
relative market share: 1 item (+), new 
product success: 5 items (+), overall 
performance: 2 items (+) 
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Lukas and 
Ferrell (2000), 
U.S. 
MO → product innovation  Product innovation: Line extensions (0 on 
customer orientation, – on competitor 
orientation, + on interfunctional coordination) 
me-too product (– on customer orientation, + on 
competitor orientation, – on interfunctional 
coordination), new-to-the-world products 
(+ on customer orientation, – on competitor 
orientation, 0 on interfunctional coordination). 
 
Matsuno and 
Mentzer 
(2000), U.S. 
MO, MO × moderators → business 
performance 
Moderator: business strategy type 
(+): prospectors, analyzers, 
reactors  
 Business performance: market share growth, 
relative sales growth, new product sales as a 
percentage of total sales, ROI 
 
Hult and 
Ketchen 
(2001), U.S. 
MO, entrepreneurship, 
innovativeness, organizational 
learning → positional advantage 
→ performance 
    5-year average
change in ROI 
(+), 5-year 
percentage 
change in 
income (+), 5-
year percentage 
change in stock 
(+) 
Kahn (2001), 
U.S. 
MO, interdepartmental integration 
→ performance 
 Product development performance (+ marketing 
managers; 0 for manufacturing and R&D 
managers) 
Product management performance (+ for 
marketing and manufacturing managers, 0 for 
R&D managers) 
 
Langerak 
(2001), the 
Netherlands 
Self-reports downstream MO, 
customer reports downstream MO, 
self-reports upstream MO, supplier 
upstream MO → self-reports 
business performance 
Control variables: 27 items 
 Sales growth (+), profit (+), NPD success (+), 
ROI (+) 
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Raju and Lonial 
(2001), U.S. 
Quality context → MO → performance  Performance (+): Financial performance: 
new profits, ROI, cash flow from 
operations, ROA, profit-to revenue ratio; 
Market/product development: new 
product/service development, investments 
in R&D aimed at new innovation, capacity 
to develop a unique competitive profile, 
market development; quality outcomes: 
mortality and morbidity rate, service quality 
as perceived by customers, cost per adjusted 
discharge, employee turnover 
 
Matear et al. 
(2002), New 
Zealand 
MO → innovation → performance 
Or: MO × innovation (0) → performance 
 Innovation: (+) 
Performance: 2 items: financial 
performance (+), market performance (+) 
 
Matsuno, 
Mentzer, and 
Ozomer (2002), 
U.S. 
Entrepreneurial proclivity → 
organizational structure → MO → 
business performance 
Antecedents: entrepreneurial proclivity 
 Market share (+), percentage of new 
product sales to total sales (+), ROI (+) 
 
Noble, Sinha, 
and Kumar 
(2002), U.S. 
MO, strategic orientation → 
organizational learning, innovativeness 
→ firm performance 
 
Mediators: organizational learning, 
innovativeness 
  ROA (+ only for 
competitor 
orientation 
dimension), ROS 
(+only for 
competitor 
orientation 
dimension) 
Agarwal, 
Erramilli, and 
Dev (2003), U.S. 
MO → innovation → judgmental 
performance 
→ objective performance 
 
Mediator: innovation, judgmental 
performance 
 Innovation: (+) 
Judgmental performance (+): service 
quality, customer satisfaction, employee 
satisfaction 
Objective 
performance (0 
direct, + 
indirect): 
occupancy rate, 
gross operating 
profit, market 
share 
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Im and 
Workman 
(2004), U.S. 
MO → NP and MP creativity → NPP 
Mediator: NP and MP creativity 
 New product creativity (+): novelty and 
meaningfulness; Marketing program 
creativity (+): novelty and meaningfulness; 
NPP (0): market, financial, and overall 
assessment measures 
 
Langerak, 
Hultink, and 
Robben (2004), 
the Netherlands 
MO → product advantage, market testing, 
launch budgeting, launch strategy, launch 
tactics → NPP → firm performance 
 A second-order scale with five subscales: 
market level, financial, customer 
acceptance, product level, timing measures 
of NPD success. 
 
Wei (2004) MO, MO × moderators → NPP → firm 
performance 
 
Moderators: compensation strategies: 
group-based pay vs. individual-based pay, 
risk-based pay vs. risk-aversion pay, 
long-term based pay vs. short-term based 
pay 
 NPP (+): 3 items: sales growth of new 
products, management satisfaction with new 
product performance, management 
satisfaction with new product performance 
NPP 
(+)Percentage of 
(1) sales (2) sales 
growth, of new 
product 
introduced /size 
of NPD 
department; 
Firm 
performance: 
market 
share/firm size in 
this 2 years 
Zhou, Yim and 
Tse (2005): 
China 
MO, technology orientation, EO) → 
technology-based innovation, market-
based innovation → firm performance, 
product performance 
Mediator: technology-based innovation, 
market-based innovation 
 Technology-based innovation (+), market-
based innovation (–), innovations on firm 
performance (+), innovations on product 
performance (+) 
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 have demonstrated that MO significantly affects new product success (e.g., Appiah-Adu 
1997; Atuahene-Gima 1995; Baker and Sinkula 1999a, b; Cooper 1994; Pelham 1997b; 
Slater and Narver 1994). However, other studies do not support this relationship (e.g., 
Appiah-Adu and Ranchhod 1998; Atuahene-Gima 1996; Greenley 1995). In the following 
section, I review the most influential studies that focus on only the relationship between MO 
and new product innovation. 
Atuahene-Gima (1995, 1996) studies the MO–NPP and MO–innovation relationships. 
The 1995 study examines the direct effect of MO on new product activities and performance 
as well as the moderating effects of the degree of product newness, the intensity of market 
competition and the hostility of the industry environment, and the stage of the product life 
cycle on the MO–NPP relationship. The results show that MO is positively related to NPP in 
terms of market performance, proficiency of product development and launch activities, 
service quality, product advantage, marketing synergy, and teamwork. Atuahene-Gima also 
finds significant moderating effects. Market orientation has a stronger effect on the new 
product if the change is incremental rather than radical. Market orientation also has a greater 
effect when the intensity of market competition and the hostility of the industry environment 
are perceived as high and during the early stage of the product life cycle. 
Atuahene-Gima (1996) also investigates the influence of MO on innovation characteristics 
and performance. The findings suggest that MO is significantly related to innovation 
characteristics such as the fit of innovation and marketing, product advantage, and 
interfunctional teamwork but not with product newness and fit between innovation and 
technology. After controlling for the effect of innovation characteristics, MO still makes 
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 strong contributions to the project impact performance but not to the market success of 
product inovation in terms of sales and profit performance. 
Han, Kim, and Srivastava (1998) suggest an MO–innovation–performance 
framework. They use a component-wise approach and test how the three core components of 
MO (customer orientation, competitor orientation, and interfunctional coordination) affect 
organizational innovativeness. They do not measure organizational innovation by NPD 
performance but from an organizational-content perspective that includes technical and 
administrative innovation. Their findings suggest that MO does not directly lead to superior 
firm performance, but it does directly lead to innovation, which is in turn related to 
performance. Therefore, innovation plays a mediating role in the relationship between MO 
and performance. 
Lukas and Ferrell’s (2000) study is one of the few studies that links MO to radical 
and incremental product innovation. Using a sample of U.S. manufacturing companies, their 
analysis shows that product innovation varies with MO. Customer orientation increases the 
introduction of new-to-the-world products and reduces the launching of me-too products. 
Competitor orientation increases the introduction of me-too products and reduces the 
launching of line extensions and new-to-the-world products. Interfunctional coordination 
increases the launching of line extensions and reduces the introduction of me-too products. 
Langerak, Hultink, and Robben (2004) investigate the structural relationships among 
MO, new product advantage, proficiency in new product launch activities, NPP, and 
organizational performance. Their findings indicate that MO is positively related to product 
advantage and to the proficiency in market testing, launch budgeting, launch strategy, and 
launch tactics. Product advantage and the proficiency in launch tactics play pure mediator 
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 roles in the relationships among MO and NPP and organizational performance. Therefore, 
MO has no direct effect on NPP or organizational performance. 
Im and Workman (2004) examine the mediating role of new product and market 
program creativity in the relationship between MO and new product success. They use a two-
stage sampling frame to collect 312 sets of responses in order to reduce common-method bias 
in measures of creativity and NPP. They measure creativity from meaningfulness and novelty 
perspectives. The results support the MO–new product/market program creativity–NP 
success model. 
In summary, when scholars have studied the relationship between MO and NPP, they 
have used different measurements to measure new product innovation, and they have 
sometimes found MO to have a positive impact on new product innovation. Except for using 
different measurements for new product innovation, is there any other reason that MO 
sometimes affects new product innovation and sometimes not? It is very important to both 
practitioners and researchers to investigate the answer to this question. This dissertation 
attempts to search for this answer from the organizational learning perspective. How 
information-processing capabilities affect invention and innovation is listed by Bell, 
Whitwell, and Lukas (2002) as a top future research topic in NPD literature. Market 
orientation represents a firm’s capability in marketing information processing and is valuable 
because it emphasizes not only continuously collecting customers’ and competitors’ 
information but also using this information to create continuous superior customer value 
(Slater and Narver 1995). Jaworski and Kohli (1993) define MO from marketing 
information–processing and organizational learning perspectives. Market orientation consists 
of information acquisition, intelligence dissemination, and organizational responsiveness, 
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 which are also the key elements for organizational learning (Sinkula 1994). Therefore, a 
market-oriented organization is a learning organization (Slater and Narver 1995). This 
dissertation examines the MO–new product innovation relationship through the lens of 
organizational learning. In the following section, I review the literature of learning theory. 
 
2.3 Organizational Learning Theory 
 Organizational learning is a very important topic for both literature and practice. 
Organizational learning may lead to behavior change and improved organizational 
performance by enhancing action-oriented use, knowledge-enhancing use, and affective use 
(Slater and Narver 1995). Although there is a large and growing body of literature on 
organizational learning, there remains a lack of consensus across disciplines on what 
organizational learning is (Bell, Whitewell, and Lukas 2002; Crossan, Lane, and White 
1999). 
Many different definitions of organizational learning exist in the literature. Cyert and 
March (1963) define organizational learning as the process by which organizations as 
collectives learn through interaction with their environments. Similarly, Slater and Narver 
(1995) define organizational learning as the development of new knowledge or insights that 
have the potential to influence behavior. Furthermore, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define 
organizational learning as the process of assimilating new knowledge into the organization’s 
knowledge base. Organizational learning begins at the individual level. New individual 
knowledge is transferred to the organization’s knowledge base only when it is shared and 
assimilated into routines, documents, and practices (Autio, Sapienza, and Almeida 2000). 
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 In the following section, I review the literature about different theories of 
organizational learning. 
 
2.3.1 Organizational Learning Theories 
 Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson (1999) argue that firms in the “new competitive 
landscape” need the ability to adapt to environmental change with innovation and speed. 
Contingency theorists have maintained that firms in uncertain environments should develop 
flexible processes to react successfully to adversity or unexpected change (Galbraith 1977). 
Therefore, I briefly review the environmental uncertainty literature before examining 
different organizational learning theories. 
2.3.1.1 Environmental Uncertainty 
 There are many types of environmental characteristics that have been examined in the 
strategic marketing and management literature, such as environmental uncertainty, 
complexity, hostility, market potential, and intensity of competition (Frese, Brantjes, and 
Hoorn 2002). Uncertainty (or dynamism) is the degree to which an environment is 
predictable or unpredictable. Complexity is the intricacy and qualitative nature of the 
environment. Hostility is pressure from competitors, if there is a negative business climate 
and a relative lack of exploitable opportunities (Covin and Slevin 1989). Market potential 
pertains to the attractiveness of a target market or the need level of customers, which reflects 
market characteristics such as size and growth (Song and Parry 1997). Competitive intensity 
refers to the nature of interfirm rivalry within the firm’s target market (Song and Parry 1997). 
Among these characteristics, environmental uncertainty may be the most important because a 
firm’s actions are affected significantly by decision makers’ perceptions of environmental 
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 uncertainty (Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, and Porras 1987). It is difficult to make accurate predictions 
about the future in a highly uncertain environment (Achrol and Stern 1988; Celly and Frazier 
1996). 
Many researchers have suggested that environmental uncertainty is a crucial 
contingency for organizations (Hambrick 1981; Ireland et al. 1987), where uncertainty is the 
unpredictability of environmental variables that have an impact on organizational 
performance (Miller 1993). There are three types of perceived uncertainty about the 
environment: (1) state, (2) effect, and (3) response (Milliken 1987). State uncertainty refers 
to the general unpredictability of the environment and its various components. Effect 
uncertainty is the inability of firms to predict the effect of future environmental changes on 
business operations. Response uncertainty captures the difficulty that firms have in predicting 
the response of their competitors to a particular strategy that the firm implemented. 
Uncertainty can be conceived of on three levels: (1) general environmental, (2) 
industry, and (3) firm-specific variables. General environmental uncertainties include 
political and governmental policy instability and macroeconomic uncertainty. Industry 
uncertainties encompass input market, product market, competitive, and technological 
uncertainties. Firm-specific uncertainties include uncertainties regarding operation, R&D, 
and management and employee actions. International management research highlights the 
general environmental uncertainties, but strategy studies have tended to focus on industry- 
and firm-level uncertainties (Miller 1993). 
In the marketing literature, the most commonly cited types of environmental 
uncertainties are technology uncertainty and demand uncertainty (Anderson and Tushman 
2001; Atuahene-Gima and Li 2004; Jaworski and Kohli 1993). Technology uncertainty (also 
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 called technology turbulence) concerns the perceived rate of technological change. Demand 
uncertainty (also called market turbulence) is the perceived rate of change and the 
unpredictability of customers’ product preferences, customer demand, and competitors’ 
behavior in response to the change. The literature suggests that in highly uncertain situations, 
decision makers are unable to assess accurately both the present and the future state of the 
environment. Objective characteristics or information are often not available to provide a 
basis for action. Information changes so fast that decision makers have to continuously 
update their information. Decision makers must use personal judgment and take risks to 
make quick decisions at each critical point (Atuahene-Gima and Li 2004; Jaworski and Kohli 
1993; Milliken 1987). Decision-maker scanning frequency and scanning interest therefore 
increase when perceived environmental uncertainty increases (Sawyerr 1993). Therefore, 
heavy and intense organizational learning is a requirement for organizations to survive by 
successful adaptation to a highly uncertain environment. 
 
2.3.1.2 Different Perspectives on Organizational Learning 
 Organizational learning is conceptualized from many different perspectives, including 
cognitive, strategic renewal, information process, and social network perspectives. 
From a cognitive perspective, the two types of organizational learning are adaptive 
and generative (Senge 1990; Slater and Narver 1995). Adaptive learning occurs within a set 
of both recognized and unrecognized constraints that reflect the organization’s assumptions 
about its environment and itself. The learning boundary constrains organizational learning to 
adaptive learning, which usually is sequential, incremental, and focused on issues or 
opportunities that are within the traditional scope of the organization’s activities. Generative 
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 learning occurs when the organization is willing to question long-held assumptions about its 
mission, customers, capabilities, or strategy. It requires the development of a new way of 
looking at the world based on an understanding of the systems and relationships that link key 
issues and events (Senge 1990; Slater and Narver 1995). 
Adaptive and generative learning are also referred to, respectively, as low- and high-
level learning, first- and second-order learning, and single- and double-loop learning (Argyris 
1999; Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001; Foil and Lyles 1985; Slater and Narver 1995). In this 
dissertation, I use the terms single- and double-loop learning. Single-loop learning is a 
routine, incremental, conservative process that serves to maintain stable relations and sustain 
existing rules (Argyris 1999; Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001; Foil and Lyles 1985). Its 
outcome is expected to be incremental change or adaptation carried out to further exploit 
existing technologies, routines, and processes in a way that does not alter underlying 
assumptions or values. Therefore, single-loop learning restricts itself to detect and correct 
errors within a given systems of rules (Argyris 1999; Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001; Foil 
and Lyles 1985). 
Double-loop learning is the search for and exploration of alternative routines, rules, 
technologies, goals, and purposes (Argyris 1999; Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001; Foil and 
Lyles 1985). This type of learning resolves incompatible organizational norms by setting new 
priorities and weighting of norms or by restructuring norms themselves, together with 
associated strategies and assumptions. Double-loop learning enables organizations to break 
out of existing thought or behavior patterns by exploring qualitatively different ways of 
thinking and doing things (Argyris 1999; Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001; Foil and Lyles 
1985). From a strategic renewal perspective, Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) develop a 
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 comprehensive framework of the process of organizational learning and identify 
organizational learning as comprising four processes—(1) intuition, (2) interpretation, (3) 
integration, and (4) institutionalization—at the individual, group, and organizational levels. 
This study suggests four key assumptions or premises for organizational learning. 
First, organizational learning involves a tension between assimilating new learning 
(exploration) and using what has been learned (exploitation). Second, organizational learning 
involves multiple levels: individual, group, and organization. Third, three levels of 
organizational learning can be linked by the social and psychological processes of intuiting, 
interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing (4Is). Fourth, cognition affects action, and 
vice versa. The 4I framework of organizational learning maps the process within the 
organizations. 
Intuition. Intuition is the preconscious recognition of the pattern and/or possibilities 
inherent in the personal stream of experience. The expert view of intuiting is a process of 
past pattern recognition. The ability to make novel connections and to discern possibilities is 
the key for intuiting. Whereas expert intuition may be past pattern–oriented, entrepreneurial 
intuition is future possibility–oriented. Expert intuition supports exploitation, whereas 
entrepreneurial intuition supports exploration. 
Interpretation. Interpretation is the explanation, through words and/or actions, of an 
insight or idea to oneself and to others. Interpreting takes place in relation to a domain or an 
environment. Individuals interpret the same stimulus differently because of their established 
cognitive maps. High-quality information may be equivocal with multiple and conflicting 
meanings. A group interpretive process may resolve equivocal situations. 
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 Integration. Integration is the process of developing shared understanding among 
individuals and of taking coordinated action through mutual adjustment. Shared 
understanding is crucially developed from dialogue and joint action. Whereas the focus of 
interpreting is change in the individual’s understanding and actions, the focus of integrating 
is coherent, collective action. Shared understanding comes from the continuing conversation 
among members of the community. Shared practice may lead to the development of 
collective mind and mutual adjustment or negotiated action. 
Institutionalization. Institutionalization is the process of embedding individual and 
group learning into the organization, and it includes systems, structures, procedures, and 
strategy. The process of institutionalizing sets organizational learning apart from individual 
or ad-hoc group learning. Some learning is embedded in the systems, structures, strategy, 
routines, prescribed practices of the organization, and investments in information systems 
and infrastructure. For new or young organizations with few established routines or 
structures, individual and group learning is dominant. As organizations mature, individuals 
begin to fall into patterns of interaction and communication, and the organizations attempt to 
capture the patterns of interaction by formalizing them. Structures, systems, and procedures 
provide a context for interactions. It takes time to transfer learning form individuals to groups 
and from groups to the organization. As the environment changes, the learning that has been 
institutionalized may no longer fit the context. 
These 4I processes are related in feed-forward and feedback processes across the 
levels. Learning not only occurs over time and across levels but also creates tension between 
assimilating new learning (feed-forward) and exploiting or using what has already been 
learned (feedback). In feed-forward processes, new ideas and actions flow from the 
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 individual to the group and to the organization level. At the same time, what has already been 
learned feeds back from the organization to group and individual levels, thus affecting how 
people act and think. The institutionalized learning, or what has already been learned, may 
impede the assimilation of new learning. Therefore, the nature of the learning process itself 
may create tension between the feed-forward and feedback, which is also referred to as 
tension between exploration and exploitation. 
Several problems may occur in the learning-flow process (Crossan, Lane, and White 
1999). First, there may be bottlenecks in the ability of the organization to absorb the feed-
forward of learning from the individual to the group and organization. Investment in 
individual learning and pressures for new product innovation may become stockpiled if the 
organization has limited capacity to absorb the learning. Individuals may become frustrated 
and disenchanted and may even leave the organization. Second, learning that has become 
institutionalized at the organizational level is often difficult to change, because it runs the 
risk of becoming irrelevant and may even obstruct feed-forward learning flows. In addition, 
inertia and rigidity may block the learning process. 
Many factors could facilitate or inhibit the tension between feed-forward 
(exploration) and feedback (exploitation), such as reward systems, information systems, 
resource allocation systems, strategic planning systems, and structure. Exploration of these 
factors is one promising area for future research in organization learning. This dissertation 
studies when the new product learning process may lead to learning inertia and how to solve 
it. 
From an information-processing perspective, Huber (1991) and Sinkula (1994) 
suggest that organizational learning has four processes: (1) knowledge acquisition, (2) 
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 information distribution, (3) information interpretation, and (4) organizational memory. 
Knowledge acquisition is the process by which knowledge is obtained. Information 
distribution is the process by which information from different sources is shared, and it 
thereby leads to new information or understanding. Information interpretation is the process 
by which distributed information has one or more commonly understood interpretation. 
Organizational memory concerns how organizations encode, store, and retrieve the lessons of 
history, despite the turnover of personnel and the passage of time. More specifically, 
knowledge acquisition consists of (1) drawing on knowledge available at the organization’s 
birth, (2) learning form experience, (3) learning by observing other organizations, (4) 
grafting on to itself components that possess knowledge needed but not possessed by the 
organization, and (5) noticing or searching for information about the organization’s 
environment and performance. 
The attributes of organizational learning can be categorized by existence, breadth, 
elaborateness, and thoroughness (Huber 1991). Existence means that an organizational 
learner is recognized as potentially useful to the organization if any of its units acquire 
knowledge. Breadth refers to the situation in which more organizational learning occurs 
when more of the organization’s components obtain the knowledge and recognize it as 
potentially useful. Elaborateness refers to a situation in which organizational learning occurs 
when more and more varied interpretations are developed. Thoroughness of organizational 
learning occurs when more organizational units develop uniform comprehension of the 
various interpretations. 
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 Slightly different from Sinkula’s (1994) version, Slater and Narver (1995) reduce the 
processes of organizational learning from four to three: (1) information acquisition, (2) 
information dissemination, and (3) shared interpretation. 
Information acquisition. Information may be acquired from direct experience, the 
experiences of others, or organizational memory. Organizations must continuously balance 
learning with exploitation (internally focused experience) and exploration (externally focused 
experience). In addition, learning from others encompasses benchmarking, joint ventures, 
networking, strategic alliances, and working with lead customers. 
Information dissemination. Effective dissemination increases information value when 
each piece of information can be seen in its broader context by all organizational players who 
might use or be affected by it and who are able to feed back questions, amplification, or 
modifications that provide new insights to the sender. 
Shared interpretation. For organizational learning to occur in any business unit, there 
must be a consensus on the meaning of the information and its implications for that business. 
However, high performance in a dynamic environment requires balancing the need for rapid 
decision making with the need to carefully consider the ramifications of alternative action 
plans through effective conflict resolution processes. 
From a social network perspective, organizational learning is viewed as the 
organizational connections that constitute a learning network rather than as information 
transfer from one individual mind to another (Fisher and White 2000). It is a reflective 
process and is played out by members at all levels in the organization. It involves the 
collection of information from both external and internal environments. This information is 
filtered through a collective sense-making process, which results in shared interpretations 
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 that can be used to instigate actions that result in enduring changes to the organization’s 
behavior and theories-in-use. 
When organizational learning is perceived as an aggregate of individual information 
processes, individual memories represent essential pieces of the organizational memory. 
Therefore, the loss of a significant individual memory “chunk” can create a hole in 
organizational memory that damages ongoing processes. 
In contrast, a social network frame assumes that learning is generated at the 
intersubjective level. From the social network perspective, learning is situated within an 
interactive context, rather than in either the minds of individuals or the organization. 
Therefore, learning is subject to system interaction effects that are located not in individual 
learning entities or nodes but in the connections between nodes. Social network thinking fits 
the definition of organizational learning with its focus on shared interpretation. 
Having synthesized major existing organizational theories in the literature, I review in 
the following section how the literature applies these theories in different research domains. 
 
2.3.1.3 Network Perspective on Organizational Learning 
 From the social network perspective, Fisher and White (2000) view organizational 
learning as the organizational connections that constitute a learning network rather than as 
information transfer from one individual mind to another. Learning is situated within an 
interactive context, rather than in either the minds of individuals or the organization as a 
whole. Therefore, system interaction effects are not located in individual learning entities or 
nodes but in the connections between nodes. 
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  According to the network perspective, most firms are embedded in multiple networks 
that include sister subsidiaries, parent companies, competitors, investors, government 
institutions, suppliers and distributors, and regulatory bodies (Dyer and Singh 1998; Young, 
Charns, and Shortell 2001). According to Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer (2000), firms are 
embedded in networks of social, professional, and exchange relationships with other firms. 
The networks’ relationships can be horizontal and vertical, including those across industries 
and countries. Slater and Narver (1995) argue that the learning organization’s architecture 
should be open to external “learning partners.” It is very important for organizations to learn 
from customers, distributors, suppliers, alliance partners, universities, and others (Slater and 
Narver 1995). Managers may limit the value of the exchange when they treat those 
information exchanges as independent transactions (Slater and Narver 1995). Conversely, the 
development of long-term, stable relationships with “learning partners” leads to information 
sharing, which benefits both partners (Slater and Narver 1995). Therefore, organizational 
learning is a function of the form and strength of the organization’s interdependence with its 
learning partners (Webster 1992). 
 The literature includes several studies that examine how organizations can benefit 
from their networks. First, strategic networks can potentially provide a firm with access to 
information, resources, markets, and technologies, as well as advantages from learning, scale, 
and scope economies (Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 2000). According to Liebeskind, Oliver, 
Zucker, and Brewer (1996), an external informational network of experts can provide the 
firm with multiple evaluations of the value of its own information and know-how. Networks 
can increase the firm’s efficiency in searching for valuable information, screening 
information, codifying information for managerial use, selecting appropriate investments, 
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 and applying managerial control. Therefore, sourcing information from external experts 
increases organizational learning (Liebeskind et al. 1996). 
 Second, interorganizational relationships in a network are positively related to 
knowledge acquisition and explication. The study of Yli-Renko, Autio, and Sapienza (2001) 
shows that social interaction and network ties are indeed associated with greater knowledge 
acquisition. Interorganizational relationships create opportunities for knowledge acquisition 
and exploitation. Through interaction with others, firms get access to extent knowledge and 
can combine it with existing knowledge. They then can apply and exploit newly created 
knowledge through such relationships. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that the ability to 
exploit external knowledge is a critical component of innovative capabilities. Network 
learning can enhance the firm’s ability to acquire and use outside knowledge because 
networks provide a diversity of knowledge in the innovation process. Organizational learning 
is therefore a function of both access to knowledge and the capabilities for using and building 
on such knowledge. 
 Liebeskind and colleagues (1996) examine how two highly successful new 
biotechnology firms (NBFs) source their most critical input—scientific knowledge—through 
three organizational options: (1) internal sourcing through the use of hierarchy, (2) external 
sourcing through market exchange, and (3) external sourcing through social networks. They 
posit that social networks are the most efficient organizational arrangement for sourcing 
information because information is difficult to price in a market and difficult to communicate 
through a hierarchical structure. Social networks serve as a source of reliable information, 
which is essential to efficient organizational learning. Therefore, collaboration enhances 
organizational learning (Hamel 1991). They find that scientists at the two NBFs enter large 
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 numbers of collaborative research efforts with scientists at other organizations, especially 
universities. Formal market contracts are rarely used to govern these exchanges of scientific 
knowledge. Therefore, the use of boundary-spanning social networks increases both their 
learning and their flexibility in ways that would not be possible with a self-contained 
hierarchical organization. 
 Third, a network serves as a locus of innovation, because it provides timely access to 
knowledge and resources that are otherwise unavailable while also testing internal expertise 
and learning capabilities. Networks also facilitate learning by promoting efficient skill 
transfer among firms or by producing novel syntheses of existing information. Furthermore, 
good knowledge transfer among organizational units provides opportunities for mutual 
learning that stimulate the creation of new knowledge and foster innovation (Tsai 2001). 
 Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) also conduct a study of the network learning 
in biotechnology firms. In the past, firms organized R&D internally and relied on outside 
contract research only for relatively simple functions or products. Now a large-scale reliance 
on interorganizational collaborations in the biotechnology industry exists in order to access 
the knowledge. The authors argue that, when the knowledge base of an industry is both 
complex and expanding and the sources of expertise are widely dispersed, the locus of 
innovation is found in learning networks rather than in individual firms. Sources of 
innovation do not reside exclusively inside firms. It is more likely that they are commonly 
found in the interstices among firms, universities, research laboratories, suppliers, and 
customers. New technologies are both a stimulus to and the focus of various cooperative 
efforts to reduce the inherent uncertainties associated with novel products or markets. 
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  Fourth, uncertainty can be reduced through networking. Firms benefit from 
organizational networks with strong ties by mitigating uncertainty and promoting adaptation 
because communication and information sharing increase (Kraatz 1998). They also enable 
firms to achieve strategic objectives, such as sharing risks and outsourcing value-chain stages 
and organizational functions. Therefore, the networks of relationships profoundly influence 
the firms’ conduct and performance, including organizational survival amid competition and 
change (Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer 2000). 
Networks are therefore considered potential sources of learning (Levitt and March 
1988; Powell 1990). The experiences to which a firm is exposed through its associations with 
its network partners affect its decisions. In general, networks enable forums for discussion, 
direct attention to new practices, and facilitate the transmission of information and normative 
pressures to engage in certain activities (Beckman and Haunschild 2002). However, it is not 
enough for firms to have networks. The quality of networks matters to the network learning. 
Depending on the variety of information available, some network structures may be better 
than others at helping firms make better decisions. Three features of network structure are 
important for decision quality: (1) network size, (2) network heterogeneity, and (3) strength 
of network. 
 The first feature of network structure is the network size or range. A network with a 
narrow learning scope may lead to more limited organizational learning capacity than one 
that has a broad learning scope. Reagans and McEvily (2003) study how different features of 
informal networks affect knowledge transfer. They argue that the network range, or ties to 
different knowledge pools, increases a person’s ability to convey complex ideas to 
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 heterogeneous audiences. A large network is highly likely to lead to worldviews. The results 
indicate that both social cohesion and network range ease knowledge transfer. 
 The second feature of network structure is the network’s heterogeneity. Network 
structure can affect decision quality because of the partners’ heterogeneity. The theory of 
structural holes pertains to how the structure of learning networks affects the magnitude of 
learning loss (Burt 1992). Networks with relatively weak linkage density but with 
heterogeneous, rather than redundant, relationships are more efficient than dense networks in 
which every member shares similar links with all other members. Network partners’ 
heterogeneity provides firms with more diverse samples of experience from which to learn. 
 Beckman and Haunschild (2002) examine the effect of the diversity of network 
partners’ experience on a firm’s acquisition decisions. Results show that firms with multiplex 
relationships with partners receive more benefit; that is, collective network experience affects 
firms’ decision quality. Diversity among network partners may create informational 
diversity. Therefore, firms with diverse partner experiences are likely to debate and 
deliberate these experiences more than firms with homogeneous network experience. The 
process through which network diversity can result in improved decisions has multiple steps. 
First, the diverse experiences of network partners provide firms with a variety of 
instrumental, normative, and procedural information. Second, the diverse experiences of 
network partners increase organizational attention to existing information. 
 The third feature of network structure is the strength of the network, which is also 
referred to as strong or weak network ties. Strong network ties are defined as frequent 
interaction, an extended history, and intimacy (Kraatz 1998). According to Rowley, Behrens, 
and Krackhardt (2000), strong ties have two advantages. First, strong ties are associated with 
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 the exchange of high-quality information and tacit knowledge. Based on a deeper 
understanding of a partner’s operations, tacit knowledge is more readily transferred across 
organizational boundaries. Second, strong ties may serve as part of the social control 
mechanism, which governs partnership behaviors. Larson (1992) shows that strong ties 
incrementally promote and enhance trust, mutual gain, reciprocity, and a long-term 
perspective. However, weak ties can be beneficial because they provide access to divergent 
regions of the network rather than to a densely connected set of actors. Strong and weak ties 
have different qualities, which are advantageous for different purposes. A mix of strong and 
weak ties may be preferable for firms. 
Several studies have made an effort to link together the concepts of network and 
organizational learning. Tsai (2001) studies how the firms conduct organizational learning 
through an intraorganizational network. According to the network perspective, organizational 
units can produce more innovations and enjoy better performance if they occupy a central 
network position that facilitates knowledge transfer across units. Knowledge transfer among 
organizational units provides opportunities for mutual learning that stimulate the creation of 
new knowledge and foster innovation. 
Kraatz (1998) is interested in how networks can promote social learning of adaptive 
responses. The study uses data from 230 private colleges over 16 turbulent years to show that 
the college members of smaller, older, and more homogeneous intercollegiate consortia are 
more likely to undertake fundamental curriculum changes. The colleges tend to imitate 
similar consortium partners that were performing well and not larger and more prestigious 
partners. Therefore, strong ties to other organizations may mitigate uncertainty and promote 
adaptation by increasing communication and information sharing. 
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 Fisher and White (2000) use a social network framework to study the impact of 
downsizing on organizational learning and propose that the effects can be viewed as a 
nonlinear function of learning network size. There is an incorrect assumption that all possible 
subgroups retain valuable, unique learning capacity and that the loss of any individual 
completely disables learning in every subgroup that he or she belongs to. This assumption 
attributes organizational learning failure to the elimination of workers during downsizing. A 
social network perspective views downsizing from a different angle. 
Burt’s (1992) theory of structural holes offers more insight into how the structure of 
learning networks may affect the magnitude of learning loss. Burt proposes that networks 
with relatively weak linkage density but with heterogeneous, rather than redundant, 
relationships are more efficient than dense networks in which every member shares similar 
links with all other members. This logic suggests that removal of individuals in dense 
networks with many redundant linkages would not necessarily significantly affect 
organizational learning capacity. 
 However, Burt (1992) also suggests that some individuals may be more strategically 
linked than others within the organization. Those individuals whose relationships span 
structural holes and account for a unique link between otherwise unlinked clusters in a 
network can be critical to the learning function. Removal of an individual who accounts for 
such a strategic link among diverse clusters could disconnect the clusters from one another 
and inflict damage to the organizational learning capacity. In conclusion, the magnitude of 
the potential damage to organizational learning capacity that results from downsizing is a 
nonlinear function that results in a progressively greater percentage of capacity lost per 
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 individual as the size of the operative learning networks embedded in the organization 
increases. 
 In this dissertation, network learning is of interest. Network learning is defined as the 
willingness to build strong relationships with broad parties outside of the firms and the 
amount of insights obtained from the external entities in the firms’ economic network. The 
potential learning sources include customers, competitors, suppliers, distributors, businesses 
in different industries, consultants, universities, government agencies, and other 
organizations or individuals that possess knowledge valuable to the business (Achrol 1991; 
Dickson 1992; Kanter 1989; Slater and Narver 1995; Webster 1992). The marketing 
literature suggests that such networks represent a new organizational form that may replace 
simple market-based transactions (Webster 1992). Because of diverse knowledge sources and 
network perspectives, it may help a firm break out of inertia in its existing marketplace. 
Thus, it is relevant and important in this dissertation to study network learning. 
 
2.3.2. Applications of Organizational Learning Theories 
 Organizational learning theories are applied to many different areas, such as NPD, 
knowledge flow, strategic change, quality management, and international business 
management. 
When organizational learning is applied to the NPD process, the information process 
or learning process becomes very complicated. Akgun, Lynn, and Reilly (2002) argue that 
NPD learning has multiple dimensions: information acquisition, information implementation, 
unlearning, thinking, improvisation, memory, history, intelligence, and sense-making. 
Information acquisition refers to a collection of primary and secondary information from a 
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 variety of sources, such as data gathered from customers; competitors; economic, financial, 
and social reports; consultants; new members; acquisition and mergers; and cross-functional 
teams. Information implementation is the application of market and technical information to 
influence related market strategy and technical actions, such as prelaunching, incorporating 
lessons learned into the product for full-scale launch, uncovering and correcting product 
problem areas with which customers were dissatisfied, and implementing new product 
strategy. Information dissemination is the process by which information from different 
sources is distributed and shared, such as memos, reports, formal courses and training, 
informal communication, dialogue, teleconferencing, and Internet and intranet. Unlearning is 
the process of reducing or eliminating preexisting knowledge or habits, such as changing the 
organizational beliefs, norms, values, procedures, behavioral routines, and physical artifacts. 
Thinking refers to the purposeful, reasoned, and goal-directed action that involves solving 
problems, formulating inferences, calculating likelihoods, and making decisions by decision 
making, problem solving, and judgment. Improvisation is planning and implementing any 
action simultaneously, such as continuous improvement, experimentation, and trial and error. 
Memory refers to stored information, such as detailed past decisions, results, past surprises, 
and the organization’s responses and unwritten decisions from an organization’s history of 
core competencies, culture, structure, beliefs, and psychological structure. Intelligence 
concerns the capability and ability to process, interpret, manipulate, and use information in 
the organization, such as the ability to gather information from outside of the organization 
(e.g., customers, vendors, suppliers, libraries, consultants), generate different market and 
technology scenarios, interpret environmental signals, and transfer customer needs to 
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 product-design specifications. Sense-making means giving meaning to data and information, 
such as information coding and summarizing. 
Following the knowledge perspective, Schulz (2001) studies the relationship between 
the learning process and knowledge flow. Knowledge flow is defined as the aggregate 
volume of know-how and information transmitted per unit of time. Knowledge may flow in 
two ways: horizontal or vertical. Horizontal outflows carry knowledge from a subunit to peer 
subunits, which are units that report to the same supervising unit. Vertical outflows carry 
knowledge from a subunit to its supervising unit. There are three learning processes: (1) 
collecting new knowledge, (2) codifying knowledge, and (3) combining old knowledge. The 
findings support that collecting new knowledge intensifies vertical flows of knowledge, that 
codifying knowledge facilitates horizontal and vertical flows, and that combining old 
knowledge mainly affects horizontal flows. The uncertain relevance of new knowledge may 
generate push and pull forces that stimulate outflows of knowledge from the knowledge 
domain of subunits. 
The strategic change literature has studied organizational change through a learning 
lens. Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996) consider strategic change an iterative process. 
Managers effect changes through a series of relatively small steps designed to probe the 
environment and the organization. These learning steps can result in major and minor 
changes to the content of a firm’s strategy. Therefore, the managers can learn during ongoing 
strategic change and experience successful strategic changes through different learning 
processes. 
Sitkin, Sutcliffe, and Schroeder (1994) try to apply learning theory to quality 
management by total quality learning (TQL) rather than by total quality management (TQM). 
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 By focusing on this exploration-oriented aspect of TQM, TQL emphasizes increasing an 
organization’s ability to explore the unknown and to identify and pursue novel solutions. 
Total quality learning is involved in many management activities, such as capability 
enhancement; information collection, analysis, and dissemination; and incentives for 
implementation. This study suggests that when task, product/process, or organizational 
uncertainty is low, practices associated with the implementation of TQC will increase 
outcome effectiveness. When task, product/process, or organizational uncertainty is high, 
practices associated with TQL implementation will increase outcome effectiveness. 
International business is an active zone for organizational learning. Internationalizing 
firms must engage in learning in order to apprehend, share, and assimilate new knowledge 
and to compete and grow in markets in which they have little or no previous experience 
(Autio, Sapienza, and Almeida 2000). Using event-history analysis and data on 1493 
expansions of 25 large Dutch firms between 1996 and 1994, Barkerma and colleagues (1997) 
report that successful international joint ventures entail both learning to operate across 
national boundaries and learning to cooperate with the joint-venture partner. 
Several studies have also examined organizational learning from slightly different 
perspectives, such as absorptive capacity, learning orientation, and learning organization. 
These studies may not be real applications of organizational learning, but they are very 
influential studies in the organizational learning literature. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) use the term absorptive capacity to study the 
organizational learning process. Absorptive capacity is the ability to recognize the value of 
new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. The ability to exploit 
external knowledge is a critical component of innovative capabilities. The increase of 
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 technological opportunity will increase the amount of available relevant, external technical 
knowledge and will elicit more R&D in more-difficult learning environments. An 
organization’s absorptive capacity depends on transfers of knowledge across and within 
subunits that may be quite removed from the original point of entry. Therefore, the structure 
of communication between the external environment and the organization, as well as among 
the subunits of the organization, and knowledge sharing versus knowledge diversity across 
individuals, affect the development of organizational absorptive capacity. The authors’ 
findings suggest that R&D intensity increases when learning becomes more difficult, because 
R&D creates an ability to assimilate and exploit new knowledge. 
Sinkula, Baker, and Noordewier (1997) suggest a framework for market-based 
organizational learning. Organizations that are competent at learning are referred to as 
learning organizations or learning oriented. They are skilled at creating, acquiring, and 
transferring knowledge and at modifying their behaviors to reflect new knowledge and 
insights. Learning organization or orientation is measured on four dimensions: (1) 
commitment to learning, (2) shared vision and/or purpose, (3) open-mindedness, and (4) 
marketing program dynamism. 
Slater and Narver (1995) argue that MO provides strong norms for learning from 
customer and competitors. In order to create a learning organization, the firm must conduct 
double-loop learning by setting up entrepreneurship and appropriate organizational structures 
and processes. 
In summary, the previous two sections reviewed the organizational learning literature 
and its application. In following section, I will look at the negative side of organizational 
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 learning theory and search for the potential interesting missing variables for the MO–new 
product innovation relationship. 
 
2.3.3 Organizational Inertia and Rigidity 
 Although organizational learning may have many positive effects on behavior and 
performance, the aforementioned literature review suggests that organizational learning itself 
may also create dysfunctional behavior and negative effects (Crossan, Lane, and White 1999; 
Foil and Lyles 1985). 
 Some studies try to identify the potential barriers for organizational learning. Adams, 
Day, and Dougherty (1998) identify three organizational learning barriers: (1) avoidance of 
ambiguity, (2) compartmentalized thinking, and (3) inertia. These barriers persistently act in 
specific ways to inhibit organizational learning. Avoidance of ambiguity occurs in the 
process of acquiring market information. People typically focus on the less ambiguous in 
order to more easily understood technologies and business truisms. Compartmentalized 
thinking happens in the process of disseminating market information. The dissemination may 
be hindered because people focus on their own goals, which are often defined within their 
department’s role instead of the overall project goals. Inertia acts as a barrier to the effective 
use of market information. People tend to proceed as they always have, maintaining the 
status quo, rather than adjusting actions to capitalize on market learning. 
Brown and Starkey (2000) study how organizational identity may inhibit 
organizational learning from a psychodynamic perspective. There are many reasons why 
organizations fail to learn. Although the literature recognizes cognitive limitations, prior 
learning, political games, and certain cultural and structural features of organizations as 
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 barriers to learning, it ignores the role of psychodynamic factors in individual and 
organizational identity and the negative effects that such factors can have on learning. The 
authors argue that it is possible for organizations to engage in routine-based learning in ways 
that support their existing self-concepts. If this sort of organizational learning requires 
identity change, organizations may engage in ego defenses to maintain collective self-esteem 
and the continuity of existing identity. At an organizational level, defenses inhibit learning by 
influencing the external search for the information and the interpretation, use, storage, and 
internal recall of information. 
 Therefore, the literature provides a reason to believe that creating an inertia trap may 
be one of the barriers that blocks the organizational learning process and suggests that it is 
important to study inertia to understand how it affects learning. In the following paragraphs, I 
review a portion of the literature on inertia. 
Inertia refers to a tendency not to move or act (Gresov, Haveman, and Oliva 1993). 
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) study inertia from an ecological perspective. As 
organizations grow or age, and as they pass long periods without fundamental change, they 
become more complex, and greater interdependence develops within and between their 
activity systems. Greater complexity and interdependence builds resistance to fundamental 
change. Therefore, the probability of organizational change in core systems declines with 
size and age. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984, 1989) suggest four internal factors that contribute to the 
stability of organizational forms: (1) past investment, (2) information-processing constraints 
on decision-makers, (3) internal politics, and (4) organizational history and the set of 
normative agreements that it engenders. Three external factors also constrain change in form: 
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 (1) legal and fiscal barriers to entry and exit from markets, (2) external constraints on the 
availability of information, and (3) environmental-imposed legitimacy constraints. These 
constraints act on all four properties of organizational form: (1) stated goals, (2) forms of 
authority, (3) core technology, and (4) marketing strategy. 
More specifically, structural inertia theory (Hannan and Freeman 1984) argues that 
organizational reliability and accountability require organizational structures that are 
reproducible or stable over time. Structural institutionalization and standardization therefore 
offers the advantage of reproducibility. However, these structures can also generate strong 
pressures against change, because the organization’s members seek to maintain the status quo 
that protects their interests. Constraints on change in the core features of organizations are 
very strong. Inertia is relative to environmental change. Inertia in the organizational structure 
is high when the speed of reorganization (core feature change) is much lower than the rate at 
which environmental conditions change. However, changing core features is dangerous, 
because it is costly for organizations. Organizational change may greatly increase risks of the 
demise of the organization. Organizations that frequently try to reorganize may produce very 
little and have slight chances of survival (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Therefore, inertia may 
not be negative in some situations. 
Contrary to inertia theory predictions, Kelly and Amburgey (1991) show empirical 
evidence that discontinuous environmental change was not associated with an increased 
probability of organizational change. In addition, organizational change was unrelated to an 
organization’s chances of survival. 
Miller and Chen (1994) study the sources and consequences of competitive inertia. 
They define competitive inertia as the level of activity that a firm exhibits when altering its 
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 competitive stance in areas such as pricing, advertising, new product or service introductions, 
and market scope. Competitive inertia reflects the number of market-oriented changes a 
company makes in trying to attract customers and outmaneuver competitors. Inertia is 
considered high if companies make few changes in competitive practices compared with the 
changes of their rivals of similar scale. Miller and Chen (1994) argue that inertia is driven by 
a motivational component (e.g., incentive to act, past performance, reinforcements, scanning 
and search, power, politics and managerial attributions, market growth), a knowledge 
component (e.g., awareness of action requirements and alternatives, market diversity, 
competitive experience), and a capability component (e.g., the constraints on managerial 
action, age and size, performance consequences of inertia). The authors assessed these three 
sources of inertia, respectively, by past performance and market growth, by competitive 
experience and diversity of the market environment, and by company age and size. The 
results of Miller and Chen’s (1994) study indicate that good past performance contributes to 
competitive inertia, whereas a diversity of markets discourages competitive inertia. 
The effects of inertia are also debated in the literature. In simpler and more stable 
environments, inertia may facilitate a more effective and economical use of managerial skills 
and resources and enable managers to concentrate on the most important decisions (Miller 
and Friesen 1984). Inertia also minimizes the costly blunders that come from making changes 
when complete information is unavailable (Hannan and Freeman 1984). But in more 
complex environments, competitive inertia as a form of a low level of market-oriented 
activity can severely retard adaptation in contexts that pose a wide variety of competitive 
threats. 
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 Rigidity is similar to inertia. Flexibility refers to the decision-making processes that 
use more information, create systems to promote debate and information sharing, and use a 
decentralized method of control over team decision-making processes, while rigidity is just 
the opposite (Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson 1999). Rigidity is a restriction of information and 
constriction of control within a group (Harrington, Lemak, and Kendall 2002). Rigidity 
theory concerns how organizations cope with a threat or crisis in complex environments 
(Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). Threat refers to an environmental event that has 
impending negative or harmful consequences for the entity. A general threat-rigidity effect 
occurs across individual, group, and organizational levels. 
Empirical studies have suggested restricted information processing and constriction 
of control under threat conditions (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). These studies have 
explored possible mechanisms underlying such a multiple-level effect as well as the possible 
functional and dysfunctional consequences. The individual effects include the link between 
threat situations and psychological stress and anxiety; the nature of cognitive manifestations 
of stress, anxiety, and arousal; the link between cognitive manifestations of stress, anxiety, 
and arousal; and properties of individual behavior. Group effects focus on the trade-off 
between external and internal attribution and the increased versus decreased cohesiveness in 
the teams. There are three consequences of threat at the organization level. First, due to an 
overload of communication channels, reliance on prior knowledge, and a reduction in 
communication complexity, there may be a restriction in the information-processing capacity 
of the organization. Second, due to centralization of authority and increased formalization of 
procedures, there may be a constriction in control. Third, there may be increased efforts to 
conserve resources within the system through cost cutting and efforts for greater efficiency. 
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 Threat-rigidity theory suggests that a threat to the vital interests of an entity leads to 
forms of rigidity. The rigidity may either be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on the 
condition. Rigidity as the only type of response to perceived threat results in a missed 
opportunity (Barnett and Pratt 2000). Rigidity effects have their source in organizational 
members’ information insufficiencies, confusion, incapacities for rapid response, desires to 
avoid blame, and misallocation of attention between internal and external environments. 
Inherent in the rigidity reaction are excessive, dysfunctional levels of fear and anxiety as well 
as arousal and stress. 
Barnett and Pratt (2000) present an opposing viewpoint. In their study of 
organizational crisis, they suggest that latent threats can generate functional levels of fear, 
anxiety, arousal, and stress, which may motivate organizational adaptation as well as long-
term change involving learning and renewal. To the extent that renewal processes become 
institutionalized, it follows that organizational lifetimes are lengthened. Therefore, on the one 
hand, crisis may produce a threat-rigidity effect that restricts opportunities for organizational 
development or survival. On the other hand, crisis can stimulate organizational 
experimentation that may result in adaptation, learning, improvement, and longevity. 
How does an event that has potentially negative or harmful consequences for the vital 
interests of a group affect the group’s behavior? Griffin, Tesluck, and Jacobs (1995) suggest 
that groups tend to respond to threatening situations rigidly by becoming less open to change; 
less accepting of new ideas; and more uniform in their behavior, attitudes, and beliefs. 
According to Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton’s (1981) threat-rigidity model, threatening 
situations may increase uniformity in attitudes and beliefs within groups through three 
processes. First, threat may influence individuals’ information-processing capacities so that 
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 they ignore or screen out novel beliefs, opinions, and new perspectives, which results in high 
uniformity. Second, frequent interaction among group members during the threat entails 
intragroup processes that may develop cohesiveness and liking among group members. 
Third, attitudes may become more uniform because of the deliberate actions of group 
members and leaders in order to achieve group consensus. 
Harrington, Lemak, and Kendall (2002) conduct an empirical study on how newly 
formed teams respond in threatening situations. The competitive environment is growing 
increasingly complex, uncertain, and adverse. An adverse environment refers to an 
environment that is perceived as having relatively high uncertainty. It may include 
unexpected, unpredictable, or fast-paced change, or it may appear threatening to the team. 
Harrington, Lemak, and Kendall (2002) argue that flexibility in decision-making processes is 
the key to effectively interacting with the environment in terms of adaptation, innovation, 
and speed. A newly formed team is a group that may or may not be familiar with one another 
and may not have worked together in this same project area. The threat-rigidity theory and 
groupthink research has suggested that the decision-making groups in adverse environments 
may reduce their flexibility, thereby sealing off new information and controlling deviant 
responses (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981). Hence, although decision-makers in an 
adverse environment should develop decision-making processes that feature decentralized 
control, openness to new ideas, and benefits from diversity within team members (Sharfman 
and Dean 1997), they might rely on well-learned responses, restrict information processing, 
and constrict decision control. 
Is it the flexibility or rigidity of the decision-making process that affects the ability of 
an organization to adapt to and survive in an uncertain and often adverse environment? Hitt, 
 76
 Ireland, and Hoskisson (1999) suggest that teams with an externally attributed threat use a 
more flexible decision-making process, whereas teams with an internally attributed threat use 
a more rigid decision-making process. Their results show that the groups with either a higher 
level of threat or an internal attribution of the threat use more rigidity in their decision-
making processes. 
In the NPD literature, capability-rigidity theory is the most influential rigidity theory. 
Leonard-Barton (1992) examines the nature of the capabilities of a firm, focusing in 
particular on their interactions with new product and process development projects. 
Capabilities are defined as clusters of knowledge and skills in people, distinct technical 
systems and managerial systems, all of which are deeply rooted in values. The first 
dimension, knowledge and skills, encompasses both firm-specific techniques and scientific 
understanding. The second dimension, technical systems, includes both information and 
procedures. The third dimension, managerial systems, represents formal and informal ways 
of creating and controlling knowledge (e.g., incentive systems, reporting structures). The 
fourth dimension, values and norms, includes the value assigned within the company to the 
content and structure of knowledge and the means of collecting and controlling knowledge. 
All four capability dimensions reflect accumulated behaviors and beliefs based on early 
corporate successes. A capability is an interrelated, interdependent knowledge system. Each 
capability dimension is supported by the other three. The four dimensions vary in ease of 
change. From technical to managerial systems, skills, and then values, the dimensions are 
increasingly less tangible, less visible, and less explicitly codified. Capabilities are 
institutionalized (Zucker 1977). Because capabilities are a collection of knowledge sets, they 
are distributed and constantly enhanced by multiple sources. 
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 Leonard-Barton (1992) argues that traditional capabilities have a downside, rigidities, 
that inhibits innovation. How to take advantage of capabilities without being hampered by 
their dysfunctional side is a paradox that new product managers must face. By responding to 
environmental and market changes, development projects become the focal point for tension 
between innovation and the status quo, because effective competition occurs with innovation 
that exploits carefully developed capabilities (Quinn 1980). Institutionalized capabilities may 
lead to incumbent inertia (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). Technological discontinuities 
can enhance or destroy existing competencies within an industry (Tushman and Anderson 
1986). Organizations then struggle whether to maintain, renew, or replace core capabilities. 
Therefore, managers of such projects face a paradox: capabilities simultaneously enhance 
and inhibit development. Rigidities hamper innovation in the development projects, 
especially along the values dimensions. The very same values, norms, and attitudes that 
support a capability and thus enable development can also constrain it. Four ways to address 
the paradox: (1) abandonment, (2) recidivism, (3) reorientation, and (4) isolation. 
 However, Leonard-Barton’s (1992) capability-rigidity framework lacks specific 
details in how organizational capabilities enhance and inhibit development and how the four 
strategies can resolve the paradox. In addition, there has been very little empirical study of 
these theoretical propositions. This dissertation attempts to take a pioneering step by 
exploring one particular organizational capability—MO and its relationship to new product 
innovation—with a view to examining whether this particular capability leads to rigidity 
outcomes in the form of competence traps that affect the firm’s NPD efforts. 
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  After reviewing the inertia and rigidity theory, I continue to explore literature that is 
specifically pertinent to understanding how organizational learning may lead to negative 
outcomes and how rigidities can negatively affect the learning process. 
 
2.3.4 Learning Traps 
 According to Crossan, Lane, and White (1999), the learning process may run the risk 
of becoming irrelevant and may even obstruct the feed-forward learning flows after the 
learning has become institutionalized at the organization level. Inertia and rigidity may block 
the learning process in what is known as learning myopia. There are three forms of learning 
myopia. The first form of myopia is the tendency to ignore the long run. This type of 
organizational learning emphasizes the short run, and therefore long-run survival is 
sometimes endangered. The second form of myopia is the tendency to ignore the big picture. 
This type of organizational learning pertains to the near neighborhood, and survival of more 
encompassing systems is sometimes endangered. The third form of myopia is the tendency to 
overlook failures. This type of organizational learning focuses on the lessons gained from 
success. Thus, organizations are likely to underestimate the risks of failure. 
March (1991) studies how organizational learning is trapped by its inertia and 
rigidity. He suggests that exploration and exploitation coexist in the organizational learning 
process. Exploration includes search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, and innovation. The essence of exploration is experimentation with new 
alternatives, but its returns are uncertain, distant, and often negative. Exploitation includes 
refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution. The 
essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing competences, 
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 technologies, and paradigms; its returns are positive, proximate, and predictable. Adaptive 
learning that engages in exploration to the exclusion of exploitation is highly likely to lead to 
the suffering of high experimentation costs without gaining many of its benefits because 
there are too many undeveloped new ideas and too little distinctive competency. Conversely, 
learning that engages in exploitation to the exclusion of exploration is highly likely to lead to 
the traps of suboptimal stable equilibrium. 
Both exploration and exploitation are essential for organizations, but they compete for 
scarce resources. The process for allocating resources between them embodies intertemporal, 
interinstitutional, and interpersonal comparisons, as well as risk preferences (March 1991). 
Therefore, maintaining an appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation is a 
primary factor in system survival and prosperity. In studies of organizational learning, the 
problem of balancing exploration and exploitation is exhibited in distinctions between the 
refinement of an existing technology and the invention of a new one. It is clear that 
exploration of new alternatives reduces the speed with which skills at existing ones are 
improved, where improvements in competence at existing procedures make experimentation 
with others less attractive (March 1991). All of this makes finding an appropriate balance 
particularly difficult. Effective selection among forms, routines, or practices is essential to 
survival, as is the generation of new alternative practices, particularly in a changing 
environment. 
Frequently, organizations are trapped by exploitation. Compared to returns from 
exploitation, returns from exploration are systematically less certain, more remote in time, 
and organizationally more distant form the locus of action and adaptation (March 1991). 
Thus, the certain speed, proximity, and clarity of feedback tie exploitation to its consequence 
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 more quickly and more precisely than is the case with exploration. In an adaptive process, 
advantages of exploitation cumulate more rapidly than those of exploration. Therefore, 
learning and imitation inhibit experimentation. 
However, what is good in the short run is not always good in the long run (Levinthal 
and March 1993; March 1991). Positive local feedback produces strong path dependence, 
which may lead to suboptimal equilibriums. The competence in an inferior activity likely 
becomes great enough to exclude superior activities with which an organization has little 
experience. But long-run intelligence depends on sustaining a reasonable level of 
exploration, not exploitation. Therefore, these tendencies to increase exploitation and reduce 
exploration make adaptive processes potentially self-destructive, which are referred to as 
learning traps. 
Learning traps are situations in which organizations become trapped in one or more 
of several learning dynamics that self-destructively lead to excessive exploration or excessive 
exploitation (Cyert and Williams 1993; Levinthal and March 1993). These dynamic 
distortions of the exploitation–exploration balance are perverse. Organizations are trapped by 
the imbalance between exploration and exploitation in the learning process. 
Although Levinthal and March (1993) made the first attempt to conceptualize the 
high-level learning traps in the literature, they fail to provide a systematic theory about 
learning traps. They mention many different types of traps existing in the learning process—
such as competence, power, learning, failure, and success—but fail to compare and contrast 
the traps on the basis of on possible theories. The result is that several concepts seem to 
overlap. However, Levinthal and March’s (1993) contribution is the introduction of a 
realization that organizational learning is imperfect. Learning processes are subject to some 
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 important limitations and have their own traps. It is therefore important for organizations to 
make an effort to improve learning capabilities and reduce learning traps (King and West 
2002). 
Competency traps occur when organizations engage in activities at which they are 
more competent with greater frequency than they engage in activities at which they are less 
competent (Levinthal and March 1993). The self-reinforcing nature of learning makes it 
attractive for an individual or organization to sustain current focus. The result is that 
distinctive competence is accentuated, and organizations become specialized in niches in 
which their competencies yield immediate advantage. Learners become increasingly removed 
from other bases of experience and knowledge and more vulnerable to change in their 
environments (Levinthal and March 1993). 
Power traps occur when organizations use their power to impose environments, which 
likely results in atrophy of their capabilities to respond to change in the long run. Because 
organizational power enables an organization to change its environments rather than adapt to 
them, it is a short-run asset but potentially a long-run liability (Levinthal and March 1993). 
Failure traps are situations in which organizations turn into frenzies of 
experimentation, change, and innovation by a dynamic of failure. New ideas and 
technologies fail and are replaced by other new ideas and technologies, which also fail 
(Levinthal and March 1993). 
Success traps are situations in which organizations discover the short-term virtue of 
local refinement and the folly of exploration. As they develop greater competence at a 
particular activity, they engage in that activity more. Thus, success leads to more exploitation 
and reduces the level of exploration (Levinthal and March 1993). 
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 All these traps are standard, potentially self-destructive products of learning. In my 
opinion, there is only one type of learning trap: the competency trap. Power, failure, and 
success traps all belong to the competency trap. Organizations engage in some specific 
activities with greater frequency due to their power, failure, or success experience. 
Similar to Levinthal and March’s idea (1993), Lant and Mezias (1990) suggest that 
when established firms face the challenge of managing entrepreneurial strategies to respond 
effectively to major environmental changes, there are three learning strategies available: (1) 
innovative, (2) imitative, and (3) fixed. When the environment changes, lessons learned from 
past experience can often result in two types of learning traps. First is the oscillation trap, 
which refers to the situation in which the optimal solutions are frequently untenable in the 
real world. A different adaptive strategy should be used when the level of ambiguity changes 
in the environment. Second, the follow-the-leaders trap occurs when imitative firms tend to 
perform poorly after discontinuous change because the largest firm in the population no 
longer provides a good signal to follow. 
Ahuja and Lampert (2001) define three traps that inhibit breakthrough inventions: (1) 
the familiarity trap (favoring the familiar), (2) the maturity trap (favoring the mature), and (3) 
the propinquity trap (favoring search for solutions near to existing solutions). They suggest 
that firms can overcome these traps and create breakthrough inventions by experimenting 
with novel technologies (e.g., those with which the firm lacks prior experience), emerging 
technologies (e.g., recent or newly developed in the industry), and (3) pioneering 
technologies (e.g., those that do not build on any existing technologies). 
In this dissertation, I am interested in competency traps in the NPD process. In the 
following section, I attempt to conceptualize competency traps in a systematic way. 
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2.3.5 Competency Traps 
 Competence (the power to do something) is the ability to sustain the coordinated 
deployment of assets in a way that helps a firm achieve its goal (O’Driscoll, Carson, and 
Gilmore 2001). Competence building is any process by which a firm achieves qualitative 
changes in its existing stock of assets and capabilities, including new abilities to coordinate 
and deploy new or existing assets and capabilities in ways that help the firm achieve its goal. 
Competency traps occur when past favorable performance with an inferior procedure 
leads an organization to accumulate more experience with it, thus keeping experience with a 
superior procedure inadequate to make its use rewarding (Levinthal and March 1993). The 
problem of competency traps is that they likely lead to maladaptive specialization if newer 
routines are better than older ones. In the technology development process, new procedures 
are always after the old procedures. The old procedures may exhibit persistent tendency 
because learning inertia makes it difficult for a firm to move away from the competences that 
it has previously developed. The difference between the impact potential of alternatives and 
the impact of the older competence is strength of such persistence or inertia in inferior 
procedures. 
How do competency traps act upon the organizational operation? How can firms 
identify whether they are in these traps? After a careful reading of existing literature, in this 
dissertation, I conceptualize the competency traps from three different perspectives—(1) 
cognition, (2) content, and (3) path of organizational learning—and rename them vision trap, 
technology trap, and routinization trap. 
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 Vision trap. First, what kind of cognition or vision do the firms in the competency 
traps have? From the cognitive perspective, competency traps may affect the cognition and 
visions of individuals and groups in firms. It is highly possible for firms to be overconfident 
with their existing competences because of past favorable performance. The inertia or 
persistence toward old procedures or competences is driven by favorable outcomes. Firms in 
competency traps are very confident of their ability to succeed in the future, which leads 
them to fail both to develop more creative alternatives and to give adequate thought to trade-
offs (Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa 1999). The overconfidence makes firms find a 
comfortable zone to work on and avoid upsetting it. Such confidence may create a strong, 
self-perpetuating cognition, which leads to a discounting of weak signals in the environment, 
where those signals threaten the source of the confidence (Fiol and Lyles 1985; King and 
West 2002; Levinthal and March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). Success leads to arrogance, 
which triggers denial of the need to change and perhaps even failure (Levinthal and March 
1993). Confidence traps firms into adhering to strategies or processes of fading value. 
Therefore, whether organizations are overconfident with their process or procedure is an 
important dimension of competency traps. 
Technology trap. Second, what kind of content do the firms in competency traps work 
on, mature technology or new technology, familiar technology or unfamiliar technology? 
From an institutional perspective, firms in competency traps tend to rely on the legitimacy of 
current existing mature and familiar technologies. According to Levinthal and March (1993), 
organizations use specialization to facilitate learning from experience. Firms in competency 
traps become specialized in what they know and what they have. They become rigid to new 
and unfamiliar technology. 
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 Mature technologies are relatively well known in the industry (Ahuja and Lampert 
2001). Because of their greater reliability, mature technologies are more likely to have an 
advantage in the short term than more recently developed and less tested approaches. In 
addition, the legitimacy of mature technologies makes the products easier to sell to 
customers. This short-term favorable outcome may lead firms to rely on mature technologies. 
Such reliance prevents the firms from identifying the significant opportunity of early 
emerging technologies, some of which may make fundamental breakthroughs later (Ahuja 
and Lampert 2001). Once the new emerging technologies take off, firms that rely on mature 
technologies will be trapped by inexperience and will lag behind firms with newly emerging 
technologies. 
Firms in competency traps also tend to select and adhere to technologies that are 
familiar. Information in familiar forms can be processed more quickly and familiar 
technologies learned more quickly. What is familiar is usually efficient. New information or 
new technologies are less efficient. Then, pursuit of the new threatens normal levels of 
return. Increased specialization reduces the motivation to move other technology bases 
(Levinthal and March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). The self-reinforcing process 
crystallizes current practice and forestalls change (King and West 2002; Stinchcombe 1986). 
If a new technology emerges, firms may be trapped by this maladaptive specialization (Ahuja 
and Lampert 2001). 
Therefore, the use of familiar and mature technology is another important dimension 
of competency traps. 
Routinization trap. Third, from a path-dependence perspective, firms in competency 
traps tend to follow formalized and standardized processes, procedures, or routines. 
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 According to Levinthal and March (1993), organizations also use simplification to facilitate 
learning from experience. A means of increasing the effectiveness of learning is to simplify 
natural experience by inhibiting learning in one part of an organization in order to make 
learning more effective in another part. Formalized and standardized procedures simplify the 
routine and improve firms’ competency, which leads to high efficiency and successful 
outcomes. However, in dynamic environments, formalized or standardized procedure or 
routine may be far from optimal (Arthur 1984; Levitt and March 1988). The inertia from 
fixed procedure may trap the firms in a changing environment. Therefore, routinized 
procedure is the third important dimension of competency traps. 
In summary, a competency trap can be defined along three dimensions: (1) vision trap 
(bias or overconfidence that may lead to an inability to see weaknesses of NPD processes), 
(2) technology trap (persistence towards using mature and familiar technology in new 
product development), and (3) routinization (inertia of using formalized and standardized 
procedures or resistance to procedure change). The three dimensions are all interrelated. 
 
2.3.6 Summary 
 Organizational learning is one of the most important activities that occurs within 
organizations. Bell, Whitewell, and Lukas (2002) review four schools of thought that pertain 
to organizational learning. They consider MO and NPD as two areas that have most fully 
embraced the organizational learning concept. Kohli and Jaworski (1990) and Jaworski and 
Kohli (1993) define MO from the marketing information-processing perspective. The 
marketing information processing in market-oriented firms includes: marketing information 
generation, dissemination, and responsiveness. Therefore, MO is inherently a learning 
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 orientation (Slater and Narver 1995). Bell, Whitwell, and Lukas (2002) list how information-
processing capabilities affect invention and innovation—in other words, how MO affects 
new product innovation— as the most important future research topic. This dissertation 
intends to study this research question by understanding the role of competency traps in the 
new product learning process. 
 
2.4 Literature Review on Entrepreneurial Orientation 
2.4.1 Entrepreneurship and Corporate Entrepreneurship 
 Entrepreneurship has been linked with innovation in the literature (e.g., Damanpour 
and Evan 1984; Wiklund 1999; Zahra and Covin 1995) and referred to as the “parent of 
innovation” (e.g., Miles and Arnold 1991). Without entrepreneurship, business and society 
would be neither dynamic nor adaptive but stagnant. Entrepreneurship leads firms to seek 
innovative and flexible means to exploit opportunities and achieve desired objectives (e.g., 
Khandwalla 1977; Miles and Arnold 1991). 
Schumpeter (1934) defines entrepreneurship as processes or activities designed to 
seize market opportunities through creative destruction. Harwood (1982) defines 
entrepreneurship as the process of assembling resources to create and build independent 
enterprises, which encompasses creativity, risk taking, and innovation. Therefore, the 
concept of entrepreneurship is related to new business entry and is concerned primarily with 
questions such as, what business do we enter? and how do we make the new business 
succeed? (e.g., Richard et al. 2004). 
Despite general agreement on the effects of entrepreneurship, there is some debate 
regarding the definition and operationalization of entrepreneurship. The various 
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 conceptualizations include individual entrepreneurs or small firms, corporate venturing or 
intrapreneurship and strategic renewal (Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994), and various types 
of behavior by established firms (Covin and Slevin 1991; Miller 1983). 
Traditional entrepreneurship research emphasizes the individual-level entrepreneurs, 
such as traits of the individual and small firm (Baron and Markman 2000; Bhide 2000; Kets 
de Vries 1977; McGrath, MacMillan, and Scheinberg 1992). However, entrepreneurship 
research has increasingly extended to the firm level: corporate entrepreneurship (Barringer 
and Bluedorn 1999; Floyd and Lane 2000; Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994). Entrepreneurs 
create and run their ventures to develop a market niche with new products or services or to 
substitute for established players by offering better quality, cheaper price, and so on. 
Corporate entrepreneurship seeks to encourage entrepreneurial behavior within established 
firms (Covin and Slevin 1991; Miller 1983; Zahra 1993a, b). To deal with problems, such as 
making changes in the marketplace to avoid stagnation and decline or perceived weakness in 
the traditional methods of corporate management (Kuratko, Nontagno, and Hornsby 1990), 
corporations to may seek to be entrepreneurial by running a new business within ongoing 
enterprises. Corporate entrepreneurship takes different formats, such as internal innovation; 
joint ventures or acquisitions; strategic renewal; product, process, and administrative 
innovations; and diversification (Dess et al. 2003). 
Corporate entrepreneurship is defined as “the process whereby an individual or a, or 
instigate renewal or innovation within that organization” (Sharma and Chrisman 1999, p.18). 
The creation of corporate entrepreneurship activity is difficult since it involves radically 
changing internal organizational behavior patterns. Corporate entrepreneurship can be 
divided into three categories: (1) the creation of new businesses within an organization, or 
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 intrapreneurship; (2) the transformation or renewal of an existing organization, and (3) 
Schumpeterian changes in the rules of competition (Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994). 
 At the corporate entrepreneurship level, entrepreneurial orientation is viewed as the 
most important and popular concept in the literature (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lee, Lee, and 
Pennings 2001; Lumpkin and Dess 1996). It is important for firms to be entrepreneurial 
oriented for the following reasons. First, as a unique business philosophy or culture, 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) influences how firms perceive certain situations and what 
strategic decisions they take (Frese, Brantjes, and Hoorn 2002). An EO suggests that 
organizations must constantly seek to exploit the dynamics of their macroenvironment and 
task environments. Second, empirical evidence indicates that financially successful firms 
tend to exhibit an entrepreneurial posture in hostile environments (Covin and Slevin 1989). 
Thus, an EO may prepare firms for the appropriate strategic response to organizational crises 
caused by environmental turbulence (Khandwalla 1977). 
 In the following section, I review the literature on EO. 
 
2.4.2 Definition of Entrepreneurial Orientation 
 Many scholars have defined EO; for example, (Morris and Paul 1987) define EO as 
“the propensity of a company’s top management to take calculated risks, to be innovative, 
and to demonstrate proactiveness.” However, the most influential definition is that of 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996), who define EO as the organizational process, methods, decision-
making activities, and styles used to implement innovation or lead to new entry. 
Entrepreneurial orientation reflects how a firm operates rather than what it does, and it 
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 represents how a firm is organized in order to discover and exploit opportunities (Wiklund 
and Shepherd 2003). 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) build their definition based on two influential studies: 
those of Covin and Slevin (1991) and Miller (1983). These two studies first suggested 
innovation, risk taking, and proactiveness as key dimensions of entrepreneurial activity. 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) incorporate two additional dimensions: (1) autonomy (propensity 
to act autonomously) and (2) competitive aggressiveness (tendency to act aggressively 
toward competitors). 
Innovativeness is the tendency to actively engage in and support new ideas, 
experimental and creative process that may result in new products, services or technological 
processes (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). Risk taking concerns the willingness to take business-
related chances with regard to strategic actions in the face of uncertainty (Lumpkin and Dess 
1996). Proactiveness refers to forward-looking, first-mover-advantage–seeking efforts to 
shape the environment by introducing new products or processes ahead of competition 
(Lumpkin and Dess 1996). Autonomy is the ability and will to be self-directed in the pursuit 
of opportunities (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). Competitive aggressiveness is the tendency of 
firms to assume a combative posture toward rivals and to employ a high level of competitive 
intensity in attempts to surpass them (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). Therefore, an EO consists of 
process, structures, and/or behaviors that can be described as aggressive, innovative, 
proactive, risk taking, or autonomy seeking. 
Among these five dimensions of EO, only the first three are most commonly cited in 
the literature: (1) innovativeness, (2) risk taking, and proactiveness. Entrepreneurial 
orientation is a process construct, grounded in the strategic-choice perspective, that promotes 
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 initiatives (Burgelman 1983). A strategic posture that emphasizes risk taking and 
proactiveness suggests that a management group needs high levels of trust and interpersonal 
communication. Both the risk taking and the proactiveness dimensions of EO require a firm 
to make quick decisions and to aggressively compete by implementing bold and risky 
strategies in the face of uncertainty (Richard et al. 2004). 
 
2.4.3 Measurement of Entrepreneurial Orientation 
 Entrepreneurial orientation is a firm-level construct (Covin and Slevin 1991). Miller 
(1983) and Covin and Slevin (1989) suggest that entrepreneurial orientation is a one-
dimensional construct. All dimensions of EO are interrelated and overlapped. Therefore, they 
collapse the EO dimensions into one. However, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) argue that the EO 
dimensions can vary independently of one another, because it might be difficult to determine 
the sources of variability in a firm’s EO and how those differences contribute to or detract 
from performance. A firm may be quite innovative and at the leading edge in its 
manufacturing operations but rather conventional in all of its other value activities (Lyon, 
Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). Lumpkin and Dess (1996) develop the two additional dimension 
scales and provide theoretical support and empirical evidence that EO dimensions may vary 
independently depending on the organizational and environmental context (Lyon, Lumpkin, 
and Dess 2000). 
Several studies investigate the issues of validity, reliability, and triangulation in EO 
research. Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess (2000) conduct a comprehensive review on a set of 
recent studies that employ different approaches to EO measurement. The studies include 
articles published between 1995 and 2000 in Academy of Management Journal, Journal of 
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 Management, Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Business Venturing, and 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. According to their findings, the highest incidence of 
reliability testing (by Cronbach’s alpha) occurs in studies that employ managerial perceptions 
to measure one or more EO dimension, which indicates good internal consistency reliability. 
The lowest incidence of testing for reliability was for constructs measured using resource 
allocations such as the percentage of scientist, R&D intensity, and financial leverage. 
Therefore, a triangulation of methods is suggested to improve the measurement. 
Kreiser, Marino, and Weaver (2002) use data from 1067 firms in six countries to 
clarify the psychometric properties of the EO measure. The results of a confirmatory factor 
analysis in LISREL supported three subdimensional models: (1) innovation, (2) 
proactiveness, and (3) risk taking. Correlation analysis revealed that the three subdimensions 
of EO can vary independently of one another in many situations. Kreiser, Marino, and 
Weaver’s (2002) study and multicountry sample strongly support the cross-cultural validity 
of Covin and Slevin’s EO scale. 
 
2.4.4 Entrepreneurial Orientation and Performance 
 Entrepreneurship scholars have tried to explain performance by focusing on a firm’s 
strategic EO (Wiklund and Shepherd 2003). Entrepreneurial orientation captures an 
important aspect of how a firm is organized, and it facilitates firm action on the basis of early 
signals from the internal and external environments (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). Therefore, 
EO can explain, in part, the managerial processes that enable some firms to be ahead of their 
competition. 
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 Previous empirical results provide support for a positive relationship between EO and 
performance (e.g., Wiklund 1999; Wiklund and Shepherd 2003; Zahra and Covin 1995). An 
EO can assist companies in many ways. The innovativeness dimension of EO leads firms to 
create and introduce new products and technologies, which may generate extraordinary 
economic performance; these have even been described as the engines of economic growth 
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). Proactive dimensions of EO can create first-mover 
advantages, target premium market segments, and skim the market ahead of competitors 
(Zahra and Covin 1995). Firms may have a chance to control the market by dominating 
distribution channels and establishing brand recognition. Risky strategies leading to 
performance variation may be more profitable in the long run (McGrath 2001). 
 However, the EO–performance relationship is contingent on the internal and external 
environments (e.g., Covin and Slevin 1989). The contingence relationship has been largely 
ignored in the literature. Lumpkin and Dess (1996) call for research to investigate how 
internal firm characteristics moderate and mediate the EO–performance relationship. 
Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) study how knowledge-based resources, applicable to the 
discovery and exploitation of opportunities, moderate the EO–performance relationship. 
They argue that EO captures a firm’s organization toward entrepreneurship and can enhance 
other firm resources. Unless the firm is willing to grasp and enthusiastically pursue these 
opportunities, the knowledge-based resources are likely to be underused. They find support 
for the interaction between EO and knowledge-based resources. 
 In conclusion, entrepreneurship literature calls for research to explore the underlying 
processes of how entrepreneurial activity affects performance in established firms (Lumpkin 
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 and Dess 1996). This dissertation responds to that call by examining how EO can help firms 
achieve high innovative outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOHTESES 
 
 Figure 1 depicts the theoretical framework that will be studied and tested in this 
dissertation. The theoretical framework for this study draws on capability-rigidity, 
entrepreneurship, and network theories. Marketing literature suggests that a balance between 
radical innovation and incremental innovation (across a firm’s portfolio of new product 
efforts) may lead to optimal new product success (e.g., Wind and Mahajan 1997). As posited 
in the model, because MO produces primarily adaptive learning insights, it increases 
incremental product innovation, which can increase NPD efficiency. Simultaneously, as with 
any other capability, MO can also lead to inertia and rigidity. In dynamic environments, this 
inertia and rigidity may create competency traps (e.g., relying on a previously successful 
NPD process rather than adopting new approaches), which in turn decrease new product 
creativity. Yet new product creativity is positively related to radical innovation. In order to 
reduce competency traps and enhance the firm’s ability to develop innovative new products, 
this model proposes that firms should seek to enhance two complementary assets to MO: (1) 
entrepreneurial orientation and (2) network learning. These may help reduce MO’s tendency 
to create learning traps by enhancing a firm’s ability to recognize new opportunities and 
create novel perspectives, which can reduce competency traps and increase radical new 
product innovation. 
 
 Figure 3.1 Research Model and Hypotheses 
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 3.1 Theoretical Framework 
3.1.1 Capability-Rigidity and Institutional Theories 
 According to section 2.3.3, the capability-rigidity framework introduces a paradox to 
the innovation literature. Leonard-Barton (1992) suggests that although organizational 
capabilities as a collection of knowledge sets enhance innovation, at the same time, they also 
hinder it. This negative side of organizational capabilities are rigidities (Leonard-Barton 
1992). In order to be efficient and effective in innovation competition, organizations exploit 
existing capabilities (Quinn 1980). However, environmental and market changes trigger 
tension between a need for innovation and the certainty and efficiency of the status quo in 
NPD projects. Organizations therefore struggle with the question of whether to maintain, 
improve, or replace core capabilities. 
 The very same values, norms, and attitudes that support a capability can also 
constrain it. How does this happen? Because institutionalized capabilities may lead to 
incumbent inertia (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). Prevailing operational routines may 
trap organizations into local search routines and limit an organization’s ability to innovate, 
imitate, and implement process improvements (Dickson 1992). This is often because human 
behavior makes it difficult to shift mentally from a successful but inefficient habitual activity 
(i.e., from an opportunity-cost perspective relative to an optimal solution for a new set of 
circumstances) to a more efficient way of solving problems or achieving a goal (Luchins and 
Luchins 1970). Therefore, an organization may become functionally fixed as a result of 
mental inertia. Furthermore, changing routines within an organization may be resisted 
because it can provoke conflict between functions and factions that have learned to work 
together over time around a particular process organization (Nelson and Winter 1982). 
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  In this dissertation, I test capability-rigidity theory by examining whether MO, as one 
particular organizational capability important in the NPD process, enhances new product 
efficiency but at the same time leads to competence traps—one type of inertia and rigidity—
that inhibit new product creativity. 
 
3.1.2 Organizational Learning Theory 
 According to section 2.3.l, organizational learning is particularly important for 
innovation and NPD in that the nature of NPD requires a departure from existing norms and 
routines, a shift that demands learning at the individual, team, and even organizational levels 
(Akgun, Lynn, and Reilly 2002; Bell, Whitewell, and Lukas 2002; Lynn, Skov, and Abel 
1999; Methe, Toyama, and Miyabe 1997). From a cognitive perspective, organizational 
learning may occur in two ways: (1) single-loop learning and (2) double-loop learning 
(Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001; Senge 1990; Slater and Narver 1995). Single-loop learning 
is a routine, incremental, conservative process that serves to maintain stable relations and 
sustain existing rules (Argyris and Schon 1978; Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001; Hedberg, 
Nystrom, and Starbuck 1976). The outcome of single-loop learning is incremental change or 
adaptation carried out to further exploit existing technologies and processes in ways that do 
not alter underlying assumptions or values (Argyris and Schon 1978; Cyert and March 1963; 
March 1991; Mckee 1992; Sinkula 2002). However, according to capability-rigidity theory, 
when a capability is codified in information systems, operating procedures, mission 
statements, and routines, these memories may persist (Slater and Narver 1995). Unintended 
consequences may result. Capabilities may become rigidities that can inhibit innovation 
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 (Leonard-Barton 1992). In order to reduce or avoid such rigidities, double-loop learning can 
be a useful complement in organizations. 
Double-loop learning concerns the search for and exploration of alternative routines, 
rules, technologies, goals, and purposes (Argyris and Schon 1978; Arthur and Aiman-Smith 
2001; Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck 1976; Mckee 1992). Second-order, or double-loop, 
learning sets new priorities and reexamines existing norms (Arthur and Aiman-Smith 2001). 
Double-loop learning enables organizations to break out of existing thought or behavior 
patterns by exploring qualitatively different ways of thinking and doing things. Double-loop 
learning is higher level and more cognitive than single-loop learning and aims at adjusting 
overall rules and norms rather than specific activities or behaviors (Foil and Lyles 1985; 
Mckee 1992). Therefore, double-loop learning is complementary to single-loop learning. 
According to March (1991), organizations must balance exploitation and exploration 
in their organizational learning because too much exploitation is unlikely to lead to double-
loop learning and too much exploration is too expensive. Very often organizations fall into 
competency traps as a result of inertia and rigidity in their organizational learning 
capabilities. Such inertia or rigidity leads the organization to become unwilling or unable to 
reject an existing capability even when a new capability may be more effective than existing 
ones. To reduce the prevalence of such adaptive learning traps, organizations must ensure 
that their networks include people with perspectives different from those of the dominant 
players in the organization (Slater and Narver 1995). 
After integrating organizational learning theories and capability-rigidity theory, this 
dissertation argues that although MO as a capability fosters new product efficiency and 
incremental new product innovation, at the same time it leads to rigidities, which are 
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 competency traps that reduce new product creativity and radical innovation. In order to break 
inertia and rigidity, and thereby reduce competency traps, organizations should conduct 
double-loop learning for reorientation by developing other complementary capabilities, such 
as an EO and network learning. According to Slater and Narver (1995), MO may not 
encourage sufficient willingness to take risks. An EO not only increases a top management 
team’s propensity for risk taking but also redirects the firm’s information processes to be 
more sensitive to new opportunity recognition. In addition, MO may limit a company’s focus 
to only the express needs of customers, which is only adaptive learning. In order to create 
double-loop learning, organizations must take advantage of other potential learning sources, 
such as suppliers, businesses in different industries, consultants, universities, and government 
agencies (Slater and Narver 1995). Such network learning extends a firm’s search scope 
beyond customers and competitors to a wider range of external sources of information, which 
helps reduce the likelihood and impact of competency traps. Therefore, EO and network 
learning may reduce or negate the rigidity outcome of MO and enable an organization to 
engage in double learning that facilitates strategic reorientation. 
 
3.1.3 Dynamic Capabilities Theory 
 Dynamic capabilities (DC) theory is built upon the theoretical foundations in 
economics provided by Schumpeter (1934), Penrose (1959), Nelson and Winter (1982), 
Teece (1988), and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997). The theory develops a framework to 
explain whether distinctive and difficult-to-replicate advantages can be built, maintained, and 
enhanced; how firms first develop firm-specific capabilities; and how firms renew 
competences to respond to rapid shifts in the business environment. Dynamic refers to the 
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 capacity to renew competencies to achieve congruence with a changing business 
environment (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Certain innovative responses are required when 
time-to-market and timing are critical to competitive success, the rate of technological 
change is rapid, and the nature of future competition and market are difficult to determine. 
Dynamic capabilities emphasize the key role of strategic management in appropriately 
adapting, integrating, and reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources, 
and functional competences to match the requirements of a changing environment (Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen 1997). 
Dynamic capabilities theory is developed from the resource-based view (RBV) of the 
firm. Both theories posit that firms are heterogeneous in the strategic resources they control, 
but they approach resource mobility differently (firms can develop firm-specific capabilities, 
and they can keep renewing their competences to respond to rapid shifts in the business 
environment) (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Because RBV theory posits that resources 
are stable and immobile, it cannot explain firm behavior and performance over time in a 
dynamic environment. According to DC theory, firms renew the capabilities required to 
acquired, develop, and reconfigure their resources, and this leads to resource mobility in the 
long run. Therefore, winners in dynamic market situations usually demonstrate timely 
responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, coupled with management’s ability 
to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences (Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen 1997). The DC approach stresses the exploitation of existing internal and external 
firm-specific competences to address changing environments. As an emerging and 
potentially integrative approach, DC theory helps to understand the new sources of 
competitive advantage (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). 
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 According to DC theory, firms’ renewal capabilities lead to resource mobility in the 
long run (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Managers contribute to renewal capabilities by 
building renewal mechanisms internally. If the mechanisms are distinctive and difficult to 
replicate, a firm can sustain superior profitability. If a business doesn’t have distinctive 
capabilities and none of its rivals have a meaningful advantage, then the profits of the 
business will settle at the industry average (Porter 1980). At the same time, interdependency 
and complementarity between various firm resources and capabilities contribute to the 
inimitability of firm-specific resource bundles, which enhances the sustainability of any 
competitive advantage achieved (e.g., Helfat 1997). 
Market orientation is viewed as an important knowledge-based capability that is rare, 
because of the difficulty and cost of obtaining such market-based knowledge, and potentially 
valuable. This is because it offers market-based insights that are not available to other firms 
(e.g., Hunt and Morgan 1995). However, complementary resources or capabilities are also 
required to enable the firm to gain maximum value and sustain innovation (Delmas 2002). 
Slater and Narver (1995, p. 71) suggest that EO and network learning are very important 
complementary capabilities to MO: “Market orientation without an entrepreneurial drive might 
focus the organization’s efforts too narrowly and, at best, produce adaptive learning.” 
Network learning may broaden the narrow construction of MO and enable a fresh perspective 
from strategic external partners. A failure to examine the impact of complementary resources 
and capabilities in the enabling of links between MO and NPP outcomes may explain why 
previous studies of the MO–NPP relationship have reported mixed empirical results. 
Although Slater and Narver (1995) suggest that MO is insufficient to produce a 
learning organization and new product innovation if it is not complemented by 
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 entrepreneurship and network learning, there is no study that empirically tests this 
proposition. Therefore, this dissertation fills this research gap by providing empirical 
evidence concerning capabilities that are complementary to MO in the NPD process. 
Specially, the framework proposes that a combination of MO, EO, and network learning is a 
key driver of new product innovation. Entrepreneurial orientation and network learning are 
complementary capabilities to MO because they help market-oriented firms break the constraints of 
MO by providing the ability to recognize radical new opportunities and to create unique 
perspectives, which in turn reduces the risk of competency traps and increases new product 
innovation. 
In the following section, I elaborate on the definitions and hypotheses. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Market Orientation 
 Section 2.3.3.1 discusses the capability-rigidity theory of Leonard-Barton (1992). 
This theory argues that on the one hand, capabilities can have positive effects on NPD; on the 
other hand, they can also simultaneously create rigidities, which inhibit new product 
innovation. There is little empirical evidence available to test this theory and framework. 
This section develops arguments to support the capability-rigidity framework by selecting 
MO as a capability and elaborating on how MO can enhance incremental NPD and NPD 
efficiency, while also inhibiting radical NPD and new product creativity by facilitating the 
creation of competency traps. 
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 3.2.2.1 The Positive Side of Market Orientation As a Capability 
 Narver and Slater (1990) define MO from a cultural perspective as a combination of 
customer orientation, competitor orientation, and interfunctional coordination. Market 
orientation as a single-loop learning capability may lead to the exploitation of existing 
technologies, routines, and processes (Dickson 1992). In this dissertation, NPD efficiency is 
conceptualized in terms of NPD speed and the ratio of NPD resources consumed to outcomes 
achieved. 
 
The link between customer orientation and NPD efficiency. Customer orientation occurs 
when firms engage in activities to understand their buyers in order to continually create 
superior value for them (Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998; Narver and Slater 1990). From a 
learning perspective, highly customer-oriented firms may have well-defined learning 
boundaries and be able to search quickly, because customer preferences become internalized 
in both individual and organizational memories. According to behavioral economics (Cyert 
and March 1963), decision makers look in the “neighborhoods” of the past patterns when 
searching for information, because this kind of internal search is quicker than broader 
external searches. Therefore, a customer focus may constrain firms to search only within the 
boundary of “customers.” Within the customer-bound search encouraged in the learning 
efforts of customer-oriented firms, managers are also more likely to focus on existing 
customers and to be bound by customers’ ability to express needs and requirements (e.g., 
Slater and Narver 1998). 
Products provided by highly customer-oriented firms may fit existing customer needs 
best. As a result, such firms’ customer-directed goals and efforts to incorporate customer 
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 value in all value-offering decisions (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997; Griffin and Hauser 1993). 
Highly customer-oriented firms should do a better job of identifying, structuring, prioritizing, 
and satisfying customers’ needs than do less customer-oriented firms (Narver and Slater 
1990). Such a customer focus may help firms capture existing market demands and reduce 
the potential risks of misfitting NPD resources to buyer needs (Li and Calantone 1998). 
Having a clear and superior understanding of customer expectations (Lee, Yang, and Yu 
2001) helps customer-oriented firms set clear time and budget goals for NPD plans. It is less 
likely that such firms waste time and NPD resources searching for inappropriate new product 
ideas and solutions. Their knowledge of customers should also enable customer-oriented 
firms to be more efficient in their test-marketing efforts. Therefore, customer orientation is 
positively associated with NPD efficiency because it enables managers to better focus NPD 
efforts and resource developments on the things that matter to customers. This leads me to 
posit that 
H1a: A firm’s customer orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
efficiency. 
 
The link between competitor orientation and NPD efficiency. Competitor orientation is the 
extent to which firms focus on learning about the resources, capabilities, motivations, and 
actions of their rivals, and it reflects their propensity to try to anticipate competitors’ moves 
(Narver and Slater 1990). Highly competitor-oriented firms often deploy significant 
resources toward market scanning and competitor intelligence. Competitor-oriented firms 
make efforts to analyze competitors’ strategies and identify their strengths and weakness 
(Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998). Such efforts may increase firms’ knowledge about 
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 competitors in terms of their resources, capabilities, strategies, and tactics (Katila 2002). 
From a learning perspective, highly competitor-oriented firms may be able to search more 
quickly and efficiently, because knowledge about their competitors becomes internalized in 
both individual and organizational memories. When NPD search patterns established by a 
competitor-focus form the boundaries of search, this kind of internal search is quicker than 
external search. 
 Through competitor analyses, highly competitor-oriented firms may know, with 
respect to the competitors’ product and service offerings, what works well for customers and 
where the competitors fail to meet customer requirements. They may therefore save time and 
resources in NPD activities by focusing only on elements of product offerings that seem to be 
important to customers, and thus avoid wasting time and resources engaging in NPD 
activities that target product elements that are less important to customers. Furthermore, since 
customer responses to new products are significantly affected by the available alternatives, 
firms with a deeper understanding of competitors are better able to develop and market new 
products that compare favorably to those of competitors. In addition, by understanding the 
benchmark of competitors’ products, a firm with a strong competitor orientation is less likely 
to overengineer (relative to competitors’ products) in its NPD efforts. A good understanding 
of competitive benchmarks is also likely to enable firms to achieve appropriate new product 
concepts quicker and to test-market new product prototypes more quickly and efficiently 
(Voss, Ahlstrom, and Blackmon 1997). Therefore, competitive intelligence and competitor 
knowledge may enable highly competitor-oriented firms to deploy NPD resources in ways 
that are more efficient than the industry average. 
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  Thus, I argue that competitor orientation is positively related to NPD speed and 
resource efficiency. 
H1b: A firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
efficiency. 
 
The link between interdepartmental coordination and NPD efficiency. Interfunctional 
coordination is the coordinated use of company resources across departmental and functional 
boundaries in creating superior value for target customers (Narver and Slater 1990). In an 
NPD context, interfunctional coordination requires NPD teams to coordinate with many other 
functional area or departments (Lukas and Ferrell 2000; Menon and Lukas 2004). 
Many previous studies indicate that coordination of NPD activities among employees 
and functional areas is associated with faster NPD (Gupta, Raj, and Wilemon 1986; Kessler 
and Chakrabarti 1996; Menon and Lukas 2004; Olson, Walker, and Ruekert 1995; Smith and 
Reinertsen 1991). Interdepartmental coordination requires the involvement of each function 
in order to serve customers’ needs, such as marketing, sales, manufacturing, R&D, finance, 
and accounting (Narver and Slater 1990). This kind of cross-functional involvement may 
significantly reduce NPD task–related errors and lead to early detection of mistakes (Kessler 
and Chakrabarti 1996; Menon and Lukas 2004), thereby reducing the number of new product 
redesigns and respecifications and enhancing NPD efficiency by saving NPD time and 
expenditures (Im, Nakata, Park, and Ha 2003). 
Interfunctional coordination also encourages each function to freely communicate 
information about its various customer experiences and the internal constraints within which 
new products will have to be developed and marketed (Narver and Slater 1990). The 
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 openness in communication and sharing information with different functions not only may 
enable every function to better understand other functions’ time lines and budget plans (Im et 
al. 2003) but also may enhance problem-solving capabilities (Han, Kim, and Srivastava 
1998) by providing a shared understanding for cooperation. Such shared understanding also 
reduces the occurrence and impact of strategy implementation barriers, further increasing 
relative NPD speed and resource utilization efficiency (e.g., Ruekert and Walker 1987). 
Furthermore, sharing resources with other functions in the interfunctional-coordinated firms 
(Narver and Slater 1990) may directly reduce duplicated budgets and any resource wasting, 
which is positively related to NPD efficiency. Thus, I suggest that 
H1c: A firm’s interdepartmental coordination is positively associated with its 
NPD efficiency. 
 
The link between customer orientation and NPD creativity. Customer-oriented firms make 
efforts to understand customer needs and wants and systematically and frequently measure 
customer satisfaction (Narver and Slater 1990). Controversial arguments about the 
relationship between customer orientation and new product creativity exist in the literature. 
On the one hand, some scholars posit that input from customers will result in less novel ideas 
than are possible through technology- or engineering-driven innovation (e.g., Bennett and 
Cooper 1981). This argument posits that customers are often resistant to the idea of change, 
limited in their ability to provide creative input into the NPD process, and even unreliable in 
predicting which new product ideas ultimately will be embraced (Veryzer 1998; Voss and 
Voss 2000). Being customer focused can therefore lead to inertia in NPD (Christensen and 
Bower 1996). This viewpoint has some empirical support in the literature. For example, Im 
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 and Workman (2004) show that a customer orientation has a negative effect on new product 
novelty. 
 Meanwhile, other scholars believe that a customer orientation is more likely to 
provide innovative ideas (e.g., Im et al. 2003). This body of literature suggests that new 
product ideas can come from lead users’ insights and suggestions (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995; von Hippel 1986). Traditional idea-generation techniques based on customer input 
usually collect information from a random or typical set of customers. A lead-user approach 
collects information about both needs and solutions from users at the leading edges of the 
target market as well as from users in other markets that face similar, but more extreme, 
problems. This approach assumes that lead users experience needs for a given innovation 
earlier than the majority of the target market. Lead users are also motivated to innovate, 
because they expect attractive innovation-related benefits from a solution to their needs 
(Lilien, Morrison, Searls, Sonnack, and von Hippel 2002). Compared with representative 
target-market users, lead users live in the future. Therefore, firms that see NPD through lead 
users’ eyes are less likely to be myopically anchored on existing products in their NPD 
efforts (Slater and Narver 1998). 
 Intuition suggests that the better you understand your customers, the more likely you 
are to be able to identify lead users. Exposing new product teams to customers’ needs and 
problems can motivate members to strive for more innovative solutions (Kanter 1989; Sethi, 
Smith, and Park 2001). Furthermore, if highly customer-oriented firms have low levels of 
competency traps, superior customer understanding should enable them to make any novel 
new product ideas meaningful to their target customers. Therefore, firms with a strong 
customer orientation will be more creative in their NPD and better able to market their new 
 110
 products such that customers will recognize and value their novelty. Therefore, I still argue 
that, absent competency traps, 
H2a: A firm’s customer orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
creativity. 
 
The link between competitor orientation and NPD creativity. Some researchers argue that a 
competitor focus may draw a firm’s attention to the issue of relative cost efficiencies 
(Gatignon and Xuereb 1997), which may tempt a firm simply to adopt competitors’ ideas and 
technology (Lukas and Ferrell 2000). However, if a firm does not exhibit competency traps, a 
highly competitor-oriented firm, with its superior knowledge of competitors, will have a 
better understanding of the benchmark products available to target customers as well as a 
better prediction of what competitors’ future products will look like and competitors’ likely 
product responses to the firm’s new product launches. Such competitor knowledge may 
enable the firm make better decisions regarding what their new product needs to be different 
from (in terms of competitors’ products), and how a product could deliver benefits to 
customers in ways that would be the most difficult for rivals to emulate. Knowing what 
competitors are and are likely to be doing, especially in terms of their strength and 
weaknesses, will therefore enable a firm to better understand what kind of NPD might be 
more novel and meaningful than that of their competitors in the market. Such competitor-
oriented firms are highly likely to create new products that are differentiated from those of 
their competitors (Im and Workman 2004). 
The objective of competitor-centered methods is to keep pace with or stay ahead of 
the rest of the field (Han, Kim, and Srivastava 1998). Therefore, such a competitive focus 
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 may provide firms with a motivation to search for novel new product ideas and facilitate new 
product innovation. Furthermore, from an evolutionary economics perspective, Dickson 
(1992) and Vorhies and Morgan (2005) argue that even though firms with a strong 
competitor orientation may be attempting to benchmark competitors’ products and processes 
to engage in imitative learning, capability interdependence and the impact of different 
organizational contexts between a benchmarking firm and a competitor benchmark firm lead 
imitative learning attempts to result in novel learning outcomes for the benchmarking firm. 
This provides the capability basis for developing novel new products (Vorhies and Morgan 
2005). Therefore, I suggest that, absent competency traps, 
H2b: A firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
creativity. 
 
The link between interdepartmental coordination and NPD creativity. Interdepartmental 
coordination encourages cooperation and involvement from different functional areas and 
departments in order to create customer value (Narver and Slater 1990). The NPD literature 
suggests that different functions and departments that may be engaged in NPD have different 
sources of knowledge and different types of expertise, and often develop different 
“thoughtworlds” (Dougherty 1992). Such heterogeneity of viewpoints may increase the 
possibility discovering novel linkages and stimulate creativity of problem solving in NPD 
process (Im et al. 2003; Milliken and Martins 1996; Sethi, Smith, and Park 2001) . Therefore, 
absent competence traps, when different departments successfully coordinate these different 
knowledge bases and perspectives to create NPD process, the potential for novelty results 
from combining different areas of knowledge to create new knowledge. 
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  In addition, groups from different backgrounds and perspectives are more likely to 
engage in devil’s advocacy and dialectical exchanges as they are forced to work together and 
to compromise and come up with agreements during the NPD process (e.g., Sethi, Smith, and 
Park 2001). This is likely to ensure that novel insights brought into the NPD process are also 
meaningful enough to persuade all areas involved of the likelihood of NPD success. Under 
such conditions, it is less likely that resultant new products are novel, because of the different 
perspectives brought to bear by different functional areas and departments, but are not 
meaningful to customers. Hence, I argue that interdepartmental coordination is associated 
with NPD creativity: 
H2c: A firm’s interdepartmental coordination is positively associated with its 
NPD creativity. 
 
3.2.2.2 The Negative Side of Market Orientation As a Capability 
 As capability-rigidity theory notes, it is also possible that MO as a capability may 
lead to rigidity, which this study refers to as competency traps. When strategic processes 
become routinized, commitment to established practices increases rigidity in behavior 
patterns and decreases both the volume and diversity of information processed (Fredrickson 
and Iaquinto 1989; Tushman and Romanelli 1985). This study argues that when a firm 
develops processes to facilitate its customer orientation, competitor orientation, and 
interfunctional coordination (Li and Calantone 1998; Narver and Slater 1990), these 
processes may be negatively related to creative and radical new product innovation. 
Atuahene-Gima’s (1996) study demonstrates that MO has a significant effect on product 
newness to customers but does not have a significant effect on product newness to the firm. 
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 A recent study by Zhou, Yim, and Tse (2005) also shows that MO facilitates innovations that 
use advanced technology and offer greater benefits to mainstream customers, but it inhibits 
innovations that target emerging market segments (e.g., lead users). These findings suggest 
that MO fosters incremental innovation, but at the same time it inhibits radical innovation. 
Lukas and Ferrell (2000) argue that the three dimensions of MO should have different 
impacts on product innovation. Their findings show that (1) customer orientation increases 
the introduction of new-to-the-world products and reduces the launching of me-too products, 
(2) competitor orientation increases the introduction of me-too products and reduces the 
launching of line extensions and new-to-the-world products, and (3) interfunctional 
coordination increases the launching of line extensions and reduces the introduction of me-
too products. 
Drawing on the literature, H2a–H2c also demonstrate that controversial arguments 
about the relationship among the three dimensions of MO and new product creativity exist in 
the literature. However, little insight is provided from available studies on how and why 
some dimensions of MO are associated with radical innovation and others are not. It is 
important for researchers and managers to understand the underlying rationale and processes 
of how organizational capabilities can lead to rigidity and inhibit innovation. In the following 
section, I attempt to map the processes of how the three dimensions of MO lead to 
competency traps. 
 
The link between customer orientation and vision trap. According to section 2.3.5, a vision 
trap is a strong, self-perpetuating, cognitive inertia that leads firms to discount weak signals 
in the environment, where those signals threaten the source of a firm’s confidence in its 
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 ability and actions. Three streams of literature provide a reason to expect a positive 
relationship between customer orientation and the degree to which a firm exhibits a vision 
trap. 
The first stream proposes that persistency in customers’ preferences can lead to 
inertia among customers that is internalized by customer-oriented firms. Most firms’ existing 
customers are not, by definition, lead users. They often have strong preferences and may not 
value or seek new radically new or different features in a firm’s new product offerings 
(Adner 2002; Im and Workman 2004). Close links with existing customers may therefore 
encourage a firm’s NPD efforts to fine-tune its offering to its customers and commit the firm 
to its current customers only (Danneels 2003). Therefore, inertia among customers may lead 
firms that are close to their customers to have a limited vision with regard to their NPD 
(Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback 1999; Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, and Anderson 2002). 
This may explain why radical and innovative product ideas are most often marketed to totally 
new customer segments (Berthon, Hulbert, and Pitt 2004). If firms’ resources are allocated to 
programs serving powerful, large, existing customers, firms may fail to lead in serving 
emerging customer segments, which may become mainstream over time (Christensen and 
Bower 1996). This stream of research therefore suggests that firms should ignore their 
existing customers (Chandy, Prabhu, and Antia 2003; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997; Hamel and 
Prahalad 1994) in order to resist NPD inertia. From this perspective, looser links with 
customers help a firm maintain its independence, its distinctiveness, and its self-
determination (Danneels 2003; Orton and Weick 1990), which fosters its vision with respect 
to NPD. 
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  A second stream of literature criticizes the credibility of consumers’ opinions as a 
source of new product ideas, even under the assumption that consumers’ preference do 
change over time. Christensen and Bower (1996) argue that listening too carefully to 
customers will restrict firms’ NPD vision to the familiar. Consumers are not perfectly 
informed about the latest market trends (Lukas and Ferrell 2000). They may not know 
enough about what new technologies are, or those that may become available, and they 
therefore lack foresight (Hamel and Prahalad 1994). They may not even be able to describe 
their requirements for a product that opens up entirely new markets and applications, limiting 
the innovation-driving benefits of the “voice of the customer” (O’Connor 1998). This stream 
in the literature therefore suggests that firms that are close to their customers and focus on 
customers in their NPD are less likely to acquire radical ideas and trigger creative NPD 
breakthroughs. Such firms are therefore more likely to have a constrained vision toward 
NPD. 
 The third stream of literature suggests that even if customers are not inert and possess 
foresight, the types of customers that make up the base of a customer-oriented firm may not 
change or vary greatly, making it difficult for a customer-oriented firm to hear very different 
and new voices. According to exit-voice theory (Hirschman 1970), when people are 
dissatisfied in relationships, they may engage in a number of behaviors including exit, voice, 
and loyalty. Customer dissatisfaction may come from a variety of causes, including customer 
preferences toward certain types of products and a desire for variety (Fornell and Wernerfelt 
1987). Customer orientation leads to high customer satisfaction and increased customer 
loyalty (Jaworski and Kohli 1993, Narver and Slater 1990). Dissatisfied customers may voice 
their complaints or exit from the firm and switch to a competitor supplier (Fornell, Johnson, 
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 Anderson, Cha, and Bryant 1996). As a result, in a customer-oriented firm, the needs, 
requirements, and preferences of its customers may become more homogenous over time—
even if the firm operates in a relatively dynamic marketplace with heterogeneous customers 
across the marketplace. Therefore, the more a firm focuses on understanding and serving its 
existing customers, the less it may be able to envision things beyond the relatively narrow 
constraints of its current customers. 
Therefore, I propose that 
H3a: The higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its vision 
trap. 
 
The link between customer orientation and technology trap. According to section 2.3.5, a 
firm in a technology trap tends to employ familiar and mature technologies in order to obtain 
legitimacy and operating efficiencies. 
 The literature suggests that customer orientation is negatively related to technological 
innovation. Technology is a powerful engine of economic progress (John, Weiss, and Dutta 
1999). Technological knowledge accumulates as a function of technological experience, and 
radical new technologies incorporate substantially different and new knowledge (Nerkar and 
Roberts 2004). This type of knowledge can be sufficiently complex that it is difficult for 
competitors to imitate (Chandy and Tellis 1998; Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999; Wuyts, 
Dutta, and Stremersch 2004). However, because customers may have little professional 
knowledge about advanced technology, they may not be a good source of knowledge 
concerning the desirability of product benefits that may be available through the use of a new 
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 technology. It is therefore unlikely that customers can provide much constructive input 
concerning new technology selections for NPD. Even if a firm provides customers with 
technology options and lets customers make technology decisions, it is possible that 
customers may reject more advanced technology because they may be uncomfortable with 
the complexity of new functions. Since most customers are by definition not lead users, it is 
less likely that existing consumers will understand the complexity of radical technology and 
see the world through technological possibilities or that they will know enough about 
leading-edge technologies (Christensen and Bower 1996; Hamel and Prahalad 1994; Lukas 
and Ferrell 2000; Slater and Narver 2000). Therefore, listening to customers leads firms to 
focus on existing technologies and minor modifications to existing technologies. 
 In an environment of scarce resources, localized learning from existing customers is 
likely to be at the expense of learning from prospective customers. Existing customers may 
often have strong preferences for existing technology, and they may not value new, 
unfamiliar technology even if the new technology proves to make further development 
(Adner 2002; Im and Workman 2004). Customers with similar needs and requirements may 
be drawn to the same supplier, further reducing the variety encountered by the customer 
oriented firm in its NPD search efforts. Exit-voice theory suggests that this is likely to be 
exacerbated over time by increased switching behavior among customers of a firm that have 
different needs and requirements from those of a firm’s mainstream customer base and that 
the firm may not meet as well (Hirschman 1970). A high customer orientation may therefore 
lead firms only to pursue new technologies that address the needs of their current customers 
and lock firms into existing mature and familiar technology (Adner 2002; Christensen and 
Bower 1996). A firm’s choice of customer may therefore constrain its decisions concerning 
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 technology. Under such conditions, a customer orientation may be associated with firms that 
higher levels of technology traps. Therefore, I suggest the following: 
H3b: The higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
technology trap. 
 
The link between customer orientation and routinization trap. As described in section 2.3.5, a 
routinization trap refers to a situation in which firms tend to follow formalized and 
standardized processes, procedures, or routines for NPD. 
 Because customers may have relatively stable preferences, customer-oriented firms 
have little incentive to experiment with and change NPD routines. In addition, the literature 
suggests that customer-oriented firms have higher levels of customer satisfaction (e.g., Day 
1994; Jaworski and Kohli 1993). Given that customer satisfaction is a key objective of 
customer-oriented firms, firms that are highly customer oriented and have high levels of 
customer satisfaction are less likely to seek to “fix what is not broken” in the NPD process. 
More likely, such firms will reinforce what may be a contributor to their success in satisfying 
customers by seeking to routinize their NPD procedures to minimize the likelihood of their 
working less well in future efforts to develop products that satisfy customer needs. Therefore, 
a customer orientation may lead firms to exhibit higher levels of routinization traps. 
 In addition, economic theory suggests that customers tend to seek new products with 
high utility (i.e., a relatively low price within a reasonable quality range) (e.g., Armstrong 
and Collopy 1996). In making trade-offs between cost and innovation in NPD, highly 
customer-oriented firms may therefore overweigh cost as compared with novelty. Adoption 
of radical new ideas requires new and flexible procedures, which are difficult, costly, and 
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 risky (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Nelson and Winter 1982). Meanwhile, formalized NPD 
procedures carry out the repeated tasks of manufacturing and distributing large volumes of 
the products efficiently, and firms in price-sensitive and competitive markets are therefore 
likely to have an incentive to routinize rather than to use more-flexible NPD procedures 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977; Henderson and Clark 1990; Nelson and Winter 1982). Thus, a 
customer orientation may lead to a vested interest in the current NPD routines (Staw 1980). 
 Furthermore, exit-voice theory (Hirschman 1970) also suggests a negative 
consequence of customer orientation on firms’ routinization behaviors. According to exit-
voice theory, the exit of dissatisfied customers with needs and requirements that differ from 
those of the mainstream customer base may lead customer-oriented firms to have less variety 
in their customer population. This may be exacerbated over time by positive word-of-mouth 
recommendations from satisfied customers to prospective customers that may have similar 
needs. The resulting stability and lack of variety in a firm’s customer population is less likely 
to create rapid changes in their needs, requirements, and preferences for new products. 
Therefore, the NPD processes required to serve customer needs are less likely to require 
significant and frequent changes in a highly customer-oriented firm. 
H3c: The higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
routinization trap. 
 
The link between competitor orientation and vision trap. Competitor orientation emphasizes 
knowledge search about competitors (Katila 2002). Although some literature argues that 
market- and learning-oriented small- and medium-sized enterprises facing strong competition 
tend to be more innovative (Sakavou, Baltas, and Lioukas 2004), the evidence linking 
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 competitor orientation with innovation is inconclusive. For example, Katila (2002) finds that 
firms that respond quickly to and build on their competitors’ actions, may introduce more 
products, but that these new product introductions are often based on imitation and are often 
not unique. 
 The literature indicates that a focus on competitors can make managers think more 
about “beating the competitors” rather than “doing the best for my firm” (Armstrong and 
Collopy 1996). Social comparison theory (Suls 1977) suggests that when the information is 
available, people often judge their performance in comparison with that of others. In a highly 
competitor-oriented firm, providing managers with information concerning competitors may 
therefore lead firms to compare and contrast their products and processes with those of 
competitors. This type of benchmarking behavior is an imitative learning process (Voss, 
Ahlstrom, and Blackmon 1997) that constrains a firm’s viewpoints and may limit a firm into 
local idea searches and block distant exploration in organizational learning. Thus, I argue the 
following: 
H4a: The higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
vision trap. 
 
The link between competitor orientation and technology trap. A competitor focus should 
keep firms abreast of emergent competitive technologies or even promote a proactive 
engagement in developing one to “beat” rivals. Highly competitor-oriented firms therefore 
also often have a strong technological orientation (D’Aunno, Succi, and Alexander 2000). 
However, a decision to select an advanced technology that may be totally new to the market 
and the industry requires going against industry norms. According to institutional theory, 
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 firms tend to copy one another and converge toward competitive norms because of three 
types of pressures: (1) coercive pressures from legal mandates or influence from 
organizations they are dependent upon, (2) mimetic pressures to copy successful forms that 
arise during high uncertainty, and (3) normative pressures to homogeneity that arise from the 
similar attitudes and approaches of professional groups and associations brought into the firm 
through hiring practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
 In the institutional environment, information about competitors’ technology may 
therefore lead firms to mimic their competitors, adopt competitors’ technology, and engage 
in refining the current similar technology rather than searching for and adopting leading-edge 
technology (Lukas and Ferrell 2000; Zahra, Nash, and Bickford 1995), because imitation 
may provide the legitimacy and certainty of the technology to the firms. In each industry, 
there are certain types of technologies that exist as a form of legitimacy or norm (e.g., 
Duguet and MacGarvie 2005; Wright 2000). A competitor-oriented firm may adhere to the 
established technology in order to obtain the legitimacy, because a competitor focus binds the 
firm to a local technology search rather than to a more widespread radical technology search 
in its organizational learning efforts. 
H4b: The higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
technology trap. 
 
The link between competitor orientation and routinization trap. There are three reasons to 
expect that a competitor orientation may be positively associated with routinization traps as 
suggested in the literature. First, the availability of intelligence regarding competitors often 
leads firms to engage in competitive benchmarking of products, processes, and performance 
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 (Vorhies and Morgan 2005). In order to be competitive in terms of the price of new products 
and the cost of NPD, competitor-oriented firms are therefore likely to emphasize the efficient 
deployment of resources in their NPD efforts. In this situation, standardized routines, rather 
than constant and radical changes in NPD, may be preferred, because standardized routines 
require fewer inputs, enhance the benefits of experiential learning, and thereby help firms 
increase efficiency and reduce costs associated with their NPD (e.g., Clark, Amundson, and 
Cardy 2002). 
Second, in focusing organizational learning search on competitors, firms often seek to 
imitate superior NPD routines from high-performing competitors. However, attempts at such 
imitative learning often fail, even within a single firm, when knowledge of the performance 
of a process is presumably greater than what a firm seeks to learn from a competitor 
(Szulanski 1996). The sticky nature of the information about competitor routines, procedures, 
and processes makes it very difficult and very costly to acquire and transfer that information 
(von Hippel 1994, 1998). Even if a competitor-oriented firm gains insight into a competitor’s 
NPD processes, the difficulties in transforming the firm’s own processes mean that most such 
attempts at imitative learning fail (Vorhies and Morgan 2005). As a result, existing NPD 
routines in competitor-oriented firms can become more inert. 
Third, a strong competitor focus may itself be a source of legitimacy in an industry. 
This may be seen in the strong competitor orientations advocated by managers in particular 
industries, such as the semiconductor industry (Grove 1990). If competitors in an industry 
focus on one another, few radically new capabilities may be developed, thus reducing the 
likelihood of significant changes in NPD processes with an industry. Furthermore, in the 
institutional environment, certain types of NPD routines may serve as a source of legitimacy 
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 or form ingredients in industry recipes as to how tasks should be accomplished (e.g., Duguet 
and MacGarvie 2005; Wright 2000). In order to be competitive, a competitor-oriented firm 
may therefore tend to acquire legitimacy in its NPD routines and conduct only local searches 
in its organizational learning for process improvement. In this situation, incremental changes 
in NPD processes may be preferred to dramatic and frequent changes in NPD processes. 
Therefore, high competitor orientation may increase the possibility of falling into a 
routinization trap. 
H4c: The higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
routinization trap. 
 
The link between interfunctional coordination and vision trap. The literature provides two 
reasons to believe that interfunctional coordination may lead to vision traps in firms’ NPD 
efforts. First, the literature suggests that cognitive conflict is common in cross-functional 
teams, and such conflicts may undermine the production of novelty (Joshi and Sharma 2004). 
As a result of different languages and vocabularies in different functional areas (Dougherty 
1992; Lovelace, Shapiro, and Weingart 2001), misunderstandings and disagreements often 
occur in cross-functional teams. Resultant difficulties in reaching agreements and finding 
integrative solutions for conflicts (Lovelace, Shapiro, and Weingart 2001) may lead teams to 
resort to simplifying heuristics or algorithmic problem solving (Andrews and Smith 1996; Im 
et al. 2003). As a result, conformity and groupthink may emerge as ways to reduce 
coordination costs and conflicts in groups of individuals from different functional areas and 
departments. Janis (1982) defines groupthink as the propensity of groups to respond to 
interpersonal pressure in such a manner that group members’ strivings for unanimity override 
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 their motivation to analyze alternative courses of action realistically (see also Miranda and 
Saunders 1995). 
 Conformity and groupthink have been often observed in firms with high levels of 
interfunctional coordinated that encourage employees with different perspectives to work 
together with a focus on a single task (NPD), with a single superordinate goal (serving 
customers), and under time pressure (as is most often the case in NPD projects) (Adams, 
Day, and Dougherty 1998; Sarin and McDermott 2003). Although such groupthink 
minimizes conflicts, it may encourage free riding and stifle innovative ideas (Jehn and 
Mannix 2001). This may constrain firms’ visions for NPD and reduce the questioning of 
NPD assumptions, such as the continued appropriateness of process and routines that have 
been successful in the past. 
 Second, in contrast to the other two elements of MO, interfunctional coordination is 
internally focused on relationships and processes within the firm (e.g., Shapiro 1988). The 
literature suggests that, ceteris paribus, a strong focus on interfunctional coordination is 
therefore more likely to lead a firm to compare its NPD processes and effectiveness with 
internal objectives and past performance than with external benchmarks (Greve 2003). This 
may constrain a firm’s organizational learning search in NPD to the local environment inside 
the firm. Given resource scarcity for organizational learning (Vorhies and Morgan 2005), this 
is likely to limit more distant external information search and may prevent the firm from 
having a more open and questioning vision of its NPD capabilities. 
Thus, I argue the following: 
H5a: The higher a firm’s interdepartmental coordination, the higher is the level 
of its vision trap. 
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The link between interdepartmental coordination and technology trap. Two areas highlighted 
in the literature indicate a potential relationship between interdepartmental coordination and 
technology traps. First, while the literature indicates that personnel with diverse backgrounds 
may potentially bring fresh perspectives to NPD (Beckman and Haunschild 2002), they may 
also cause conflicts among different functional areas. Different functions may have different 
ideas and suggestions on how to conduct novel and meaningful NPD, each of which may 
involve certain degrees of risk (Wind and Mahajan 1997). The increased difficulties 
associated with reaching agreements across different departments and different 
“thoughtworlds” leads firms to seek a way to minimize interdepartmental conflicts (Janis 
1982; Miranda and Saunders 1995). Reliance on proven existing and established technologies 
in NPD is one way to aid coordination among different functions and provides a safe way to 
reduce uncertainty and minimize the political interfunctional arguments (Tyre and Hauptman 
1992). Therefore, the pressure to make agreements and coordinate among different functions 
may lead firms to prefer to adopt and maintain existing and familiar technologies rather than 
leading-edge technologies in their NPD efforts (Argyris 1982; Carmel 1995; Crawford 1992; 
Lukas and Ferrell 2000). 
Second, the management and marketing literature also suggest that the execution of 
strategies that requires the acquisition and deployment of new-to-the-firm resources is more 
difficult to achieve than those that are “tried-and-tested” within the firm (Moorman and 
Miner 1997; Ruekert and Walker 1987). This literature also indicates that a lack of effective 
interfunctional coordination is a key problem that undermines strategy execution (Jaworski 
and Kohli 1993; Walker and Ruekert 1987). To the extent that firms with a focus on 
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 interdepartmental coordination are seeking to smooth strategy implementation, they are 
therefore less likely to continually seek to incorporate new technologies in their NPD 
strategies, since this would increase likely strategy implementation problems. Therefore, this 
literature suggests that negotiation, consensus, compromise, and a stronger focus on 
implantation “realities” will increase the perceived coordination difficulties from any radical 
change and will lead firms to prefer incremental changes in technology in an NPD context 
(e.g., Ruekert and Walker 1987). Thus, I suggest the following: 
H5b: The higher a firm’s interdepartmental coordination, the higher is the level 
of its technology trap. 
 
The link between interfunctional coordination and routinization trap. Routines refer to 
processes or procedures for NPD. Organizational routines are tacit procedures that become 
embedded in NPD practice and serve to give employees a standardized, practical means to 
accomplish required tasks. Routinization becomes a method of getting things done, a sharing 
between organizational members of learning as a common understanding so as to exploit 
what is necessary to achieve the ends desired (Fiol 1994). Routines go beyond written 
manuals to include tacit procedures as well as explicit processes (Clark, Amundson, and 
Cardy 2002). These routines provide a map for people with different skills and knowledge 
across different areas to work together to achieve a common objective. The literature 
suggests two reasons to expect a positive relationship between interfunctional coordination 
and routinization traps. 
 First, firms with a strong interdepartmental orientation focus on maintaining strong 
coordination mechanisms (Maltz and Kohli 2000). Since the NPD process is a key 
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 coordinating process within most firms (Menon and Lukas 2004), firms seeking to maintain 
coordination will have less incentive to change their NPD routines. Moreover, as previously 
discussed interdepartmental orientation emphasizes local NPD learning within the firm and is 
less conducive to the conduct of extensive distant or external searches for potentially novel 
new NPD routines. 
 Second, the structure of interfunctional coordination may shift firms’ focus from the 
external environment to internal coordination. According to Tushman and Romanelli (1985), 
internal requirements for coordinated activities and flows may lead to increased structural 
elaboration and social complexity. Such interdependent structural and social linkages in 
coordinated activities dispose individuals in the group against any radical change (in the 
routines) and increase individual and group commitments to the current status and routines 
(Houston et al. 2001; Miller and Friesen 1980). Therefore, high interdepartmental 
coordination is likely to increase cognitive inertia toward current new product routines and 
invites incremental modifications rather than radical changes in new product processes and 
procedures. 
 For these reasons I expect the following: 
H5c: The higher a firm’s interdepartmental orientation, the higher is the level of 
its routinization trap. 
 
3.2.2 Competency Traps 
 Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) define NPD as “the process of conceiving and creating 
a new product and the outcomes of that process.” The objective of NPD is to combine 
available resources for creating value offerings that match the needs of the external 
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 environment. Strong organizational learning capabilities can lead to enhanced NPP and lead 
a firm to be highly innovative (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
The link between vision trap and NPD efficiency. Firms engage in exploration and/or 
exploitation of knowledge through organizational learning to improve their ability to 
effectively and efficiently perform required tasks (e.g., Slater and Narver 1995). A vision 
trap represents a cognitive bias toward current NPD procedures that have already 
demonstrated favorable outcomes. Vision-trapped firms tend to believe that habitual activity 
or experiential learning (i.e., exploitation) is a more efficient way of solving NPD problems 
than exploration (Luchins and Luchins 1970). Firms immediately benefit from this kind of 
exploitation learning by having certain speed, proximity, and clarity of outcome (March 
1991). A low level of vision trap indicates less cognitive inertia in the existing NPD process 
and a strong preference toward experimentation with new NPD procedures. However, the 
returns from this kind of exploration learning returns are uncertain, distant, and often 
negative. Low speed and high costs of experimentation are common features of exploration 
learning (March 1991). Thus, organizational learning theory suggests that 
H6a: The level of vision trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively associated with 
its NPD efficiency. 
 
The link between technology trap and NPD efficiency. Technology-trapped firms tend to rely 
on the legitimacy of familiar and current existing mature technologies. Familiar technology 
requires little new or additional learning in the firm’s NPD process (Ahuja and Lampert 
2001). Firms in technology traps become specialized in a familiar technology (Levinthal and 
March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). The experiential learning from familiar technology 
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 may shorten the time taken in NPD and increases the potential discovery of ways to use 
resources more productively in the NPD process. Mature technologies are also relatively well 
known in the industry (Ahuja and Lampert 2001). The legitimacy of mature technologies 
may also shorten NPD cycle times by increasing the speed of acceptance of new products 
among customers and channel intermediaries (Ahuja and Lampert 2001; Levinthal and 
March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). Products incorporating mature technology may 
therefore also enable a firm to expend relatively fewer resources convincing customers of 
their legitimacy (Ahuja and Lampert 2001). The relative reliability of mature technologies 
may also reduce new product failures during the NPD process, further saving time and other 
resources. 
In contrast, firms with a low level of technology traps have to spend more time on 
learning new technologies, and they also expend more effort and deploy more resources to 
educate their customers on new technologies. Furthermore, many emerging technologies may 
make fundamental breakthroughs and achieve eventual success only after they have gone 
through a number of failures (Ahuja and Lampert 2001). New emerging technologies are 
therefore likely to require more time and greater resources than mature and familiar 
technology in NPD. Therefore, firms with a low level of technology traps may not be as 
efficient as firms with a high level of technology traps. 
H6b: The level of technology traps in a firm’s NPD process is positively 
associated with its NPD efficiency. 
 
The link between routinization trap and NPD efficiency. Firms in routinization traps tend to 
follow formalized/standardized rather than flexible/new NPD processes, procedures, or 
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 routines. Formalized and standardized procedures may facilitate experiential learning by 
simplifying and repeating the same routines over time (Clark, Amundson, and Cardy 2002). 
This kind of facilitated learning may shorten the NPD process and enable the firm to use its 
NPD resources very productively (Levinthal and March 1993). In contrast, firms with low 
level of routinization traps may use more flexible NPD procedures and tend to experiment 
with new NPD procedures (Arthur 1984; Levitt and March 1988). It takes time for firms to 
learn new procedures and make adjustment to different NPD procedures (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991). Experimenting with new NPD procedures can be costly and may require that 
firms maintain underutilized resources to enable a switch in NPD procedures when the 
results of experimental learning indicate that a new NPD process may be beneficial (e.g., 
Dobrev, Kim, and Carroll 2003). Thus, 
H6c: The level of routinization traps in a firm’s NPD process is positively 
associated with its NPD efficiency. 
 
The link between vision trap and new product creativity. As noted in section 2.3.5, vision 
traps occur when organizations have a cognitive bias toward current NPD procedures and 
tend to deny the need to change their NPD processes. A higher level of vision trap indicates 
overconfidence in a firm’s current NPD process. Such confidence may create a strong, self-
perpetuating cognition, and lead firms stay within a comfort zone in their NPD processes that 
they believe have been successful in the past (Levinthal and March 1993; Levitt and March 
1988). Firms with high levels of vision trap are less likely to search broadly, because they are 
satisfied with the performance of their existing NPD capabilities (e.g., Greve 2003; Miller 
1990). Strong inertia in current NPD procedures therefore reduces their motivation to 
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 conduct intensive exploration learning and to search for greater creativity in their NPD 
efforts. 
In contrast, a low level of vision trap indicates low cognitive inertia or bias in favor of 
the existing NPD processes. Firms with low cognitive inertia tend to look for opportunities 
and areas for improvement in their existing NPD processes and procedures. They are highly 
motivated to conduct distant exploration learning in order to develop more novel and 
meaningful new products than their existing products (Levinthal and March 1993; Levitt and 
March 1988). Therefore, firms with low levels of vision traps are more likely to seek and find 
creativity in their NPD efforts: 
H7a: The level of vision traps in a firm’s NPD process is negatively associated 
with its NPD creativity. 
 
The link between technology trap and new product creativity. Firms with higher levels of 
technology traps tend to rely on the legitimacy of familiar and current existing mature 
technologies. Although sticking with familiar and current existing mature technologies may 
require less time and effort in NPD, failure to incorporate new technologies may lead the 
firm to render its NPD capabilities obsolete over time (Afuah 2001). The nature of localized 
learning in NPD that draws on familiar and mature technologies may limit the possibilities 
for the development of creative new products. In addition, higher levels of technology traps 
are likely to be evident in firms that have a low technology orientation, which is often 
associated with a low R&D orientation. Yet greater R&D capabilities have been linked with 
more innovative NPD efforts (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
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 In contrast, lower levels of technology traps may be positively related to a high 
technological orientation. A technology-oriented firm tends to encourage employees to seek 
novel ideas and meaningful inventions (Zhou, Yim, and Tse 2005). Firms with a low level of 
technology traps are willing to incorporate early emerging technologies even though these 
new technologies may not be as efficient or may provide less certain returns (Levinthal and 
March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). However, the fresh perspective offered by new 
emerging technologies offers a greater likelihood of creativity in NPD. In order to be able to 
make fundamental breakthroughs later (Ahuja and Lampert 2001), firms with lower levels of 
technology traps are willing to trade legitimacy and efficiency benefits from mature or 
familiar technology for NPD creativity benefits that are potentially available from more 
recently developed and less-well-tested new technologies. Thus: 
H7b: The level of technology traps in a firm’s NPD process is negatively 
associated with its NPD creativity. 
 
The link between routinization trap and new product creativity. Firms with higher levels of 
routinization traps tend to follow formalized and standardized processes, procedures, or 
routines to develop new products. Formalized procedures are likely to produce routine 
solutions to problems, which discourages new-idea generation (Troy, Szymanski, and 
Varadarajan 2001). The inertia that often accompanies standardization of procedures may 
limit firms’ NPD learning within a local domain. However, novel NPD ideas may require 
distant learning in order to obtain a very fresh perspective (Brockman and Morgan 2003; 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
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  In contrast, firms with lower levels of routinization traps tend to use less formalized 
and standardized routines and as a result have more flexible NPD routines. In general, low-
formalization and high-flexibility NPD routines permit openness and facilitate creative ideas 
(Damanpour 1991). Creativity in NPD often comes from greater risk taking and multiple 
experiments involving NPD procedures or processes (Wind and Mahajan 1997). It is intuitive 
that radical and creative new products are less likely to emerge from the same NPD 
procedure that produced a firm’s existing products. Thus: 
H7c: The level of vision traps in a firm’s NPD process is negatively associated 
with its NPD creativity. 
As elaborated above, MO as a capability may have a “dark-side” effect—the 
development of competence traps. In order to reduce the detrimental effects of competency 
traps, organizations may create double-loop learning systems by creating a complementary 
EO and by engaging in network learning. This dissertation proposes that EO and network 
learning are two important complementary assets to MO that may reduce both the level and 
the negative effects of competency traps in the NPD process. 
 
3.2.3 Entrepreneurial Orientation 
 Entrepreneurial orientation concerns entrepreneurship behaviors at the firm level 
rather than at the individual level (Lee, Lee, and Pennings 2001). According to the literature 
reviewed in section 2.4.2, EO refers to a culture with high tolerance for risk, high innovation, 
and proactiveness (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and 
Dess 2000; Richard et al. 2004). New product development teams may perceive higher 
psychological safety in their decision making in highly entrepreneurial-orientated firms than 
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 in low entrepreneurial-oriented firms, which may encourage them to search for novel new 
product ideas. Competency traps represent a tendency to maintain existing and familiar 
technologies and routines in NPD (Levinthal and March 1993). Firms with higher levels of 
competency traps tend to engage in excessive exploitation because the return of exploitation 
is more certain, quick, and precise than that of exploration (March 1991). 
 
The direct link between entrepreneurial orientation and vision trap 
 In a direct way, an entrepreneurial culture that values innovativeness, risk taking, and 
proactiveness may change managers’ perceptions of the risks involved in exploring the 
domain of the firm’s NPD processes. According to Kirzner (1997), an entrepreneurial culture 
encourages a firm to discover new means–end relationships rather than to seek to optimize 
existing ones. Highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms are therefore more likely to proactively 
seek novel ideas for new products through experimental and creative NPD processes (e.g., 
Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). 
 In contrast, a low EO may discourage the proactive risk taking and comfort with 
ambiguity and potential for failure that may be required to depart from existing NPD routines 
that are believed to have been successful in the past. Rather, a firm with a low EO is more 
likely to maintain less risky and more certain current NPD procedures or routines and to 
focus on the less ambiguous and more obvious benefits available from local exploitation 
learning in their NPD efforts. Therefore, a firm’s EO may directly reduce vision traps by 
encouraging managers to focus on new opportunities and providing a strong motivation to 
move away from the firm’s preexisting routines for developing new products. 
 Thus: 
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 H8a: The higher a firm’s EO, the lower is the level of its vision trap. 
 
The direct link between entrepreneurial orientation and technology trap. The innovativeness 
dimension of EO emphasizes the ability to implement experimentation and to develop 
original approaches to problem solving (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; 
Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). Highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms may therefore tend to 
avoid using mature and familiar technologies and instead are more likely to value new and 
emerging technologies for NPD activities. The risk-taking dimension of EO promotes more 
risky and less certain behaviors in the NPD process (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and 
Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). High-risk goals are usually preferred in such 
firms (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). In 
a highly entrepreneurial-oriented firm, it is less likely for NPD teams to “play it safe” and 
stick with technologies they already know in the NPD process. Although adopting new 
emerging technologies in NPD may risk increased problems in customer acceptance and 
lower reliability, the behaviors valued in highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms may lead 
managers to perceive the risk of sticking with new and familiar technologies as greater than 
the risk of missing new opportunities that may be afforded by new emerging technologies 
(Adner 2002; Gatignon et al. 2002; Slater and Narver 2000). The proactiveness dimension of 
EO fosters a forward-looking perspective and values the creation of a first-mover advantage 
(Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). A highly 
entrepreneurial-oriented firm is therefore more likely to encourage its NPD teams to 
incorporate very new technologies in its NPD process that rivals may not yet have adopted. 
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 In contrast, low entrepreneurial-oriented firms may not value innovation and 
experimentation approaches very much, and they may not prioritize new emerging 
technology ahead of mature and familiar technology (Adner 2002; Gatignon et al. 2002). 
Low risk taking in low entrepreneurial-oriented firms may discourage broad NPD technology 
search and encourage only local technology search in NPD (Nerkar and Roberts 2004). In 
addition, the reactive posture associated with low levels of EO may only motivate the firm to 
engage in imitative learning as a way of seeking legitimacy (Covin and Slevin 1991; 
Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). Mature and familiar technology is 
therefore more likely to be preferred in NPD efforts rather than new emerging technology in 
low entrepreneurial-oriented firms. 
 Therefore: 
H8b: The higher a firm’s EO, the lower is the level of its technology traps. 
 
The direct link between entrepreneurial orientation and routinization trap. Highly 
entrepreneurial-oriented firms highly value experimentation and original approaches to 
problem solving (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and 
Dess 2000). Such cultures may therefore encourage managers to experiment with new and 
different NPD procedures and routines. Highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms do not like to 
play it safe (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 
2000). Maintaining preexisting fixed and formalized NPD procedures is therefore not 
consistent with the characteristics of entrepreneurially oriented firms. Rather, such firms 
prefer to take greater risks and conduct broader searches in their organizational learning that 
may result in more significant and radical changes to the firm’s NPD routines. The proactive 
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 nature of highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms drives them to chase potential new 
opportunities in a changing market (Lumpkin and Dess 1996). This makes it less likely that 
such firms will protect and maintain the same standardized or formalized NPD procedures 
over time. 
 In contrast, low entrepreneurial-oriented firms may be much more concerned with 
avoiding risk in their NPD activities, and they are therefore less likely to recognize a need for 
change in NPD processes and procedures that may have been proved over time. Rather, fixed 
and formalized NPD procedures may be valued by low entrepreneurial-oriented firms. The 
culture of firms with a low EO is likely to encourage process inertia (Covin and Slevin 1991; 
Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000), making them slow to recognize a 
need to change their NPD processes and limiting changes that are adopted once a need to do 
so is recognized. Local NPD learning is likely to be more encouraged than broader NPD 
learning, which discourages experimentation and the exploration of new and different ways 
to accomplish NPD tasks (Nerkar and Roberts 2004). 
Thus, I suggest the following: 
H8c: The higher a firm’s EO, the lower is the level of routinization traps in its 
NPD 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation, market orientation, and competency traps. According to Slater 
and Narver (1995), an MO within a firm may not encourage a sufficient willingness to take 
risks. A market-oriented firm may not be able to envision opportunities for radical new 
products in new markets, because it focuses primarily on the express needs of its existing 
customers (Christensen and Bower 1996; Lukas and Ferrell 2000; Slater and Narver 1995). 
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 Therefore, an MO may lead to competency traps. In the following section, I propose that EO 
plays a moderating role in the link between MO and competency traps. This suggests that in 
addition to its direct negative effect on competency traps, a firm’s EO may also weaken the 
relationship between its MO and competency traps. 
In this moderating role, EO is suggested as a complement to MO (Slater and Narver 
1995). By providing a motivational force against inertia and rigidity, entrepreneurial cultures 
may weaken the tendency of market-oriented firms to have a narrow focus on existing 
customers, competitors, and cross-functional relationships that facilitate the development of 
competency traps in the NPD process. 
 
The moderating role of entrepreneurial orientation in the link between market orientation 
and vision trap. In highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms, an MO is less likely to create vision 
traps. As argued in earlier hypotheses, MO may be associated with vision traps. H3a argues 
that customer orientation may limit firms’ vision because of customers’ preference inertia, 
the credibility of customers as a source of new product ideas, and the stability of customer 
populations in customer-oriented firms. However, an entrepreneurial culture values risk 
taking and proactive postures (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, 
Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). This may help customer-oriented firms to overcome the relatively 
limited vision available from an existing customer perspective when the firm searches for 
new product ideas. Firms will be less likely to limit their learning search in NPD to only their 
existing customers. They may be more likely to also approach different potential future 
customer populations and even chase feedback from their existing unhappy or unsatisfied 
customers. Thus, an entrepreneurial culture may give firms the motivation to engage in a 
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 more widespread search for customer feedback and to target new and different customer 
populations to break through the limited vision that may be created by customer orientation 
alone. 
 Similarly, as argued in H4a, a competitor orientation may also limit firms’ NPD vision 
by promoting imitative learning. However, an entrepreneurial culture emphasizes risk taking 
and the use of original approaches to problem solving (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and 
Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). Such a culture may discourage competitor-
oriented firms from simply imitating in their learning behaviors and encourage them to also 
experiment with new NPD approaches that are different from those employed by their 
competitors. Thus, EO may weaken the relationship between competitor orientation and 
vision traps. 
 According to H5a, interfunctional coordination may also limit firms’ vision by 
fostering conformity, groupthink, and an internal orientation. However, an entrepreneurial 
culture values risk taking and proactive perspectives (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and 
Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). The risk taking aspect of entrepreneurial 
orientation may help reduce the danger of prioritizing the minimization of conflict in 
interdepartmental communication that can lead to groupthink. Furthermore, it is also less 
likely that a firm with both a focus on interfunctional coordination and an EO will choose 
less challenging projects in order to avoid potential functional conflicts between departments 
and functions. The proactive characteristic of EO (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and 
Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000) may also help managers recognize and plan 
ways to deal with the potential coordination challenge if interfunctional teams work on very 
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 new, and therefore more uncertain and risky, NPD projects. Therefore, an entrepreneurial 
culture may weaken the link between interfunctional coordination and vision traps. 
 Therefore: 
H9a: A firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and vision 
traps in its NPD process. 
 
The moderating role of entrepreneurial orientation in the link between market orientation 
and technology trap. In highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms, MO is also less likely to create 
technology traps. According to H3b, customer orientation may lead to technology traps, 
because little professional knowledge about advanced technology makes customers a poor 
source of information in making NPD technology-selection decisions. In addition, existing 
customers’ preferences for existing technologies may lead customer-oriented firms to resist 
moving away from existing familiar or mature technologies (Adner 2002; Im and Workman 
2004). However, an entrepreneurial culture may weaken or even break these links. 
Entrepreneurially oriented firms seek to be innovative, risk taking, and proactive. Such firms 
may therefore be more likely to avoid making technology-selection decisions solely on the 
basis of inputs from their existing customers. 
 Similarly, as argued in H4b, a competitor orientation may also lead to technology traps 
because a firm focused on competitors may often engage in mimetic technology learning and 
seek to adopt competitors’ technologies (Lukas and Ferrell 2000; Zahra, Nash, and Bickford 
1995). However, EO may weaken this link by encouraging managers in competitor-oriented 
firms to emphasize risk taking and the use of original approaches to problem solving (Covin 
and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). This may lead 
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 managers in competitor-oriented firms to resist industry norms, ignore legitimacy threats, and 
test riskier new technologies in their NPD projects. Simple imitation of competitors’ 
technology may therefore be strongly discouraged in highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms. 
 According to H5b, interfunctional coordination may also lead to technology traps 
because the pressure to seek agreements among interfunctional members makes 
interfunctionally coordinated firms stick with familiar or mature technologies with which 
each functional area is already familiar (Argyris 1982; Carmel 1995; Crawford 1992; Lukas 
and Ferrell 2000). However, the risk-taking and proactiveness characteristics of an 
entrepreneurial culture may weaken this link. Risk taking may help firms focused on 
interfunctional coordination discount the danger of coordination difficulties and conflicts and 
promote consideration of whether technology options can lead to radical NPD innovation in 
the technology-selection process. Proactiveness may also help managers in firms focused on 
interdepartmental coordination expect and be prepared for potential interfunctional conflict. 
Therefore, this forward-looking posture in entrepreneurial culture may weaken the link 
between interfunctional coordination and technology traps. 
 Therefore: 
H9b: A firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and 
technology traps in its NPD process. 
 
The moderating role of entrepreneurial orientation in the link between market orientation 
and routinization trap. In highly entrepreneurial-oriented firms, MO is also less likely to 
create routinization traps. According to H3c, customer orientation may lead to routinization 
trap as a result of existing customers’ relatively stable preferences, trade-offs between cost 
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 and innovation, and relatively stable customer populations in customer-oriented firms. 
However, by encouraging the development of very fresh and creative new solutions in the 
NPD processes, an entrepreneurial culture may weaken or even break these links. 
Furthermore, such a culture will promote the change in rather than the exploitation of 
existing processes. As a result, entrepreneurially oriented firms are much more willing to 
take risks and to seek to be innovative in their NPD procedures and routines (Covin and 
Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). 
 Similarly, as argued in H4c, a competitor orientation may also lead to routinization 
traps, because it leads managers to focus on cost and efficiency, imitative learning, and 
threats to legitimacy. However, the value placed on innovation, risk taking, and proactiveness 
may enable a firm with an entrepreneurial culture to weaken these links (Covin and Slevin 
1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). An EO may discount or 
offset the cost/efficiency focus of competitor orientation, promote exploration over imitative 
learning in the NPD process, and encourage risk taking and the use of original approaches to 
problem solving in NPD (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, 
and Dess 2000). These perspectives may motivate competitor-oriented firms to go against 
industry norms, ignore legitimacy threats, and experiment with and employ different new 
NPD routines. Therefore, EO may weaken the relationship between competitor orientation 
and routinization traps. 
 According to H5c, a focus on interfunctional coordination may also lead to 
routinization traps because its internal orientation and concern for minimizing conflicts and 
promoting harmony among different functions may tempt the firm to stick with existing NPD 
routines (Maltz and Kohli 2000), which then become more formalized over time. However, 
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 by promoting innovation, risk taking, and proactiveness, EO may weaken these links (Covin 
and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). 
Entrepreneurially oriented firms are more willing to take risks and experiment with different 
NPD routines and procedures in order to be unique and innovative (Covin and Slevin 1991; 
Lumpkin and Dess 1996; Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). Their proactive attitude enables 
them to be prepared for potential functional conflicts and coordination difficulties in 
advance, which reduces the priority placed on avoiding interfunctional conflict. It is therefore 
less likely that entrepreneurially oriented firms employ the same standardized NPD processes 
over time. 
 For these reasons, I expect the following: 
H9c: A firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and 
routinization traps in its NPD process. 
 
3.2.4 Network Learning 
 Network relationships are an important aspect of a firm’s social capital that determine 
the firm’s ability to create value and achieve economic goals (Tsai 2000). This dissertation 
defines network learning as the willingness to build strong relationships with parties in the 
broader environment outside of the firm, such as suppliers, distributors, consultants, 
universities, and government agencies. Strategic network learning provides a firm with 
access to a diversity of knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) that may stimulate the 
creation of new knowledge within the firm and foster innovation (Tsai 2001). An NPD team 
is more likely to formulate creative decisions if it has speedy access to timely information; 
diverse ideas; and critical instrumental, political, and emotional resources from the firm’s 
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 external connections with diverse groups (Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Milliken and Martins 
1996). Furthermore, network learning may also reduce innovation uncertainty through 
communication and information sharing (Kraatz 1998), which may further reduce the 
occurrence of competency traps. 
 
The direct link between network learning and vision trap. In a direct way, network learning 
may increase firms’ broad external learning. According to Slater and Narver (1995), the 
development of long-term, stable relationships (e.g., Glazer 1991; Miles and Snow 1992; 
Mohr and Spekman 1994; Ruekert, Walker, and Roering 1985) with “learning partners” can 
lead to information sharing that benefits both partners. Networks of interfirm relationships 
may provide channels for sharing valuable information, experience, knowledge, connections, 
and resources (Luo 2003). In this situation, diverse information from outside the firm and its 
immediate environment may reduce the possibility that firms are overconfident in their 
existing NPD processes. Rather, firms with strong network learning systems in place will 
have a strong orientation to the broader environment that keeps them updated with novel 
ideas and new perspectives in the NPD process. 
In addition, broad network learning may empower the firm with a broader NPD 
vision, because the firm’s conception of what is normal, legitimate, and superior extends 
beyond its own industry. The diverse sources of information, knowledge, and experience 
from network partners outside of the firm’s own industry may give firms an opportunity to 
view more dissimilar alternatives and to be aware of very novel fresh perspectives (Yli-
Renko, Autio, and Sapienza 2001), which should provide firms with a less constrained 
vision. Successful examples of dissimilar NPD activities in other industries provide a strong 
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 motivation to move away from current conventional NPD processes and to experiment 
different new NPD process. 
Thus, I propose the following: 
H10a: A firm’s network learning is negatively associated with the level of vision 
traps in its NPD processes. 
 
The direct link between network learning and technology trap. There are two main reasons to 
expect that network learning reduces the occurrence of technology traps. First, when firms 
experience uncertainty about the likelihood of technical success and its associated costs, they 
may expand their networks in order to learn about new practices and technologies (Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996). Because such network partners may have different 
operational resources (e.g., production facilities, technologies, and distribution channels) 
network learning increases a firm’s ability to discover and access different new technologies 
(Luo 2003). Second, network learning helps firms to see different new technologies as 
legitimate and therefore acceptable to incorporate in NPD efforts. Through diversity in firms’ 
networks, technical uncertainty is more likely to be controllable (Beckman, Haunschild, and 
Phillips 2004). Diverse networks with others (e.g., organizations in other industries, 
universities, technology labs, outside consultants, suppliers) can help firms maintain or 
regain legitimacy. These types of network relationships can signal to external constituents 
that technical uncertainty is being recognized and dealt with, which may reduce the 
propensity to select familiar and mature technologies in order to alleviate legitimacy 
concerns of customers and investors in technology-trapped firms. 
For these reasons, I expect the following: 
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 H10b: A firm’s network learning is negatively associated with the level of 
technology traps in its NPD processes. 
 
The direct link between network learning and routinization trap. There are two main reasons 
to expect that network learning may also reduce the occurrence of routinization traps. First, 
the broad external search involved in network learning is more likely to motivate firms to 
keep their NPD procedures updated and flexible over time. Broad network relationships 
provide firms with opportunities to share valuable information, experience, knowledge, 
resources, technology, and operation practices (Luo 2003). Through such network learning, 
firms may see very different NPD routines that may exist in other industries. This knowledge 
may motivate firms to experiment with new routines in their NPD process and discourage the 
kind of formalization that emerges from process inertia in NPD. 
Second, the successful examples of different NPD routines that may be available 
from a broad network of learning partners may increase managers’ willingness to go against 
industry norms and discount legitimacy threats in their NPD process management. Network 
learning extends firms’ perceptions of what is normal and legitimate beyond its own industry 
(Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips 2004). Network learning provides firms with unusual 
opportunities to see what others are doing with different NPD processes. When firms want to 
borrow the most successful NPD routines from their partners in other industries or markets, 
strong relationships may help firms be more successful in their process technology transfer 
efforts (Camp 1995). In this situation, managers may have the confidence to go against 
current industry norms and to experiment with novel NPD routines that competitors may not 
consider legitimate. 
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 Thus, I expect the following: 
H10c: A firm’s network learning is negatively associated with the level of 
routinization trap in its NPD processes. 
 
Creating superior customer value is the key objective of MO (Slater and Narver 
1995). From this perspective, firms’ ideas concerning how to create superior values are based 
on knowledge derived from customer and competitor analyses. However, a market-oriented 
firm should not underestimate the potential contributions of other learning sources, such as 
suppliers, businesses in different industries, consultants, universities, government agencies, 
and others that possess knowledge valuable to creating superior customer value (Dickson 
1992; Slater and Narver 1995). For example, Vorhies and Morgan (2005) argue that market-
oriented firms learning from outside their own industry are less prone to blind spots. Their 
results show that firms are better off benchmarking marketing capabilities across all firms 
rather than just focusing on peer firms in their own industries. 
As previously argued, because of MO’s focus on the proximate environment of 
customers and competitors, and internal orientation on interfunctional coordination, MO may 
not encourage broad external search and can therefore lead to competency traps. In the 
following section, I propose that network learning plays a moderating role in the link 
between MO and competency traps. In this moderating role, I suggest that external learning 
from the wider environment is a complement to MO that provides a broader external 
orientation (Slater and Narver 1995). By providing broad external search and diverse external 
knowledge, network learning may weaken the tendency of market-oriented firms to have a 
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 narrow focus on existing customers, competitors, and cross-functional relationships that 
facilitate the development of competency traps in the NPD process. 
 
The moderating role of network learning in the link between market orientation and vision 
trap. In a moderating role, network learning is a valuable complementary asset to MO (Slater 
and Narver 1995). As argued in previous hypotheses, MO may lead to vision traps because it 
focuses on what existing customers want and what existing competitors are doing. According 
to H3a, customer orientation may limit firms’ vision because of existing customers’ 
preference inertia, the utility of customer opinions as a source of new product ideas, and the 
stability of existing customer populations. However, network learning may broaden the scope 
of customer orientation by opening firms to a new and fresh worldview from external 
learning partners, such as distributors, suppliers, alliance partners, universities, and others. 
Broad external search introduces very dissimilar NPD knowledge and different customer 
populations from external network partners (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996; Yli-
Renko, Autio, and Sapienza 2001). This may enable firms to avoid the limiting visions 
available solely from a customer orientation and motivate firms to seek fresh ideas from 
outside their proximate market environment (Li and Rowley 2002; Nerkar and Roberts 
2004). Therefore, when a firm has a high level of network learning, novel and diverse 
knowledge from network partners is likely to weaken the relationship between MO and 
vision traps. 
 Similarly, as argued in H4a, a competitor orientation may limit firms’ NPD vision by 
promoting imitative learning from competitors. However, network learning emphasizes a 
focus beyond competitors in the industry, thereby broadening external learning and widening 
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 the conception of sources of legitimacy to those outside a firm’s own industry. This external 
orientation may effectively reduce competitor-oriented firms’ imitative learning behavior 
(Vorhies and Morgan 2005) and encourage them to experiment with new NPD approaches 
from outside the industry. Thus, network learning may weaken the relationship between 
competitor orientation and vision traps. 
According to H5a, interfunctional coordination may limit firms’ vision by fostering 
conformity, groupthink, and narrow internal orientation. However, network learning brings 
an external orientation beyond interdepartmental coordination and promotes broad external 
search in organizational learning. Furthermore, exemplars in other industries of how to 
smooth interdepartmental communication in challenging projects may also help firms with a 
focus on interfunctional coordination overcome the problems of conformity and groupthink. 
Therefore, network learning may weaken the link between interfunctional coordination and 
vision traps. 
Thus, I argue: 
H11a: A firm’s network learning weakens the positive relationship between its 
MO and vision traps in its NPD processes. 
 
The moderating role of network learning in the link between market orientation and 
technology trap. In high network-learning firms, MO is less likely to create technology traps. 
According to H3b, a customer orientation may lead to technology traps because of customers’ 
limited technology knowledge and preferences for existing technologies (Adner 2002; Im 
and Workman 2004). Customer-oriented firms tend to make technology-selection decisions 
on the basis of existing customers’ feedback (e.g., Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback 1998). 
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 However, network learning may supplement customer feedback and thus broaden the firms’ 
NPD vision by providing relevant information regarding technologies used and advocated by 
external learning partners and the preferences of their partners’ customers in other industries 
(Vorhies and Morgan 2005). This information and knowledge from network learning may 
reduce customer-oriented firms’ uncertainty regarding whether its customers would accept a 
new technology and provide insights regarding how customers may best be educated about a 
different new technology if it is adopted. In this situation, a customer-oriented firm is less 
likely to stick with technologies just because they are familiar and more certain for existing 
customers. 
 Similarly, as argued in H4b, a competitor orientation may also lead to technology traps 
because it encourages the imitation of competitors’ technologies (Lukas and Ferrell 2000; 
Zahra, Nash, and Bickford 1995). However, network learning may weaken this link by 
broadening the firm’s knowledge of available and emerging technologies and enabling the 
firm to see these “in action” outside of the proximate industry environment. Network 
learning may also enable competitor-oriented firms to see different new technologies in other 
industries as legitimate, enabling them to control the uncertainty associated with new and 
emerging technologies (Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips 2004). Therefore, network 
learning may weaken the relationship between competitor orientation and technology traps. 
 According to H5b, a focus on interfunctional coordination may also lead to technology 
traps, because the pressures to avoid sources of conflict encourages the use of familiar 
technologies in NPD (Argyris 1982; Carmel 1995; Crawford 1992; Lukas and Ferrell 2000). 
However, network learning may provide opportunities for firms to discover very different 
new NPD routines that can be successfully implemented by cross-functional teams in other 
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 industries. Such successful examples from broad external search may decrease managers’ 
fear of legitimacy threats and increase managers’ confidence to go against industry norms in 
NPD. 
 For these reasons I expect the following: 
H11b: A firm’s network learning weakens the positive relationship between its 
MO and technology traps in its NPD processes. 
 
The moderating role of network learning in the link between market orientation and 
routinization trap. In firms with strong learning networks, MO is also less likely to create 
routinization traps. As argued in H3c, customer orientation may lead to routinization traps 
because of customers’ preference stability, trade-offs between cost and innovation, and 
relatively stable customer populations. However, network learning may weaken or break this 
link. Network learning introduces a broader external search and an orientation beyond the 
narrow focus of existing customers (Slater and Narver 1995). Broad network relationships 
may provide firms with opportunities to see different new NPD routines in other industries, 
how these are accepted by their partners’ customers, and whether novel NPD routines 
produce benefits above and beyond their costs for their network partners. Successful 
examples may increase firms’ confidence to abandon industry norms and to experiment with 
new routines in their NPD process (Camp 1995). 
 According to H4c, a competitor orientation may also lead to routinization traps 
because of its strong cost and efficiency focus, tendency toward imitative learning from 
competitors, and prioritization of threats to legitimacy. However, network learning may 
reduce or even sever this link. Network learning may broaden competitor-oriented firms’ 
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 narrow competitor focus and supplement it with a broader external orientation (Slater and 
Narver 1995). Network partners’ experiences with different new NPD routines may help the 
firm reduce any uncertainty toward the potential cost and benefit of experimentation in NPD 
efforts (Luo 2003). Successful examples of different new NPD routines in other industries 
may discourage the competitor-mimetic learning tendency in competitor-oriented firms. 
Furthermore, a wider conception of legitimacy and industry norms may motivate firms to 
follow the steps of partners outside the proximate industry environment and enable a firm to 
introduce radical new NPD routines to the industry. 
According to H5c, a strong focus on interfunctional coordination may also lead to 
routinization traps because of its internal orientation and pressures to avoid sources of 
conflict that encourage the use of familiar NPD routines. However, network learning 
supplements the internal orientation of a focus on interfunctional coordination with a broader 
external orientation (Yli-Renko, Autio, and Sapienza 2001). Network partners may provide 
good examples of how cross-functional teams can be effectively coordinated in firms using 
different NPD processes. This kind of partnership help firms codify the coordination process 
of how cross-functional teams in successful learning partners in other industries reduce 
groupthink and enhance communication in challenging new NPD projects. In this situation, 
firms with a strong focus on interfunctional coordination are more likely to keep their NPD 
procedures updated and flexible over time. 
For these reasons, I argue: 
H11c: A firm’s network learning weakens the positive relationship between MO 
and routinization traps in its NPD processes. 
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CHPATER 4: METHODOLOGY DESIGN 
 
 This dissertation aims to model the up- and downside effects of market orientation 
(MO) on competency traps and new product innovation. Due to the exploratory nature of this 
study, new measurements, including competency traps and network learning, must be 
developed in order to test the model. On the basis of my research goals, I selected the field-
study method to collect data because this approach may enhance the external validity, 
applicability, and acceptability of results from empirical studies (Cook and Campbell 1979). 
 
4.1 Questionnaire Survey and Questionnaire Design 
 Survey research has many advantages. First, survey research has relatively high levels 
of validity, because researchers can pose questions that directly address the underlying nature 
of a construct (Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). Survey measures can gauge intent and 
depict the processes associated with firm strategies (Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). 
Second, to enhance content validity, surveys can be developed that contain a sufficiently 
comprehensive set of items to represent the subject matter of interest. Convergent and 
discriminant validity techniques can be used to determine the adequacy of such measures 
(Mason and Bramble 1989). Third, unlike measures that aggregate broadly across firms in an 
industry, perceptual measures are also useful for measuring current conditions within a firm 
with a high degree of specificity (Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess 2000). Thus, multi-item scales 
 and survey instruments ensure high construct validity. Scale items that have forced-choice 
responses can also contribute to greater measurement validity. Moreover, the survey 
approach enables the testing of theoretical relationships in this study in different industrial 
settings. Because this study is at the early stage of theory development, survey study is 
appropriate for the development of concepts, frameworks, and theories (Bonoma 1985; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Hirschman 1986; Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring 1982). 
There are two practical reasons to use a questionnaire survey in this study. First, a 
questionnaire survey can efficiently generate large amounts of data that can be subjected to 
statistical analysis (Snow and Thomas 1994). Second, it is necessary to allow respondents 
maximum discretion in answering the questionnaire, since many organizations consider 
sensitive a discussion of the “darkside” effects of any strategies, competency traps, or 
compensation strategies. 
I followed the following procedures to develop the questionnaire. First, previous 
studies related to each variable in the framework were reviewed. Most measures in the 
questionnaire were chosen from those that had been employed in previous research. If the 
variables had satisfying quality in previous literature variables, they were adopted. Second, 
on the basis of constitutive definitions of the constructs and relevant literature, new 
measures, which previous research did not provide, were created through pretest. 
Third, in order to enhance the content validity of each scale, a panel with three 
researchers evaluated the instrument for problems with the content and wording of individual 
items prior to the administration. If one judge objected to an item, the item was either 
reworded to dismiss the objection or deleted from the final instrument. 
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 Fourth, one experienced researcher on the subject in China was hired to translate the 
original English questionnaire into Chinese. Another experienced researcher was hired to 
back-translate from Chinese to English. Back-translation enables the enhanced validity of the 
cross-cultural setting. The original questionnaire and back-translated questionnaire were 
compared in order to detect any misunderstanding due to translation. The errors were 
detected and corrected. (For the final questionnaire, see appendix A.) 
 
4.2 Sampling Method 
4.2.1 The Cross-Sectional Field Study 
 Cross-sectional data were chosen from different industries as a sample of new product 
innovation firms. The cross-sectional approach was chosen to enable the collection of 
relatively low-cost data from a large, diverse sample. Although the effectiveness of the 
conclusions regarding the causality of this approach may be challenged, it was adopted 
because of this study’s exploratory nature. 
 
4.2.2 Sample Frame and Selection Process 
 The data collection occurred in China rather than in the United States. The purpose of 
this study is to understand whether a capability may lead to a rigidity, which then causes 
competency traps. Rigidity happens in complex and dynamic environments with threats or 
crisis. China is experiencing a transitional economy, which is more unstable and dynamic but 
full of opportunities (Lau, Tse, and Zhou 2002) compared with the economy in the United 
States. Competency traps should be more salient and important in Chinese companies than in 
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 American companies. Therefore, China is a more suitable setting to test my framework on 
the rigidity of competency traps. 
The study sample derives from different industries in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhao, 
and Shenzhen in China. There are approximately five industries included in this study: (1) 
electronic information; (2) new energy; (3) new materials; (4) new pharmaceuticals, or 
bioengineering; and (5) integrated optical-mechanical and electronics. This relatively broad 
range of industries helps improve generalizability in the sample. 
Only firms within the high-technology zone were included in the sample, because 
these firms were highly likely to have active NPD activities. The selection criteria included 
the following: (1) the firm produces new products, (2) the firm has an R&D department or 
special engineers to develop new products, and (3) the new product has been sold in the 
market. 
The sample frame was obtained from the management office of the high-technology 
zone. Around 600 firms with NPD projects were included in the first vision sample frame. 
The research assistant made a phone call to each firm and asked whether it was willing to 
participate in the research. In this study, the unit of analysis was designed at the firm level 
rather than the project level or the product level. 
In order to reach valid conclusions about populations from samples, random sampling 
is the best way to reduce bias and gain the ability to generalize (Sekaran 1992). The 
disadvantage of this method is that the process is cumbersome and expensive. Because of 
time and budget limitations, this study adopted the availability sampling method, which is an 
alternative to random sampling (Keppel, Saufley, and Tokunaga 1992). This method collects 
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 data from the companies that are willing to participate in the research. Therefore, the subject 
is free to decide whether to participate in the research. 
 
4.2.3 Respondents 
 Common-method variance problems occur when independent and dependent 
measures are collected from the same individuals (Rousseau 1978; Vecchio 1982). In order 
to reduce common-method bias, two respondents were chosen (one marketing manager and one 
R&D manager, both of whom were deeply involved in NPD) from each firm to measure different 
constructs. There were 300 respondents from 150 firms that were expected to answer the 
questionnaires. 
 
4.3 Data Collection 
4.3.1 Scale Development 
 Before the major survey, the measurement development was conducted first. Given the 
rather novel nature of this research, two new scales were required for the key constructs of 
competency traps and network learning. In order to develop better measures, the procedure 
suggested by Churchill (1979) was followed. First, on the basis of a thorough literature review, 
the constructs were conceptualized to specify the construct domain and to generate the items for 
the constructs. Second, in order to establish face validity and content validity, a list of measure 
items with the definitions of the constructs was submitted to a panel of experienced academic 
researchers and practitioners. Through many rounds of modification, the new scales were well 
refined. Third, a pretest was conducted among MBA and EMBA students. In order to check 
discriminant validity, several similar constructs, such as willingness to cannibalize and balance 
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 between exploitation and exploration, were included in the pretest. In the pretest, 46 
questionnaires were collected. Fourth, to purify the measures, a comprehensive analysis was 
conducted—including exploratory factor analysis, reliability assessment, and confirmatory factor 
analysis—to check the unidimensionality, reliability, construct convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity in SPSS and AMOS. Fifth, a panel with experienced academic researchers 
checked the pretest results and made decisions about the measures’ revision and purification on 
the basis of the reliability and validity assessment. 
 
4.3.2 Data-Collection Procedures 
 A major weakness of a questionnaire survey is nonresponse bias, which may lead to a 
poor sample and affect both the reliability of the research and the types of data analysis 
(Davis and Cosenza 1993; Emory and Cooper 1991; Neuman 1994). Nonresponse bias may 
be reduced through proper design of data-collection procedures, such as the avoidance of 
ambiguous questions, the provision of training to the research assistant, and the use of 
preliminary notification and follow-ups (Armstrong and Overton 1977; Churchill 1995). 
A senior research assistant was hired for data collection. To overcome the difficulties 
of a low response rate and the high costs of survey research in China (e.g., Calantone, 
Schmidt, and Song 1996), an administered-on-site method was used to collect questionnaires. 
Snow and Thomas (1994) suggest the use of an administered-on-site method to improve the 
response rate. This method requires the research assistant to have a face-to-face interview 
and ask respondents to complete the questionnaire during the interview. In order to control 
quality, the research assistants were asked to bring back a business card from each 
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 respondent, the firm’s brochure, and an official chop, or a signature of the respondent with 
the address on the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire collection was implemented as follows. First, the research assistant 
explained the purpose of the study to the respondents of the selected firms. In order to get 
accurate information and minimize social desirability, a rich explanation of the significance 
of the research was presented in the beginning of the questionnaire. In order to reduce the 
complexity, ambiguity burden, and consistency for judgment, the informant was told to fill 
out the questionnaire based on simple facts rather than past opinions or beliefs formed from 
reading the introduction of the questionnaire. In order to improve the reliability and validity 
of the data by using a structured questionnaire, the respondents were instructed to answer 
each question in terms of the actual situation rather than the ideal situation. In addition, in 
order to assure the respondents of confidentiality, they were reminded that there were no 
right or wrong answers to the questions. The questionnaire also included the statement, “I 
guarantee confidentiality of all information, am honest about procedures, and am only 
interested in the general and scientific collection of data.” The research assistant needed to fit 
the interviews into the respondents’ schedules. 
 
4.4 Data Analysis and Measurements 
 Structure equation modeling with measurement models and path models was used to 
test my hypotheses and framework. All constructs were measured by multi-items. I planned 
to collect both primary and secondary data to provide a multimethod approach for purposes 
of triangulation and measurement validation. All subjective measures were assessed by a 
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 seven-point Likert-type scale. All scales are available upon request. I briefly outline the key 
constructs below. 
 
4.4.1 Dependent Variables 
 New product performance (NPP) is the dependent variable in this study. It was 
measured both subjectively and objectively. 
 
NPP. Objective measures included (1) number of line extensions, me-too products, and new-
to-the-world products in the last three years (Lukas and Ferrell 2000), (2) percentage of sales 
of new products introduced in the last three years, (3) percentage of sales provided by new 
products less than three years old, (4) percentage of profits provided by new products less 
than three years old, (5) percentage of market share from new products less than three years 
old, and (6) percentage of sales growth from new products less than three years old. 
Five dimensions were measured in subjective NPP. 
First, for overall NPP (Moorman 1995), respondents were asked to rate the extent to 
which their new products had achieved the following outcomes relative to their original 
objectives during the first 12 months of their life in the marketplace: (1) market share, (2) 
sales, (3) profit margin, and (4) ROI. 
Second, new product creativity (modified from Andrews and Smith 1996) was 
measured by the following: (1) is really “out of the ordinary,” (2) can be considered 
revolutionary, (3) is stimulating, (4) reflects a customer perspective from industry norms, (5) 
is radically different from industry norms, and (6) shows an unconventional way of solving 
problems. 
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 Third, for NPD speed (modified from Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001), respondents 
were asked to circle a number that best indicates their assessment of NPD activities in their 
companies: (1) usually behind our time goals–usually ahead of our time goals, (2) slower 
than the industry average–faster than the industry average, (3) much slower than we 
expected–much faster than we expected, and (4) much slower than our competitors–much 
faster than our competitors. 
Fourth, for new product advantage (modified from Li and Calantone 1998), 
respondents were asked to rate the extent to which their new product is superior to that of 
their largest competitor along the following dimensions: (1) reliability: our new products are 
free of errors compared with the competitor’s products; (2) compatibility: our new products 
are compatible with other products and better than competitor’s products; (3) uniqueness: our 
product offers unique benefits to customers that are not provided by the competitor’s 
products; (4) ease of use: our new products are easier to learn and use than competitor’s 
products; (5) productivity: our new products increase a customer’s work efficiency more than 
competitor’s products; (6) functionality: our new products solve problems customers have 
with competitor’s products; and (7) quality: customers perceive the quality as significantly 
higher than that of competitor’s products. 
Fifth, for new product resource efficiency (new scale), respondents were asked to rate 
the resources consumed in NPD. (1) more than expected–less than expected, (2) far exceeded 
budget–well under budget, (3) many resources consumed–few resources consumed, and (4) 
exceeding plan–less than plan. 
 
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
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  Three types of independent variables were included: the independent variable of MO; 
the mediating variable of competency traps; and the moderating variables of EO, network 
learning, and environmental uncertainty. The MO measure was adapted from the work of 
Narver and Slater (1990). The EO measure was modified from the work of Matsuno, 
Mentzer, and Ozsomer (2002) and Liu, Luo and Shi (2002). Competency traps and network 
learning are new scales developed in this study. The environmental uncertainty (technology 
and demand uncertainty) measures were adapted from the work of Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993). 
 
 Market orientation. On the basis of Narver and Slater’ (1990) study, MO has three 
dimensions. First is customer orientation, measured by six items: (1) We constantly monitor 
our level of commitment and orientation to serving customers needs, (2) Our business 
strategies are driven by our beliefs about how we can create greater value for our customers, 
(3) Our strategy for competitive advantage is based on our understanding of customers needs, 
(4) Our business objectives are driven primarily by customer satisfaction, (5) We measure 
customer satisfaction systematically and frequently, and (6) We give close attention to after-
sales services. 
Second is competitor orientation, measured by four items: (1) Our salespeople 
regularly share information within our business concerning competitor strategies, (2) We 
rapidly respond to competitive actions that threaten us, (3) Top managers regularly discuss 
competitors’ strengths and strategies, and (4) We target customers where we have 
opportunities for competitive advantage. 
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 Third is interfunctional coordination, measured by five items: (1) Our top managers 
from every function regularly visit our current and prospective customers, (2) We freely 
communicate information about our successful and unsuccessful customer experiences across 
all business functions, (3) All of our business functions (e.g., marketing/sales, manufacturing, 
R&D, finance/accounting) are integrated in serving the needs of our target markets, (4) All of 
our managers understand how everyone in our business can contribute to creating customer 
value, and (5) We share resources with other business units. 
 
 Competency traps. Competency traps have three dimensions: (1) vision trap, (2) 
technology traps, and (3) routinization traps. Competency traps have three dimensions and 18 
items: vision trap, technology trap, and routinization trap. Each dimension includes six 
items. 
Vision traps. The respondents were asked to think about how the company develops 
new products and indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following statements: (1) 
Our confidence in our NPD process is based on its past success rather than its current 
performance; (2) We believe that the past success of our NPD process makes it the best 
approach for the future; (3) Because of its past success, people tend to ignore current 
weaknesses in our NPD approach; (4) Our pride in the past success of our NPD processes 
blinds us to opportunities for improvement; (5) Despite contrary indications, people still 
believe our NPD approach is better than that of our rivals; and (6) The past success of our 
NPD process inhibits attempts to experiment with new approaches. 
Technology traps. With respect to the new products developed in the past year, 
respondents were asked to consider the following statements: (a) We have incorporated a lot 
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 of technology that is new to the industry, (b) We have only used technologies already proved 
in the marketplace, (c) The technologies we have used are well known in this industry, (d) 
We have used tried and tested methods, (e) We have tended to stick with what we know, and 
(f) The technologies we have incorporated have all been mature. 
Routinization traps. With respect to NPD, respondents were asked to consider the 
following statements: (a) We have well-understood “rules,” (b) Our procedures are highly 
formalized, (c) Our procedures can be easily changed, (d) We never relax our standard 
procedures, (e) Our procedures are not very standardized, and (f) We follow formalized 
procedures. 
 
 EO (modified). Matsuno, Mentzer and Özsomer (2002) and Liu, Luo and Shi (2002) 
developed the scales for EO, and these scales were modified to fit the research setting. This 
scale has three dimensions: (1) innovativeness, (2) risk-taking propensity, and (3) 
proactiveness. 
(1) Innovativeness. (a) When it comes to problem solving, we value creative new 
solutions more than the solutions of conventional wisdom; (b) We encourage the 
development of innovative marketing strategies, even knowing well that some will fail; (c) 
Relative to our competitors, our company has higher ability to implement experimentation 
and original approaches to problems; and (d) Relative to our competitors, our company has 
higher level of innovation and R&D. 
(2) Risk taking. (a) We value the orderly and risk-reducing management process 
much more highly than leadership initiatives for change; (b) We like to play safe; (c) We like 
to implement plans only if they are very certain that they will work; (c) Relative to our 
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 competitors, our company has higher propensity to take risks; and (d) Relative to our 
competitors, our company has a strong proclivity for high-risk goals with chances of high 
returns. 
(3) Proactiveness. (a) We firmly believe that a change in market creates a positive 
opportunity for us; (b) We tend to talk more about opportunities rather than problems; (c) 
Relative to our competitors, our company has a higher tendency to engage in strategic 
planning activities;(d) Relative to our competitors, our company has a higher ability to 
identify new opportunities; and (e) Relative to our competitors, our company has a higher 
ability to persevere in making our visions of the business a reality. 
 
 Network learning. Two methods were used to measure network learning. The first 
measurement was developed on the basis of the works of Gatignon and Xuereb (1997) and 
Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001). The respondents were asked about the extent to which 
they agreed with the following statements about their companies’ relationships with outside 
companies and organizations (e.g., suppliers, distributors, consultants, retailers, banks, 
government contacts, university contacts, employment agencies, technology search firms): 
(1) We put substantial effort into learning from outside companies and organizations; (2) We 
have strong relationships with companies and organizations outside of our industry, (3) We 
benefit from close contacts with companies and organizations outside of our industry, (4) We 
have learned a lot from interactions with companies and organizations outside of our 
industry, (5) We have gained significant knowledge from companies and organizations 
outside of our industry, and (6) We have partners from a wide variety of different industries. 
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 For the second measurement, respondents were asked how much insight or 
knowledge their companies gain from relationships with the following in their NPD efforts: 
(1) suppliers, (2) distributors, (3) consultants, (4) retailers, (5) peer companies outside of our 
industry, (6) government contacts, and (7) university contacts. 
 
 Technology uncertainty. The technology uncertainty measurement from the work of 
Jaworski and Kohli (1993) was modified as follows: (1) The technology in our industry was 
changing quite rapidly, (2) Technological changes provided big opportunities in our industry, 
(3) A large number of new product ideas have been made possible through technological 
breakthroughs in our industry, (4) There have been major technological developments in our 
industry, and (5) It is very difficult to predict where the technology in our industry will be in 
the next two or three years. 
 
 Demand uncertainty. The demand uncertainty from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) was 
adopted: (1) Our customers tend to look for new products all the time, (2) The product 
preferences of our customers change quite rapidly, (3) We are witnessing demand for our 
product from customers who never bought from our firm before, (4) New customers tend to 
have product needs that are quite different from existing customers, (5) Demand is hard to 
forecast in this product industry. 
 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
 To prevent model misspecification error and to control the potential confounding effects, 
several control variables are included in this dissertation: strategy types (Matsuno and 
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 Mentzer 2000), balance between exploitation and exploration (Kim and Atuahene-Gima 
2004); competition intensity (Jaworski and Kohli 1993), past performance (Geletkanycz 
1997), perceived industry dominance (Chandy, Prabhu, and Antia 2003), willingness to 
cannibalize (Chandy and Tellis 1998), firm size and age, and so on. 
Strategy types. The strategy-type scale was adopted from the work of Matsuno and Mentzer 
(2000). 
 (1) Defender. This type of business unit attempts to locate and maintain a secure 
niche in a relatively stable product or service area. The business unit tends to offer a more 
limited range of products and services than its competitors, and it tries to protect its domain 
by offering higher quality, superior service, lower price, and so forth. Often this business unit 
is not at the forefront of development in the industry, and it tends to ignore industry changes 
that have no direct influence on current areas of operation and concentrates instead on doing 
the job possible in a limited area. 
 (2) Prospector. This type of business unit typically operates within a broad product-
market domain that undergoes periodic definition. The business unit values being “first in” in 
new product and market areas, even if not all of these efforts prove to be highly profitable. 
This organization responds rapidly to early signals concerning the area of opportunity, and 
these responses often lead to a new round of competitive actions. However, this business unit 
may not maintain market strength in all of the areas it enters. 
 (3) Analyzer. This type of business unit attempts to maintain a stable, limited line of 
products or services while at the same time moving quickly to follow a carefully selected set 
of the more promising new developments in the industry. This organization is seldom “first 
in” with new product and services. However, by carefully monitoring the action of major 
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 competitors in areas compatible with its stable product-market base, this business can 
carefully be “second in” with more cost-efficient product or services. 
 (4) Reactor. This type of business unit does not appear to have consistent product-
market orientation. This organization is usually not as aggressive in maintaining established 
products and markets as some of its competitors, nor is it willing to take as many risks as 
other competitors. Rather this type of business unit responds in those areas where it is forced 
to by environmental pressures. 
 
 Balance between exploitation and exploration in NPD (new scales). Based on the 
works of March (1991) and Levinthal and March (1993), Kim and Atuahene-Gima (2004) 
develop a scale for exploitation and a scale for exploration. In this dissertation, those scales 
were modified by combining them in one scale with two poles. Respondents were asked to 
circle a number that best indicated their assessments of NPD activities in their companies for 
each of the following statement pairs: (1) We frequently undertake novel NPD projects that 
we are far from certain we can successfully complete versus We usually undertake NPD 
projects that we are certain we can successfully complete; (2) We often develop new product 
ideas for emerging or anticipated market needs versus We only develop new product ideas 
that meet existing market needs; (3) Most of our NPD projects require us to develop new 
knowledge and areas of expertise versus Most of our NPD projects tap our existing areas of 
knowledge and expertise; (4) We are always experimenting with new ways of developing 
new products versus We always use tried and tested NPD approaches; and (5) We frequently 
undertake NPD projects that let us experiment with new technologies versus We only 
undertake NPD projects where we can exploit existing technologies. 
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 Competition intensity. Six items were adapted from Jaworski and Kohli (1993) to 
measure this construct: (1) Competition in this product industry is cutthroat; (2) There are 
many promotion wars in this product industry; (3) One hears of a new competitive move 
almost every day; (4) Price competition is a hallmark of this product industry; (5) Anything 
that one competitor can offer, others can match readily; and (6) Competitors are relatively 
weak. 
 
 Past performance. Based on the work of Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson 
(1993) and Geletkanycz (1997), respondents perceptions of their firm’s performance was 
captured by asking them to describe their organization’s profitability on a four-item scale, 
where 1 = unprofitable, 2 = breaking even, 3 = moderately profitable, and 4 = very profitable. 
 
 Perceived industry dominance. Based on the work of Chandy, Prabhu, and Antia 
(2003) five items were developed to measure the construct of perceived industry dominance: 
(1) Our performance so far has been better than that of everyone else in our industry, (2) We 
have had few serious threats to our position as industry leaders so far, (3) We had led the 
market from the start, (4) We have control in our industry, and (5) Other firms try to follow 
us in the technology. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION 
 
 This chapter outlines the characteristics of the sample, including participating 
firms and respondents, measurement development, and the major findings in this study. 
The first section introduces the characteristics of the sample, including participating firms 
and respondents. The second section discusses the measurement development, including 
reliability and validity issues of the constructs. Then the results of this study are 
presented. The last section presents the findings of the hypotheses testing. 
 
 
5.1 Characteristic of the Sample 
5.1.1 Response Rates 
 A total of 600 firms were invited to participate in the final survey between July 
2004 and September 2004. Two respondents were required for each firm’s participation. 
A total of 302 usable questionnaires from 151 firms were received, representing a 
25.17% response rate. This response rate is acceptable in marketing. Given the on-site 
data collection, a test of response bias by comparison of early and late respondents was 
not appropriate. 
 
 5.1.2 Characteristics of Firms and Respondents 
 Before providing the data description of firms and respondents, I explain the 
careful screening of the missing data. If some characteristics of firms and respondents 
were missing in the questionnaires but are available from the secondary sources provided, 
I checked the secondary sources (e.g., brochures, Web sites) and filled in the missing data 
with the located information. In addition, outliers were also checked and screened by 
matching the information from secondary sources. 
 A major concern for the sample frame was the selection of appropriate managers 
as primary informants. My original plan was to get one marketing manager and one R&D 
manager from each firm in order to reduce common-method bias. However, the actual 
sample frame (302 usable questionnaires from 151 firms) from the data collection 
included 158 marketing managers and only 34 R&D managers. The rest of the 
respondents included 36 CEOs, 15 from manufacturing departments, 15 from finance and 
accounting departments, 37 from administration departments, and 7 from unknown 
departments. In this situation, the original plan to reduce common-method bias could not 
be implemented by this sample frame. Therefore, I decided to only use the questionnaire 
of one marketing manager from each firm to test the hypotheses. When two marketing 
managers from the same firm answered the questionnaires, I chose the questionnaire from 
the manager who indicated him- or herself as having a longer experience in the firm or in 
the position and as having better knowledge about NPD. As a result, 113 marketing 
managers’ questionnaires were selected for the final data analysis. 
 This section summarizes the major characteristics of 113 firms and respondents. 
Table 5.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the major characteristics of firms and 
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 respondents in the final survey. The mean firm age is 12.53, and the standard deviation 
(STD) is 10.31. The mean firm size is 930.35 and STD is 1954.93. A total of 113 
marketing respondents in this survey have worked in their companies for approximately 
five years (mean = 5.32, STD = 2.73) and have been in the same job position for 
approximately three years (mean = 3.57, STD = 1.98). Their knowledge of NPD activities 
over the past year is high (mean = 6.15, STD = 1.85; on a ten-point scale). 
 
Table 5. 1 Characteristics of Firms and Respondents 
Variable Mean STD 
Firm’s age 12.53 10.31 
Firm’s size 930.35 1954.93 
   
Respondents’ experience in the firm 5.32 2.73 
Respondents’ experience in the position 3.57 1.98 
Respondents’ knowledge about NPD 6.15 1.85 
 
 Table 5.2 reports the industry type of the participating firms. As noted previously, 
the firms were sampled from a high-tech industrial zone in China. According to the first 
respondent, the major industries in the sample include electronics and information 
technology (10, or 8.8%), computer and software (2, or 1.8%), telecommunications (5, or 
4.4%), integrated optical mechanical and electronic (26, or 23%), chemical, 
pharmaceutical, or biotechnology (11, or 9.7%), new energy and materials (44, or 
38.9%), and other (12, or 10.6%). Three companies did not indicate their industry type. 
The profile of industry types provides evidence that the sample includes a broad variety 
of industries. Thus, research findings of this study can be generalized to most high-tech 
industries. 
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 Table 5. 2 Types of Business for Participating Firms 
Variable Number Percentage 
1. Electronics and information technology 10 8.8% 
2. Computer and software 2 1.8% 
3. Telecommunications 5 4.4% 
4. Integrated optical mechanical and electronic 26 23% 
5. Chemical/pharmaceutical/biotechnology 11 9.7% 
6. New energy and materials 44 38.9% 
7. Other 12 10.6% 
Missing 3 2.7% 
Total 113 100% 
 
 Table 5.3 reports the ownership o the participating firms. Four types of ownership 
are included: (1) state-owned company (10, or 8.8%), (2) private company (56, or 
49.6%), (3) collectively owned company (3, or 2.7%), and (4) joint venture and foreign 
company (38, or 33.6%). Six companies did not indicate their ownership. 
 
Table 5. 3 Ownership of Participating Firms 
Variable  Number Percentage 
1. State-owned company 10 8.8% 
2. Private company 56 49.6% 
3. Collectively owned company 3 2.7% 
4. Joint venture and foreign company 38 33.6% 
Missing 6 5.3% 
Total 113 100% 
 
5.2 Measurement Development 
 The development of valid and reliable measures was a first major step before 
hypotheses testing. One of the main challenges of this dissertation is to develop a new 
measure for competency traps and network learning, because there is no available 
measure for these in the existing literature. 
 174
 To determine whether the empirical responses to measure items are consistent 
with the hypothesized conceptual constructs, researchers must identify scale items that 
map the empirical data on the hypothesized measurement model. The evaluation of scale 
items and composite scales sometimes produces results that require the model’s 
respecification. In this section, I discuss the procedures for measurement development 
before going into the detail about two new measures: (1) competency traps and (2) 
network learning. Then, I review and respecify measurement models for the other major 
constructs on the basis of an empirical analysis of the collected data. For most of the 
other constructs, existing measures were tested for validity and reliability prior to their 
adoption in the study. In the end, I discuss the results of the confirmatory factor analysis 
and tests of convergent and discriminant validity. 
 
5.2.1 General Procedure for Measure Development 
 To develop valid and reliable measures for constructs is critical to theory testing. 
Churchill (1979) suggests the following steps for measure development: (1) specification 
of the construct domain on the basis of a literature review, (2) generation of a pool of 
items on the basis of a literature review and an exploratory survey and interview, (3) data 
collection, (4) purification of the measure using coefficient alpha and exploratory factor 
analysis, and (5) assessment of reliability and validity. These steps involve an iterative 
process. At each stage, the researchers evaluate the results and decide whether to proceed 
to the next step or to modify the measure and repeat the same procedure. This study 
follows the above iterative steps through pretest and final survey. Section 4.3.1 shows the 
steps that were completed before the final survey. Table 5.4 summarizes the pretest 
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 Table 5. 4 Summary for Measurements Before and After Pretest 
(N = 46) 
 
Construct Original 
Item No. 
Retained 
Item No. 
Modified 
Scale 
Property 
Decisions 
for Final 
Survey 
Sources 
Dependent Variables 
Objective NPP: 1 3 N/A N/A  Lukas and Ferrel 
(2000) 
Objective NPP: 2 5 N/A N/A  N/A 
Overall subjective NPP  5 4 α = 0.84 
χ2 = 4.98 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.083 
Delete 1 
item 
Moorman (1995) 
New product creativity 7 4 α = 0.84 
χ2 = 1.907 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.385 
Delete 1 
item 
Andrews and 
Smith (1996) 
NPD speed 6 4 α = 0.88 
χ2 = 2.46 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.292 
Delete 2 
item 
Rindfleisch and 
Moorman (2001) 
New product advantage 7 5 α = 0.89 
χ2 = 8.44 
d.f. = 5, 
p = 0.133 
 Li and Calantone 
(1998) 
New product resources 
efficiency 
4 4 α = 0.71 
χ2 = 2.844 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.241 
 New 
Independent variables 
MO   α = 0.83 
χ2 = 45.98 
d.f. = 32, 
p = 0.052 
 Narver and Slater 
(1990) 
Customer orientation 6 3    
Competitor orientation 4 4    
Interfunctional 
coordination 
5 3    
EO   α = 0.89 
χ2 = 44.90 
d.f. = 32, 
p = 0.065 
 Matsuno, Mentzer, 
and Ozsomer 
(2002), Liu, Luo, 
and Shi (2002) 
Innovativeness 4 3    
Risk taking 5 3    
Proactiveness 5 4    
Network learning1 6 5 α = 0.93 
χ2 = 7.779 
d.f. = 5, 
p = 0.169 
 Gatignon and 
Xuereb (1997), 
Rindfleisch and 
Moorman (2001) 
Network learning2 7 5 α = 0.61 
χ2 = 5.24 
d.f. = 5, 
p = 0.388 
 Gatignon and 
Xuereb (1997), 
Rindfleisch and 
Moorman (2001) 
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 Control Variables 
Technology uncertainty  5 5 α = 0.93 
χ2 = 2.003 
d.f. = 5, 
p = 0.849 
 Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) 
Demand uncertainty 5 4 α = 0.76 
χ2 = 5.414 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.067 
 Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) 
Strategy types 6 5 α = 0.39 
χ2 = 23.21 
d.f. = 5, 
p = 0.00 
Delete 2 
items 
 
Matsuno and 
Mentzer (2000) 
Balance between 
exploitation and 
exploration in NPD  
5 4 α = 0.70 
χ2 = 3.185 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.203 
 New 
Willingness to cannibalize 6 4 α = 0.65 
χ2 = 1.47 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.479 
 Chandy and Tellis 
(1998)
Competition intensity 6 4 α = 0.82 
χ2 = 5.347 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.069 
Delete 2 
items 
Jaworski and Kohli 
(1993) 
Past performance 4    Hambrick, 
Geletkanycz, and 
Fredrickson 
(1993); 
Geletkanycz 
(1997) 
Perceived industry 
dominance 
5 4 α = 0.81 
χ2 = 1.855 
d.f. = 2, 
p = 0.396 
 Chandy, Prabhu, 
and Antia (2003) 
 
  
instruments in terms of the number of original items, the number of retained items, 
decisions done after pretest for the final survey, and source of the measures.  
 The following sections focuses on new measure development: competency traps. 
In the measure-validation process, Gerbing and Anderson (1988) recommend that 
unidimensionality should be included, except for reliability and validity assessment. 
Therefore, coefficient alpha, item-to-total correlation, exploratory factor analysis, and 
 177
 confirmatory factor analysis in structural equation modeling are used for measure 
validation process in this study. 
 
5.2.2 Development of Competency Traps: Pretest Study Validation 
 In the pretest, a total of 24 items collected from the literature review and 
exploratory interviews were initially proposed for 4 dimensions of competency traps: (1) 
confidence, (2) familiarity, (3) maturity, and (4) routinization. Each dimension has six 
items. Table 5.5 summarizes the results from this pretest with 46 respondents. 
 First, coefficient alpha was examined for all four dimensions to examine internal 
consistency. The results show that all the dimensions have good internal consistency, as 
reflected in a high coefficient alpha for each dimension (0.89 for confidence traps, 0.87 
for familiarity traps, 0.82 for maturity traps, and 0.83 for routinization traps). 
 Second, a corrected item-to-total correlation represents the correlation of a single 
item with the sum of all other items. “Alpha if item deleted” shows what the scale’s alpha 
value would be if that single item is removed. “Item-to-total” and “alpha if deleted” 
values are used to help remove poor items from scales. According to “alpha if deleted” 
values, none of the items should be deleted in order to improve the scale’s alpha. 
 Third, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted for each dimension of 
competency traps, on the basis of the pretest data, to examine the fit of the measurement 
model. The measurement model examines the relationship of observed indicators to their 
underlying dimension of competency traps and provides a confirmatory assessment of 
convergent validity. 
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  The chi-square statistic shows an overall assessment of model fit by testing the 
hypotheses that all of the differences between the observed and implied covariances are 
zero simultaneously. Familiarity trap and routinization trap have good model fits with the 
data. Confidence trap and maturity trap do not have very desirable model fits with the 
data, maybe because of the relatively small sample size in the pretest. When competency 
traps were tested as a high-order construct, a problem was identified. The other three 
subdimensions of competency traps are positively related to high-order construct 
competency traps, but not confidence traps (r = –0.58), which means that respondents 
perceive the items in confidence traps as positive confidence rather than dysfunctional 
confidence or overconfidence. In other words, items of confidence traps do not really 
measure “traps.” Therefore, this dimension had to be rewritten in order to correctly 
measure the dysfunctional rather than the functional cognition. In the final survey, this 
dimension was renamed “vision traps.” 
 Fourth, an exploratory factor analysis was performed with the principal axis 
extraction method to test the appropriateness of each item. After several rounds of 
deletion, a three-factor solution (see table 5.5) was derived on the basis of the eigenvalue 
rule (eigenvalue > 1) and the visual examination of the scree plot for competency traps. 
The three factors explain a substantial amount of variance: 61.84%. Three distinguishing 
dimensions can be found in the rotated factor matrix without any cross-loadings, which 
suggests that competency traps have three dimensions rather than four. Among four 
dimensions of competency traps, the respondents had no problem distinguishing 
confidence traps and routinization traps. But the respondents could not distinguish 
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 Table 5. 5 Measure of Competency Traps Before and After Pretest 
(N = 46) 
 
Rotated Factor Matrix Types of Traps α, If 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Property Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Decision 
for Final 
Survey 
Confidence       
Please think about how your 
company develops new products, 
and indicate to what extent you 
agree with the following 
statements: 
     
1. We have a great deal of 
confidence in our NPD process. 
0.88   0.80  
2. Our NPD approach maximizes 
our chances of success. 
0.84   0.75  
3. There are no obvious 
weaknesses in our current NPD 
approach. 
0.86   Deleted  
4. We are proud of our NPD 
processes. 
0.83   0.86  
5. Our NPD approach is better 
than that of our competitors. 
0.84   0.65  
6. We strongly believe in our 
NPD process. 
0.83   0.88  
Coefficient α 0.89 χ2 = 19.32 
d.f. = 9, 
p = .023 
   
Because 
this 
dimension 
is 
negatively 
related to 
competen
cy trap, all 
items are 
totally 
rewritten 
in order to 
keep its 
direction 
with other 
dimension
s. It is 
renamed 
“vision 
trap.” 
Correlation between confidence 
trap and competency traps 
-0.58      
Familiarity      
In the new products we have 
developed over the past year…. 
     
7. We have incorporated a lot of 
leading edge technology. 
0.88  Deleted   
8. We have only used 
technologies already proved in the 
marketplace. 
0.84  0.74   
9. The technologies we have used 
are well known in this industry. 
0.86  0.58   
10. We have avoided technologies 
that are “just out of the lab.” 
0.83  0.78   
11. We have relied on stable 
technologies. 
0.84  Deleted   
12. The technologies we have 
incorporated have all been mature. 
0.83  0.66   
Coefficient α .89 χ2 = 
10.323 
d.f. = 9, 
p = .325 
   
Correlation between familiarity 
trap and competency traps 
1.00     
Maturity      
In developing new products…      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According 
to the 
rotated 
factor 
matrix, 
responden
ts cannot 
identify 
the 
familiarity 
and 
maturity 
traps; 
these two 
dimension
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 13. We use a familiar process. 0.81  Deleted   
14. We use tried and tested 
methods. 
0.81  Deleted   
15. We tend to stick with what we 
know. 
0.77  0.55   
16. We incorporate familiar 
technologies 
0.77  0.80   
17. We avoid technologies we 
have not dealt with before. 
0.78  0.77   
18. We are not comfortable with 
unfamiliar NPD methods. 
0.81  Deleted   
Coefficient α 0.82 χ2 = 30.41 
d.f. = 9, 
p = .00 
   
Correlation between maturity trap 
and competency traps 
0.85     
s are 
combined 
in the 
final 
survey 
and 
renamed 
“technolo
gy trap.” 
Routinization      
19. We have well-understood 
“rules.” 
0.80    0.68 
20. Our procedures are highly 
formalized. 
0.78    0.78 
21. Our procedures can be 
changed without formal approval. 
0.82    Deleted 
22. We never relax our standard 
procedures. 
0.83    Deleted 
23. Our procedures are not very 
standardized. 
0.83    0.53 
24. We closely follow formalized 
procedures. 
0.75    0.84 
Coefficient α 0.83 χ2 = 12.78 
d.f. = 9, 
p = .17 
   
Correlation between routinization 
trap and competency traps 
0.52     
 
 
 
 
 
No big 
change in 
this 
dimension 
 
between familiarity traps and maturity traps, which led to the decision to combine the two 
dimensions, which were renamed “technology traps” after the pretest. 
 Thus, after the pretest, a 19-item Likert-type scale was used to measure 3 
dimensions of competency traps in the final survey: 7 items for vision traps, 6 items for 
technology traps, and 6 items for routinization traps. 
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5.3 Data Analyses 
 A total of 113 firms were included in the final study. A two-stage approach was 
employed to analyze the data and test the hypotheses. In the first stage, confirmatory 
factor analysis measurement models were assessed using AMOS. Once a suitable 
measurement model was obtained, a path model was identified using the structural 
models in the second stage. This two-stage approach has two advantages (Anderson and 
Gerbing 1988). First, it requires a smaller sample size because of the reduced model at 
each stage. The parameter estimates are more accurate and reliable, with a good ratio of 
the number of cases in sample frame per indicator or per latent variable when the sample 
size is relatively small. Second, it can avoid the potential confounding effect between the 
structural model and the measurement model. This section discusses the measurement 
model and structural model in confirmatory factory analysis. Table 5.6 provides the 
descriptive statistics and correlations. The correlation matrix is derived from the 
measurement model. 
 
5.3.1 Measurement Models 
 Confirmatory factor analysis was used to estimate a measurement model. Five 
measurement models were estimated: (1) dependent variables (new product creativity, 
NPD speed, and NPD efficiency), (2) high-order MO (including customer orientation, 
competitor orientation, and cross-functional coordination), (3) high-order EO 
(innovativeness, risk taking, and proactiveness), (4) low-order competency traps (vision 
trap, technology trap, and routinization trap), and (5) network learning and control 
variables (technology uncertainty and competition intensity). Table 5.7 provides the fit 
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Table 5. 6 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of the Study Constructs (a = 0.001, b = 0.05) 
 
 
Construct Mean STD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. New product 
creativity  
4.65 1.32              —
2. NPD speed 4.75  —            0.98 0.32a
3. New product 
resource efficiency 
4.07              0.71 0.05 0.40a —
4. MO 4.84            1.01 0.40a 0.50a 0.31a —
5. Vision traps 3.87              1.10 -0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 —
6. Technology traps 5.08             0.86 0.04 0.33a 0.22 0.25a 0.04 —
7. Routinization traps 5.20           1.00 0.29a 0.51a 0.34a 0.49a 0.09 0.31 —
8. EO 4.75         0.96 0.33a 0.58a 0.40a 0.70a 0.15 0.25a 0.40a —
9. Network learning 4.95        1.10 0.31a 0.43a 0.19b 0.48a 0.12 0.40a 0.45a 0.38a —
10. Technology 
uncertainty 
5.20       1.19 0.32a 0.39a 0.26a 0.43a 0.15 0.30a 0.30a 0.54a 0.52a —
11. Competition 
intensity 
4.02       1.70 0.35a 0.22b 0.11 0.57a 0.01 -0.20b 0.30a 0.27a 0.23b 0.19b —
12. Firm size 930               1955 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.10 -0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.06 —
13. Firm age 12.5             10.31 -0.17 0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.08 0.11 0.11 -0.04 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.25a — 
 indices of measurement models and the reliability of each construct. As indicated in Table 
5.7, all measurement models exhibit acceptable fit indices. Each factor loading is positive 
and significant. The coefficient alpha, composite reliability, and average variance extracted 
also provide satisfactory evidence of reliability (coefficient alpha greater than 0.60 
(composite reliability greater than 0.70, according to Churchill 1979; average variance 
extracted greater than 0.50, according to Fornell and Larcker (1981). 
 
Table 5. 7 Measurement Models (from 113 Marketing Managers) 
Constructs and Items Standardize  dCoefficient t-Value
b
 
Model 1: Dependent Variables 
Model fit: χ2(24) = 31.94, p = 0.13; CFI = .998; TLI = .996; IFI = .998; RMSEA = .054 
 
Subjective new product creativity (Cronbach α = 0.90; composite reliability = 
0.90; average variance extracted = 0.75) 
 scaling 
NPC2: fresh–routine 
NPC4: novel–predictable 
NPC6: unique–ordinary 
0.818 
0.961 
0.806 
scaling 
11.414 
10.001 
Subjective NPD speed (Cronbach α = 0.92; composite reliability = 0.92; average 
variance extracted = 0.79) 
For each pair of statements below, please circle a number that best indicates your 
assessment of the speed of the NPD activities in your company over the past 12 
months: 
  
NPS2: slower than the industry average–faster than the industry average 
NPS3: much slower than we expected–much faster than we expected 
NPS4: much slower than our competitors–much faster than our competitors 
0.884 
0.896 
0.878 
scaling 
12.957 
12.583 
Subjective NPD resource efficiency (Cronbach α = 0.65; composite reliability = 
0.69; average variance extracted = 0.44) 
Please consider your NPD efforts over the past 12 months. For each pair of 
adjectives below, please circle a number that best indicates your assessment of the 
resources consumed in NPD: 
  
NPE1: more than expected–less than expected 
NPE3: many resources consumed–few resources consumed 
NPE4: exceeding plan–less than plan 
0.572 
0.531 
0.837 
scaling 
4.184 
4.260 
 
Model 2: High Order Construct: EO 
Model fit: χ2(24) = 29.245, p = 0.211; CFI = .998; TLI = .997; IFI = .998; RMSEA = .044 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements about your 
company: 
  
Customer orientation (CT) (Cronbach α = 0.82; composite reliability = 0.83; 
average variance extracted = 0.63) 
0.807 scaling 
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 CM3: Our strategy for competitive advantage is based on our understanding of 
customers needs. 
CM5: We measure customer satisfaction systematically and frequently. 
CM6: We give close attention to after-sales service. 
0.872 
 
0.864 
0.619 
7.036 
 
7.004 
scaling 
Competitor orientation (CP) (Cronbach α = 0.79; composite reliability = 0.80; 
average variance extracted = 0.58) 1.087 4.471 
CP1: Our salespeople regularly share information within our business concerning 
competitor strategies. 
CP2: We rapidly respond to competitive actions that threaten us. 
CP4: We target customers where we have opportunities for competitive advantage. 
0.753 
 
0.885 
0.613 
6.358 
 
6.998 
scaling 
Cross-functional coordination(CC) (Cronbach α = 0.81; composite reliability = 
0.69; average variance extracted = 0.44) 0.650 4.713 
CC3: All of our business functions (e.g., marketing/sales, manufacturing, R&D, 
finance/accounting) are integrated in serving the needs of our target markets. 
CC4: All of our managers understand how everyone in our business can contribute 
to creating customer value. 
CC5: We share resources with other business units. 
0.731 
 
0.766 
 
0.816 
7.208 
 
scaling 
 
7.789 
 
Model 3: High-Order Construct: EO 
Model fit: χ2(24) = 34.736, p = 0.072; CFI = .997; TLI = .994; IFI = .997; RMSEA = .063 
 
To what extent do the following statements describe your company?   
Innovativeness (INN) (Cronbach α = 0.90; composite reliability = 0.88; average 
variance extracted = 0.71) 
1.000 scaling 
INN1: When it comes to problem solving, we value creative new solutions more 
than the conventional wisdom. 
INN3: Relative to our competitors, our company has a higher ability to implement 
experimentation and original approaches to problems. 
INN4: Relative to our competitors, our company has higher levels of innovation. 
0.749 
 
0.949 
 
0.909 
scaling 
 
10.489 
 
10.164 
Risk taking (RT) (Cronbach α = 0.91; composite reliability = 0.91; average 
variance extracted = 0.78) 0.515 3.641 
RT2: Top managers in this business unit do not like to “play it safe.” 
RT3: Top managers around here are happy to implement plans even if they are 
uncertain that they will work. 
RT4: Top managers around here are happy to implement plans even if they are 
uncertain that they will work. 
0.875 
0.949 
 
0.822 
 
scaling 
13.809 
 
11.333 
 
Proactiveness (Pro) (Cronbach α = 0.74; composite reliability = 0.74; average 
variance extracted = 0.49) 0.743 3.643 
Pro2: Top managers in this business are proactive in seeking to create new 
opportunities. 
Pro3: Members of this business unit tend to talk more about opportunities rather 
than problems. 
Pro4: Relative to our competitors, our company has higher ability to generate new 
opportunities. 
0.610 
 
0.708 
 
0.782 
scaling 
 
5.534 
 
5.793 
 
Model 4: Competency Traps 
Model fit: χ2(24) = 21.217, p = 0.626; CFI = 1.000; TLI = 1.002; IFI = 1.001; RMSEA = .000 
 
Vision traps (VIS) (Cronbach α = 0.71; composite reliability = 0.75; average 
variance extracted = 0.53) 
Please think about how your company develops new products, and indicate to what 
extent you agree with the following statements:   
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 VIS3: Because of its past success people tend to ignore current weaknesses in our 
NPD approach. 
VIS4: Our pride in the past success of our NPD processes blinds us to opportunities 
for improvement. 
VIS5: Despite contrary indications, people still believe our NPD approach is better 
than that of our rivals. 
0.648 
 
0.975 
 
0.457 
 
scaling 
 
4.085 
 
4.536 
 
Technology traps (Tech) (Cronbach α = 0.73; composite reliability = 0.74; 
average variance extracted = 0.49) 
In the new products we have developed over the past year…   
Tech4: We have used tried and tested methods. 
Tech5: We have tended to stick with what we know. 
Tech6: The technologies we have incorporated have all been mature. 
0.867 
0.528 
0.667 
scaling 
4.641 
5.341 
Routinization traps (Rout) (Cronbach α = 0.84; composite reliability = 0.85; 
average variance extracted = 0.674) 
In developing new products…   
Rout1: We have well-understood “rules.” 
Rout2: Our procedures are highly formalized. 
Rout6: We follow formalized procedures. 
0.925 
0.877 
0.609 
scaling 
10.322 
6.933 
 
Model 5: Network Learning and Control Variables 
Model fit: χ2(32) = 44.390, p = 0.071; CFI = .996; TLI = .994; IFI = .996; RMSEA = .059 
 
Network learning (B) → external learning (Cronbach α = 0.84; composite 
reliability = 0.86; average variance extracted = 0.62) 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements about your company’s 
relationships with outside companies and organizations (e.g., suppliers, 
distributors, consultants, retailers, banks, government and university contacts, 
technology search firms): 
  
NLA1: We have strong relationships with companies and organizations outside of our 
industry. 
NLA2: We benefit from close contacts with companies and organizations outside of our 
industry. 
NLA4: We have gained significant knowledge from companies and organizations outside of 
our industry. 
NLA5: We have partners from a wide variety of different industries. 
0.914 
0.901 
0.498 
 
0.760 
scaling 
13.293 
5.584 
 
10.095 
Technology uncertainty (TU): (Cronbach α = 0.89; composite reliability = 0.89; 
average variance extracted = 0.74) 
Please think about the market environment for your firm and indicate how much 
you agree or disagree with the following statements:   
TU2: Technological changes have provided big opportunities in our industry. 
TU3: A large number of new product ideas have been made possible through 
technological breakthroughs in our industry. 
TU4: There have been major technological developments in our industry. 
0.863 
0.776 
 
0.928 
scaling 
9.847 
 
12.157 
Competition intensity (CI): (Cronbach α = 0.86; composite reliability = 0.87; 
average variance extracted = 0.69) 
CI2: There are many promotion wars in this industry. 
CI3: One hears of a new competitive move almost every day. 
CI4: Price competition is a hallmark of this industry. 
0.777 
0.985 
0.712 
scaling 
9.310 
8.170 
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 Table 5. 8 Summary of Measurement Models 
 
Dependent Variables 
New product creativity 
NPD speed 
NPD resource efficiency 
χ2 = 31.94 (d.f. = 24) N.S. α = 0.90, 
α = 0.92, 
α = 0.65 
Independent Variables 
MO (high order) 
         Customer orientation 
         Competitor orientation 
         Cross-functional coordination 
χ2 = 21.25 (d.f. = 24) N.S.  
α = 0.82, 
α = 0.79, 
α = 0.88 
EO (high order) χ2 = 35.71 (d.f. = 25) N.S.  
α = 0.90, 
α = 0.91, 
α = 0.74 
Competency traps (low order) χ2 = 21.22 (d.f. = 24) N.S.  
α = 0.71, 
α = 0.73, 
α = 0.84 
Network learning 
Technology uncertainty 
Competitive intensity 
χ2 = 44.39 (d.f. = 32) N.S. α = 0.84, 
α = 0.89, 
α = 0.86 
 
5.3.2 Structural Models 
 This section reports the findings of the research. Two sets of relationships are 
included in this section. The first shows the results of the directional relationships (H1a–c–H7a–
c). The second demonstrates the moderating effects of EO and network learning (H8a–c–H11a–
c). Path analysis is used to assess the hypothesized model. Using structural question modeling 
methodology makes it possible to simultaneously test all the hypothesized relationships 
among constructs. Item-factor scores are averaged to form the factor scores for path analysis. 
When the moderations are tested, the independent variables are mean-centered for the 
interaction testing. 
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 5.3.2.1 Results of Hypotheses Testing: Direct Relationships (H1a–c–H7a–c) 
 In the first path model (see figure 5.1), the first 21 hypotheses are tested. The chi-
square is 17.85 and not significant with p-values of 0.21, which indicates a good overall 
model fit. Other fit indices of comparative fit index, Tucker Lewis index, incremental fit 
index, and root mean square error of approximation are respectively 0.999, 0.995, 0.999, and 
0.05. All the indices together suggest a very good model fit. In addition, the model attempts 
to control some confounding variables. Two important control variables are included: (1) 
firm age and (2) technology uncertainty. Firm age has a positive and significant association 
with new product creativity (b = 0.22, significant). Technology uncertainty has a positive and 
significant relationship with new product resource efficiency and new product creativity (b = 
0.18, significant; and b = 0.28, significant, respectively). H1a–c–H7a–c were tested after 
controlling for these two important, confounding variables. 
 
Figure 5.1 Direction Relationship 
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H1a suggests that a firm’s customer orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
efficiency, which includes two components: (1) NPD speed and (2) NPD resource efficiency. 
The path coefficients are negative and not significant (N.S.) between customer orientation 
and NPD speed and NPD resource efficiency (b = –0.18, N.S.; and b = –0.04, N.S., 
respectively). Therefore, H1a is not supported. 
H1b suggests that a firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
efficiency. The path coefficients are positive on NPD speed and NPD resource efficiency. 
However, only the relationship between competitor orientation and NPD speed is significant 
(b = 0.35, significant), while the relationship between competitor orientation and NPD 
resource efficiency is not significant (b = 0.13, not significant). Therefore, H1b is partially 
supported. 
H1c states that a firm’s interdepartmental coordination is positively associated with its 
NPD efficiency. This hypothesis is rejected by the data since the path coefficients are not 
significant on NPD speed and NPD resource efficiency (b = 0.08, N.S.; and b = 0.06, N.S., 
respectively). 
 H2a proposes that a firm’s customer orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
creativity. This hypothesis is refuted, since the path coefficient is negative rather than 
positive, although it is significant (b = –0.27, significant). 
 H2b suggests that a firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
creativity. This hypothesis is supported by the data. The path coefficient is positive and 
significant (b = 0.26, significant). 
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  H2c suggests that a firm’s interdepartmental coordination is positively associated with 
its NPD creativity. This hypothesis is supported by the data. The path coefficient is positive 
and significant (b = 0.23, significant). 
 H3a states that the higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
vision trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path coefficient is positive but 
not significant (b = 0.07, N.S.). Customer orientation does not have a significant relationship 
with vision trap. 
 H3b states the higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
technology trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path coefficient is positive 
but not significant (b = 0.23, N.S.). Customer orientation does not have a significant 
relationship with technology trap. 
 H3c states the higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
routinization trap. This hypothesis is supported by the data. The path coefficient is positive 
and significant (b = 0.49, significant). Customer orientation has a significant positive 
relationship with routinization trap. 
 H4a states the higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
vision trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path coefficient is not 
significant (b = –0.00, N.S.). Competitor orientation does not have a significant relationship 
with vision trap. 
 H4b proposes the higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
technology trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path coefficient is positive 
but not significant (b = 0.20, N.S.). Competitor orientation does not have a significant 
relationship with technology trap. 
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  H4c suggests the higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
routinization trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path coefficient is 
positive and significant (b = 0.14, N.S.). Competitor orientation does not have a significant, 
positive relationship with routinization trap. 
 H5a states that the higher a firm’s interdepartmental coordination, the higher is the 
level of its vision trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path coefficient is 
positive but not significant (b = 0.05, N.S.). Interdepartmental coordination does not have a 
significant relationship with vision trap. 
 H5b proposes the higher a firm’s interdepartmental coordination, the higher is the 
level of its technology trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path coefficient 
is negative and not significant (b = –0.15, N.S.). Interdepartmental coordination does not 
have a significant relationship with technology trap. 
 H5c suggests that the higher a firm’s interdepartmental orientation, the higher is the 
level of its routinization trap. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path 
coefficient is negative and not significant (b = –0.04, N.S.). Interdepartmental coordination 
does not have a significant, positive relationship with routinization trap. 
 H6a states that the level of vision trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively associated 
with its NPD efficiency. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. New product 
development efficiency includes two components: (1) NPD speed and (2) NPD resource 
efficiency. The path coefficient is not significant for both dependent components (b = 0.00, 
N.S.; and b = 0.12, N.S., respectively). Thus, vision trap does not have a significant 
relationship with either NPD speed or NPD resource efficiency. 
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  H6b states that the level of technology trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively 
associated with its NPD efficiency. This hypothesis is not supported by the data. The path 
coefficient of technology trap is positive but not significant for both dependent components 
(b = 0.13, N.S.; and b = 0.10, N.S., respectively). Technology trap does not have a significant 
relationship with either NPD speed or NPD resource efficiency. 
 H6c suggests that the level of routinization trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively 
associated with its NPD efficiency. This hypothesis is partially supported by the data. The 
path coefficients of routinization trap on both NPD speed and NPD resource efficiency are 
significant and positive (b = 0.35, significant; and b = 0.22, significant, respectively).  
 H7a states that the level of vision trap in a firm’s NPD process is negatively associated 
with its NPD creativity. This hypothesis is supported by the data. The path coefficient is 
significant and negative (b = –0.24, significant). Vision trap has a significant, negative effect 
on NPD creativity. 
 H7b argues that the level of technology trap in a firm’s NPD process is negatively 
associated with its NPD creativity. This hypothesis is rejected by the data. The path 
coefficient is not significant (b = –0.09, N.S.). Technology trap does not have a significant 
relationship with NPD creativity. 
 H7c states that the level of routinization trap in a firm’s NPD process is negatively 
associated with its NPD creativity. This hypothesis is refuted by the data. The path 
coefficient is significant and positive (b = 0.25, significant). Thus, routinization trap has 
significant, positive relationship with NPD creativity. 
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 5.3.2.2 Results of Hypotheses Testing: Moderating Relationships (H8a–c–H11a–c) 
 In the second path model, the rest of the 12 hypotheses are tested. A best-fitting 
model is found and provided in Figure 5.2. The chi-square is 11.82 and not significant with 
the p-value of 0.38, which indicates a good overall model fit. Other fit indices of comparative 
fit index, Tucker Lewis index, incremental fit index, and root mean square error of 
approximation are respectively 1.000, 0.998, 1.000, and 0.026. All the indices together 
suggest a very good model fit. Moreover, this model attempts to control some confounding 
variables. H8a–c–H11a–c were tested after controlling for the negative effect of firm size. 
H8a–c suggest that the higher a firm’s EO, the lower are the levels of its vision, technology, and  
 
Figure 5.2 Moderating Relationship 
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 routinization traps in its NPD process. The data refute H8b and reject H8a and H8c. The path 
coefficients of EO are positive and significant for technology trap (b = 0.37, significant) but 
not significant for vision trap and routinization trap (b = 0.23, N.S.; and b = 0.16, N.S., 
respectively). Therefore, a firm’s EO has a positive relationship with technology trap but no 
significant relationship with vision or routinization traps. 
 H9a–c suggest that a firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and 
the vision, technology, and routinization traps in its NPD process. The data only support H9b 
and reject H9a and H9c. The interaction effect between MO and EO is negatively related to 
technology trap (b = –0.70, significant) but has no association with vision trap and 
routinization trap (b = –0.27, N.S.; and b = 0.19, N.S., respectively). 
 H10a–c suggest that a firm’s network learning is negatively associated with the levels 
of vision, technology, and routinization traps in its NPD process. The data support H10b and 
H10c but reject H10a. The path coefficients of network learning are positive and significant for 
technology trap and routinization trap (b = 0.28, significant; and b = 0.25, significant, 
respectively) but not significant for vision trap (b = 0.05, N.S.). Therefore, a firm’s network 
learning has a positive relationship with technology trap and routinization trap but not with 
vision trap. 
H11a–c suggest that a firm’s network learning weakens the positive relationship 
between its MO and the vision, technology, and routinization traps in its NPD processes. The 
data only support H11b and reject H11a and H11c. The interaction effect between MO and 
network learning is positively related to technology trap (b = 0.32, significant) but has no 
association with vision trap and routinization trap (b = –0.00, N.S.; and b = 0.06, N.S., 
respectively). 
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 5.4 Discussion of the Results 
 This section discusses the empirical findings presented in the previous sections in 
detail in terms of the literature. The results indicate that (1) a firm’s competitor orientation is 
positively associated with its NPD resource efficiency but not with its NPD speed; (2) a 
firm’s customer orientation is negatively associated with its NPD creativity; (3) a firm’s 
competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD creativity; (4) a firm’s 
interdepartmental coordination is positively associated with its NPD creativity; (5) the higher 
a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its routinization trap; (6) the level of 
routinization trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively associated with its NPD efficiency; 
(7) the level of vision trap in a firm’s NPD process is negatively associated with its NPD 
creativity; (8) the level of routinization trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively associated 
with its NPD creativity; (9) the higher a firm’s EO, the higher is the level of its technology 
trap; (10) a firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and technology trap 
in its NPD process; (11) a firm’s network learning is positively associated with the level of 
technology trap in its NPD processes; (12) a firm’s network learning is positively associated 
with the level of routinization trap in its NPD processes; and (13) a firm’s network learning 
strengthens the positive relationship between its MO and technology trap in its NPD 
processes (see table 5.9). 
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 Table 5. 9 Summary of Findings 
 Context of Hypotheses  Findings 
1. H1a: A firm’s customer orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
efficiency 
+ Not Supported 
2. H1b: A firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
efficiency 
+ Partial 
Supported  
3. H1c: A firm’s interdepartmental coordination is positively associated with its 
NPD efficiency 
+ Not Supported 
4. H2a: A firm’s customer orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
creativity 
+ Refuted 
5. H2b: A firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD 
creativity 
+ Supported 
6. H2c: A firm’s interdepartmental coordination is positively associated with its 
NPD creativity 
+ Supported 
7. H3a: The higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
vision trap 
+ Not Supported 
8. H3b: The higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
technology trap 
+ Not Supported 
9. H3c: The higher a firm’s customer orientation, the higher is the level of its 
routinization trap 
+ Supported 
10. H4a: The higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
vision trap 
+ Not Supported 
11. H4b: The higher a firm’s competitor orientation, The higher is the level of its 
technology trap 
+ Not Supported 
12. H4c: The higher a firm’s competitor orientation, the higher is the level of its 
routinization trap 
+ Not Supported 
13. H5a: The higher a firm’s interdepartmental coordination, the higher is the level 
of its vision trap 
+ Not support 
14. H5b: The higher a firm’s interdepartmental coordination, the higher is the level 
of its technology trap 
+ Not Supported 
15. H5c: The higher a firm’s interdepartmental orientation, the higher is the level 
of its routinization trap 
+ Not Supported 
16. H6a: The level of vision trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively associated 
with its NPD efficiency 
– Not Supported 
17. H6b: The level of technology trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively 
associated with its NPD efficiency 
– Not Supported 
18. H6c: The level of routinization trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively 
associated with its NPD efficiency 
– Supported 
19. H7a: The level of vision trap in a firm’s NPD process is negatively associated 
with its NPD creativity 
+ Supported 
20. H7b: The level of technology trap in a firm’s NPD process is negatively 
associated with its NPD creativity 
+ Not Supported 
21. H7c: The level of routinization trap in a firm’s NPD process is negatively 
associated with its NPD creativity 
+ Refuted 
22. H8a: The higher a firm’s EO, the lower is the level of its vision trap – Not supported 
23. H8b: The higher a firm’s EO, the lower is the level of its technology trap – Refuted 
24. H8c: The higher a firm’s EO, the lower is the level of routinization trap in its 
NPD 
– Not Supported 
25. H9a: A firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and 
vision trap in its NPD process 
– Not Supported 
26. H9b: A firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and 
technology trap in its NPD process 
– Supported 
27. H9c: A firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship between its MO and – Not Supported 
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 routinization trap in its NPD process 
28. H10a: A firm’s network learning is negatively associated with the level of 
vision trap in its NPD processes 
– Not supported 
29. H10b: A firm’s network learning is negatively associated with the level of 
technology trap in its NPD processes 
– Refuted 
30. H10c: A firm’s network learning is negatively associated with the level of 
routinization trap in its NPD processes 
– Refuted 
31. H11a: A firm’s network learning weakens the positive relationship between its 
MO and vision trap in its NPD processes 
– Not supported 
32. H11b: A firm’s network learning weakens the positive relationship between its 
MO and technology trap in its NPD processes 
– Refuted 
33. H11c: A firm’s network learning weakens the positive relationship between its 
MO and routinization trap in its NPD processes 
– Not Supported 
 
5.4.1 Discussion of Results: Direct Relationships (H1a–c–H7a–c) 
 As indicated previously, according to the capability-rigidity theory of Leonard-Barton 
(1992), MO as a capability can enhance incremental NPD and NPD efficiency while at the 
same time inhibiting radical NPD and new product creativity by facilitating the creation of 
competency traps. Little empirical evidence is available to test this theory and framework. 
This study attempts to test this capability-rigidity theory. 
 H1a–c state that three components of MO (customer orientation, competitor 
orientation, and interdepartmental coordination) are positively related to NPD efficiency. The 
results only partially support H1b. Contrary to expectations, customer orientation and 
interdepartmental coordination have no significant relationship with NPD efficiency (H1a, 
H1c). But the data suggest that competitor orientation is positively related to NPD speed 
(H1b1) but not to NPD resource efficiency (H1b2). Therefore, highly competitor-oriented firms 
may be able to develop new products more quickly than low competitor-oriented firms 
because their knowledge about competitors facilitates the NPD search. 
 H2a–c state that three components of MO (customer orientation, competitor 
orientation, and interdepartmental coordination) are positively related to new product 
creativity. The results refute H2a but support H2b and H2c. Contrary to expectations, customer 
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 orientation is negatively related to new product creativity (H2a). These findings do not 
support von Hippel’s (1986) leader-user theory but are consistent with the view of 
Christensen and Bower (1996) and with the results of Im and Workman (2004). Consistent 
with expectations, competitor orientation is positively related to new product creativity. 
Highly competitor-oriented firms are more likely to create new products that are different 
from those of their competitors (Im and Workman 2004). Consistent with expectations, 
interdepartmental coordination is positively related to new product creativity. Firms with 
interdepartmental coordination are more likely to generate novel new product ideas than are 
firms without interdepartmental coordination, because of the heterogeneity of viewpoints 
from different functions. 
 H3a–c attempt to check whether customer orientation leads to three types of 
competency traps (vision, technology, and routinization). H4a–c attempt to check whether 
competitor orientation leads to three types of competency traps (vision, technology, and 
routinization). H5a–c attempt to check whether interdepartmental coordination leads to three 
types of competency traps (vision, technology, and routinization). The results reject all the 
hypotheses except for H3c: customer orientation may lead to routinization traps. An 
explanation for these results may be that the relationship between MO and competency traps 
is indirect rather than direct. It is possible that MO and competency traps coexist in firms, 
interact with each other, and then impact new product innovation performance. However, the 
findings suggest that customer orientation does have direct relationship with routinization 
traps. A high customer orientation may lead firms to follow standardized and formalized 
routines and procedures. 
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  As the proposed framework indicates, the competency traps represent a type of inertia 
and rigidity in the organizational learning. Competency traps may encourage exploitation 
learning (NPD efficiency) and discourage exploration learning (new product creativity). H6a–c 
attempt to check whether three different types of competency traps (vision, technology, and 
routinization) are positively associated with NPD efficiency. The data support only H6c and 
reject H6a and H6b. The findings suggest that routinization trap encourages experiential 
learning, which shortens NPD speed and enables the firm to use its resources very 
productively. Therefore, routinization trap is positively associated with NPD efficiency. 
 H7a–c attempt to check whether three different types of competency traps (vision, 
technology, and routinization) are negatively associated with NPD creativity. According to 
this data set, H7a is supported, H7b is rejected, and H7c is refuted. Therefore, vision trap 
discourages exploration learning and is negatively associated with NPD creativity. Contrary 
to expectations, technology trap has no relationship with new product creativity. In addition, 
routinization trap encourages rather than discourages exploration learning: it is positively 
related to new product creativity. 
 To summarize these results above, the capability-rigidity theory of Leonard-Barton 
(1992) is only partial supported. The positive effect of MO on NPD is only supported by the 
positive relationship between competitor orientation and NPD speed. Contrary to 
expectations, MO also has positive rather than negative effects on new product creativity: 
competitor orientation and interdepartmental coordination are positively related to new 
product creativity. The negative effect of MO on NPD is only supported by the negative 
relationship between customer orientation and new product creativity. 
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  Furthermore, I predicted that the negative effect of MO on new product creativity 
derived from the rigidity-competency traps generated by MO. In other words, MO causes 
competency traps, and competency traps reduce new product creativity. According to the 
results, among the three competency traps, only customer orientation creates routinization 
traps. Contrary to expectations, routinization traps increase rather than decrease new product 
creativity. In addition, routinization traps also increase NPD speed and NPD resource 
efficiency. Although vision traps decrease new product creativity, there is no link between 
vision trap and any of the dimensions of MO. 
 Therefore, it is difficult to say that the reason MO inhibits new product creativity is 
because of competency traps. Not all competency traps are harmful for new product 
innovation. In some situations, firms may benefit from some forms of rigidity, such as 
routinization traps. 
 
5.4.2 Discussion of Results: Moderating Relationships (H8a–c–H11a–c) 
 As indicated previously, organizational learning theory and DC theory suggest that 
complementary capabilities to MO are required in order to reduce the rigidity and increase 
new product innovation performance. 
 H8a–c state that EO may reduce three different types of competency traps (vision, 
technology, and routinization). The results only suggest that EO is significantly related to 
technology traps (H8b). However, this relationship is positive rather than negative. 
 H9abc state that EO may weaken the relationship between MO and three different 
types of competency traps (vision, technology, and routinization). The results suggest that 
EO only weakens the relationship between MO and technology trap (H9b). 
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  Combining H8b and H9b, I expected that a firm’s EO weakens the positive relationship 
between its MO and technology traps in its NPD process. But the results show that a firm’s 
EO strengthens the negative relationship between its MO and technology traps in its NPD 
process. To facilitate interpretation, this interaction was plotted in Figure 5.3. As shown in 
Figure 5.3, MO has a stronger negative effect on technology traps in high-entrepreneurial-
oriented firms than in low-entrepreneurial-oriented firms. In low-market-oriented firms, 
entrepreneurial culture does not have much influence on firms’ technology decisions. But in 
high-market-oriented firms, entrepreneurial culture does influence firms’ technology 
decisions. When the high-market-oriented firms employ high entrepreneurial culture, they are 
less likely to fall into technology traps and stick with mature and familiar technology. When 
the high-market-oriented firms employ low entrepreneurial culture, they are more likely to 
fall into technology traps and stick with mature and familiar technology. 
 Therefore, consistent with expectations, EO is the remedy for market-oriented firms 
to reduce their level of technology traps. This finding demonstrates the importance of 
entrepreneurship in business practice. Entrepreneurial activities can provide market-oriented 
firms an additional ability to recognize new opportunities and to create unique perspectives, 
which reduces rigidity and sustains innovation performance. 
 H10a–c state that network learning may reduce three different types of competency 
traps (vision, technology, and routinization). Contrary to expectations, the results show that 
network learning is positively rather than negatively related to technology traps and 
routinization traps (H10b, H10c). 
 H11a–c state that network learning may weaken the relationship between MO and three 
different types of competency traps (vision, technology, and routinization). Contrary to
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Figure 5.3 Interaction Between MO and EO on Technology Traps 
 
-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
Low MO Hi MO
Market Orientation
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 T
ra
ps
Low EO
High EO
 
 
expectations, the results show that network learning fosters rather than weakens the 
relationship between MO and technology traps as well as routinization traps (H11b). 
 In combining H10b and H11b, I expected that a firm’s network learning weakens the 
positive relationship between its MO and technology traps in its NPD processes. But the 
results show that that a firm’s network learning strengthens the positive relationship between 
its MO and technology traps in its NPD processes. Figure 5.4 illustrates this interaction, 
indicating that MO has a stronger positive effect on the level of technology trap when 
network learning is high rather than low. Network learning does not much influence the level 
of technology traps in low-market-oriented firms. But network learning does make a big 
difference for high-market-oriented firms. When high-market-oriented firms employ high 
network learning, they are more likely to fall into technology traps and less likely to use new 
emerging technologies. When high-market-oriented firms employ low network learning, they 
are less likely to fall into technology traps and stick with mature and familiar technology. 
Therefore, contrary to expectations, network learning cannot reduce the level of technology 
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 traps for market-oriented firms. This finding suggests that network learning may still create 
groupthink for firms at the industry level. Industry “recipes” generated by network learning 
might guide market-oriented firms toward sticking with mature and familiar technology. 
 
Figure 5.4 Interaction Between Market Orientation and Network Learning 
on Technology Traps 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Low MO Hi MO
Market Orientation
Te
ch
no
lg
oy
 T
ra
ps
Low NL
High NL
 
 
 
 
 203
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6: IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This chapter is the final chapter. It reviews the study’s potential implications in light 
of the research questions and the theoretical models presented in chapters 1 and 2, 
respectively. It also addresses the limitations of the current study and offers directions for 
future research. I review the objectives, research questions, and contributions of the study 
before offering the implications. 
 
6.1 Review of the Research Questions in the Study 
 Learning traps are a dangerous zone that firms should not step into. Competency traps, 
one type of learning trap, lead firms to unconsciously fall into a vicious cycle of adherence to 
inferior routines and denial of the need for change (Fiol and Lyles 1985; King and West 
2002; Levinthal and March 1993; Levitt and March 1988). Both the marketing and the 
management literatures call for an integrated conceptual framework for identifying 
competency traps, their antecedents, and the consequences for firms’ innovation outcomes. 
This dissertation attempts to fill this important research gap with its three objectives. The first 
objective is to conceptualize competency traps and develop new scales for competency traps. 
The second objective is to investigate the relationship between MO, competency traps, and 
new product innovation in the capability-rigidity theory framework. The third objective is to 
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 examine whether the relationship between MO and competency traps depends on EO and 
network learning, as suggested by DC theory. 
On the basis of these objectives, this study aims to answer three questions. 
What are competency traps and how to define and measure them? Although the notion of 
competency traps is important for both academics and practitioners, little is known about 
how to conceptualize and operationalize competency traps. The development of a 
competency-trap scale should enable firms to identify competency traps and stimulate much-
needed empirical research. This study classifies competency traps into three types: (1) vision, 
(2) technology, and (3) routinization. The scales developed in this study for vision, 
technology, and routinization traps have demonstrated reasonably good validities and 
reliabilities. 
 
What kind of relationship exists among MO, competency traps, and new product innovation? 
Why and how does a firm competence such as MO lead to competency traps? What are the 
consequences of competency traps for new product innovation? Marketing and management 
scholars have debated the role of a firm’s customer orientation in innovation. Christensen and 
Bower (1996) suggest that close customer ties deter product and service innovation. A 
customer orientation may contribute to imitation and to more conservative NPD (e.g., 
Bennett and Cooper 1979, 1981). In contrast, Slater and Narver (1998) argue that a market-
oriented philosophy (customer orientation, competitor orientation, and interfunctional 
coordination) consists of more than being customer led and is essential to success in terms of 
NPD. 
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 The findings of this study answered the debate in the following way: consistent with 
the suggestions of Christensen and Bower (1996), a firm’s customer orientation is negatively 
associated with its NPD creativity. Consistent with Slater and Narver’s (1998) arguments that 
market orientation goes beyond being customer led, a firm’s competitor orientation and 
interfunctional coordination are positively associated with its NPD creativity. In addition, a 
firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD resource efficiency. 
Capability-rigidity theory suggests that MO, as a capability or a learning mechanism, 
may create competency traps and decrease new product creativity while directly increasing 
NPD efficiency. The findings of this study showed that a firm’s customer orientation does 
create routinization traps. However, contrary to expectations, not all competency traps are 
harmful for NPD. Although vision traps in a firm’s NPD process are negatively associated 
with NPD creativity, routinization traps in a firm’s NPD process are positively associated 
with its NPD creativity and NPD resource efficiency. 
How can firms reduce the occurrence and negative consequences of competency traps? Why 
and how does this work? On the basis of organizational learning theory and DC theory, EO 
and network orientation are suggested as complements to MO to reduce competency traps 
and to enhance creativity in new product innovation. According to the results of this study, 
consistent with predictions, EO is more likely to help high-market-oriented firms rather than 
low-market-oriented firms reduce technology traps. However, contrary to expectations, 
network learning is more likely to lead high-market-oriented firms rather than low-market-
oriented firms to increase rather than reduce the level of technology traps. 
In the subsequent section, I discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of the 
findings of this study in detail. 
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6.2 Implications for the Literature 
 This dissertation attempts to make significant contributions to the marketing and the 
management literatures and practices in five ways. 
The major contribution of this study is the first step toward conceptualizing and 
developing scales for competency traps. Although the notion of competency traps was 
suggested by the management literature more than a decade ago, the concept remains 
undeveloped. The new scales conceptualized and developed in this dissertation provide a 
foundation for future research on competency traps. Thus, this research may stimulate much-
needed empirical research in the future. 
Second, the findings of this dissertation include empirical evidence that contributes to 
the debate about whether customer power has adverse effect on radical innovation and new 
product creativity. The findings support the work of Christensen and Bower (1996) and 
partially support the work of Slater and Narver (1998, 1999). Consistent with the work of 
Christensen and Bower (1996), a firm that only has a focus customer orientation is harmful to 
new product creativity. Consistent with the suggestions of Slater and Narver (1998, 1999), 
competitor orientation and interfunctional coordination are positively associated with NPD 
creativity. A firm’s competitor orientation is positively associated with its NPD resource 
efficiency. The conflict effects from different dimensions of MO (customer orientation, 
competitor orientation, and interfunctional coordination) on new product creativity have 
confirmed why previous literature has documented mixed results in the MO–NPP 
relationship. 
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 Third, this study advances understanding of competency traps. Not all types of 
competency traps are definitely harmful to NPD. Although vision traps in a firm’s NPD 
process are negatively associated with NPD creativity, routinization traps in a firm’s NPD 
process are positively associated with NPD creativity and NPD resource efficiency. 
Fourth, the findings of this study provide some empirical evidence for capability-
rigidity theory. Capability-rigidity theory suggests that MO may enhance and inhibit NPD at 
the same time. According to the results, some dimensions of MO do enhance NPD. 
Competitor orientation and cross-functional coordination enhance new product creativity, 
and competitor orientation also enhances NPD speed. Some dimensions of MO do inhibit 
NPD. Customer orientation inhibits new product creativity. 
How does MO inhibit and enhance NPD at the same time? To advance capability-
rigidity theory, this study hypothesizes that competency traps are the rigidity created by MO, 
and in return competency traps reduce new product creativity. However, the results do not 
support this hypothesized framework. According to the results, customer orientation creates 
routinization trap. But contrary to expectations, routinization traps enhance, not reduce, new 
product creativity, NPD speed, and NPD resource efficiency. Although vision traps are 
negatively associated with NPD creativity, there is no link between any dimensions of MO 
and vision trap. 
Therefore, the results of this study demonstrate a much more complex relationship 
than what the theory and framework predict. These complex relationships not only increase 
understanding but also provide an opportunity for future research to advance capability-
rigidity theory. 
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 Fifth, the study found that EO and network learning play moderating roles in the 
relationship between MO and technology trap. Entrepreneurial orientation is more likely to 
reduce technology traps in high-market-oriented firms than in low-market-oriented firms. 
However, contrary to expectations, network learning is more likely to create technology traps in 
high-market-oriented firms than in low-market-oriented firms. Thus, EO but not network 
orientation is the remedy for technology traps. 
 
6.3 Implications for Practitioners 
 The findings of this study should help managers better understand how to identify and 
manage the level of competency traps in order to improve NPP. This study has four 
managerial implications for managers and practitioners. 
 First, the new scale developed in this dissertation may help managers diagnose the 
existence and level of competency traps. 
 Second, it is dangerous for firms to be only customer oriented. It is important to be 
competitor oriented and have interfunctional coordination in order to have a high level of 
new product creativity. 
 Third, managers should be aware that different types of competency traps may have 
different effects on new product innovation. Vision traps may harm new product creativity. 
However, routinization trap as a form of rigidity may help a firm’s NPD process in terms of 
new product creativity and NPD efficiency. Therefore, firms should take advantage of good 
competency traps, such as routinization, and reduce bad competency traps, such as vision, in 
order to improve their new product innovation rate. 
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  Fourth, managers in high-market-oriented firms should employ EO to reduce technology 
traps. However, managers in high-market-oriented firms should not be network oriented, because 
network learning may still lead to groupthink and make the firms stick with industry norms. 
 
6.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 Although this study provides some meaningful results for research and practice, there 
are several limitations. These limitations might threaten the internal and external validity of 
the research, but they also provide opportunities for future research: 
 First, the sample size (113) in this study is relatively small, which may limit the 
generalizability of the findings. In addition, competency traps as a type of rigidities may 
occur in all kinds of contexts beyond marketing and NPD. In order to prove the 
generalizability of these new constructs, it is necessary to test these constructs in other 
functions and contexts of a firm, such as management, manufacturing, operations, finance, 
administration, and service. Furthermore, this study is conducted in China, which may limit 
the extent to which the results can be applied to firms in other countries with different 
cultural contexts. Thus, future studies should use larger samples in order to gain more 
confidence in these results. Also, a clear conclusion can be drawn if this study would be 
replicated with other samples in other functional domains and different countries. 
 Second, the use of an availability-sampling method can easily be challenged for its 
generalizability. The study adopted availability sampling rather than random sampling, which 
may present some biases in the data. The companies that were willing to participate in the 
research may be different from those that were not willing to participate. Therefore, the 
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 representativeness of this nonrandom sample is in doubt. Future studies should attempt to 
study this content with randomized samples. 
 Third, the cross-sectional approach may not lead to effective conclusions regarding 
causality. Lack of sufficient causality may make it difficult to apply the conclusions to all 
industries. Although the current research accessed firms from several industries, the limited 
sample size did not allow for industry comparisons. Furthermore, because MO, competency 
traps, and new product innovation are all dynamic factors, it is difficult to use the cross-
sectional data to reflect ongoing transformations in relationships. Therefore, it is important to 
incorporate longitudinal research designs in the future to enable better capturing of the 
dynamism of the constructs and better understanding of the learning process in NPD. 
 Fourth, this study originally aimed to have one marketing manager and one R&D 
manager from each firm in order to avoid various biases. Unfortunately, although the actual 
sample frame (302 usable questionnaires from 151 firms) had two respondents from each 
firm, most respondents were marketing managers (158 marketing managers and only 34 
R&D managers). The rest of the respondents are CEOs and managers from manufacturing, 
finance and accounting, and administrative departments. As a result, the original plan could 
not be implemented by this sample frame. Therefore, only 113 marketing managers’ 
questionnaires were selected to test the hypotheses. Future studies should attempt to collect 
data from multiple respondents, which allows for reliability checks of data and avoids 
various biases, such as position, vested interests, and common method. 
 Future research should further conceptualize other important types of learning traps 
and develop new scales for them. For example, power trap occurs when organizations use 
their power to impose environments, which likely results in an atrophied ability to respond to 
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 change in the long run. Failure trap occurs when organizations are turned into frenzies of 
experimentation, change, and innovation by a dynamic of failure. New ideas and 
technologies fail and are replaced by other new ideas and technologies, which in turn fail 
(Levinthal and March 1993). 
 Moreover, further study is needed to investigate other important mediators and 
moderators in the relationship among MO, competency traps, and NPD innovation, such as 
competitive behavior versus collaborating behavior and output control versus process 
control. For example, competitive behavior may help market-oriented firms address the 
rigidity generated by competency traps and increase NPD creativity, while collaborating 
behavior may foster competency traps in market-oriented firms and decrease NPD creativity. 
 Furthermore, because of the lack of mature measurements for radical innovation and 
incremental innovation, this research indirectly studied the relationship between MO and 
NPD creativity and efficiency. Future studies should attempt to search for or develop 
measurements for radical and incremental innovation and investigate the direct evidence for 
the debate. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 The main purpose of this study was to conceptualize and develop scales for 
competency traps, to obtain empirical evidence in the debate between the management and 
marketing literatures as to the relationship between MO and innovation, and to understand 
the role of competency traps in the relationship between MO and new product innovation. 
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  This study used data from 46 MBA students for pretest and 113 marketing managers 
in high-tech industry zone in China for the final study. Structural equation modeling and 
reliability tests were used for data analysis. 
 Three types of competency traps were conceptualized in this study: (1) vision, (2) 
technology, and (3) routinization. The newly developed scales demonstrated reasonably good 
validity and reliability. 
 Moreover, the data showed that a firm’s customer orientation is negatively associated 
with NPD creativity, but its competitor orientation and interdepartmental coordination are 
positively associated with NPD creativity. In addition, a firm’s competitor orientation is also 
positively associated with NPD resource efficiency. 
 Furthermore, the findings indicated that customer orientation may lead to 
routinization trap. Among the three types of competency traps, only the level of vision trap in 
a firm’s NPD process is negatively associated with its NPD creativity. The level of 
routinization trap in a firm’s NPD process is positively associated with its new product 
creativity and NPD efficiency. No significant, direct relationship was found in the 
relationship between technology trap and new product innovation. 
 The relationship between technology trap and new product innovation is indirect and 
moderated by EO and network learning. Entrepreneurial orientation, playing a positive 
moderating role, is more likely to help high-market-oriented firms rather than low-market-
oriented firms reduce technology traps. However, network learning, playing a negative 
moderating role, is more likely to lead high-market-oriented firms rather than low-market-
oriented firms increase the level of technology traps. 
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  This study is a pioneering research attempt to explore the existence and role of 
competency traps in the relationship between MO and new product innovation. This study 
also provides insights into the debate between the marketing and management literatures. In 
particular, this study investigates how to help firms reduce competency traps and improve 
new product innovation. Thus, it contributes to the marketing and management literatures by 
studying the relationship among rigidity-competency traps, MO, and new product innovation. 
 Although some useful results have been discovered, the findings should be considered 
tentative, given the issues examined and the limitations of the study. Future studies are 
needed to refine this work and to provide additional insights into the literature and practice. 
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 APPENDIX 
 
A SURVEY OF NEW PRODUCT DEVELPMENT 
 
 
 We’d like to ask you to help us with this survey of new product development practices. Your 
complete response is very important to the accuracy of the research. The survey uses a fixed-response 
format so that you will be able to complete it easily and quickly—less than 20 minutes. This is not a 
“test” and there are no correct or incorrect answers. Companies perform various activities in different 
ways, and no one way is better than others. We simply want your opinion based on your knowledge 
and experience of practice in your firm. To ensure reliable and valid measures, some of the items you 
see may appear similar, while others look very different from one another. It is important to respond 
to every item, even if the wording for a question is not exactly what you might have used. Simply 
read each question carefully and then circle the response that best matches your opinion. In 
answering the questions in this survey, please focus on the new products you have developed and 
launched over the past 12 months. 
 
SECTION I:  GENERAL PRACTICES IN YOUR COMPANY 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements about 
your company: 
Not 
At All 
Great 
Extent 
We constantly monitor our level of commitment and orientation to serving 
customers needs 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our business strategies are driven by our beliefs about how we can create greater 
value for our customers 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our strategy for competitive advantage is based on our understanding of customers 
needs 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our business objectives are driven primarily by customer satisfaction 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We measure customer satisfaction systematically and frequently 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We give close attention to after-sales service 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our salespeople regularly share information within our business concerning 
competitor strategies 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We rapidly respond to competitive actions that threaten us 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Top managers regularly discuss competitors’ strengths and strategies 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We target customers where we have opportunities for competitive advantage 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our top managers from every function regularly visit our current and prospective 
customers 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We freely communicate information about our successful and unsuccessful 
customer experiences across all business functions 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
All of our business functions (e.g., marketing/sales, manufacturing, R&D, 
finance/accounting, etc) are integrated in serving the needs of our target markets.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
All of our managers understand how everyone in our business can contribute to 
creating customer value 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We share resources with other business units 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
To what extent do the following statements describe your company? 
 
Not 
At All 
Great 
Extent 
When it comes to problem solving, we value creative new solutions more than the 
conventional wisdom 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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 Top managers here encourage the development of innovative marketing strategies, 
knowing well that some will fail 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Relative to our competitors, our company has a higher ability to implement 
experimentation and original approaches to problems 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Relative to our competitors, our company has higher levels of innovation 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We value leadership initiatives for change more highly than risk-reducing 
management process  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Top managers in this business unit do not like to “play it safe” 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Top managers around here are happy to implement plans even if they are uncertain 
that they will work 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Relative to our competitors, our company has a strong proclivity for high-risk goals 
with chances of high returns 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Relative to our competitors, our company has a higher propensity to take risks 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We firmly believe that market changes create positive opportunities for us 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Top managers in this business are proactive in seeking to create new opportunities 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Members of this business unit tend to talk more about opportunities rather than 
problems 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Relative to our competitors, our company has higher ability to generate new 
opportunities 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements about your 
company’s relationships with outside companies and organizations (e.g., 
suppliers, distributors, consultants, retailers, banks, government and 
university contacts, technology search firms, etc.). 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
We have strong relationships with companies and organizations outside of our 
industry 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We benefit from close contacts with companies and organizations outside of our 
industry 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We have learned a lot from interactions with companies and organizations outside 
of our industry 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We have gained significant knowledge from companies and organizations outside 
of our industry 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We have partners from a wide variety of different industries 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
SECTION II:   NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT (NPD) PRACTICES 
 
In your new product development (NPD) efforts over the past 12 months, how 
much insight or knowledge has your company gained from your relationships 
with the following:    
None 
At All 
A Great 
Amount 
Our suppliers 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our distributors 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our consultants 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our retailers 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our contacts in universities and government 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Companies outside of our industry 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
Please think about how your company develops new products, and indicate to 
what extent you agree with the following statements: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Our confidence in our NPD process is based on its past success rather than its 
current performance 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We believe that the past success of our NPD process makes it the best approach for 
the future 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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 Because of its past success people tend to ignore current weaknesses in our NPD 
approach 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our pride in the past success of our NPD processes blinds us to opportunities for 
improvement 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Despite contrary indications, people still believe our NPD approach is better than 
that of our rivals 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
The past success of our NPD process inhibits attempts to experiment with new 
approaches 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 In the new products we have developed over the past year….  
…we have incorporated a lot of technology that is new to the industry 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…we have only used technologies already proven in the marketplace 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…the technologies we have used are well-known in this industry 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…we have used tried and tested methods 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…we have tended to stick with what we know 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…the technologies we have incorporated have all been mature 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
In developing new products… 
…we have well-understood “rules” 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…our procedures are highly formalized 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…our procedures can be easily changed 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…we never relax our standard procedures 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…our procedures are not very standardized  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
…we follow formalized procedures 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Now we ask that you switch gears and first examine each of the opposite statements below. For each pair 
of statements, please circle the number that best indicates your assessment of new product development 
activities in your company. 
We frequently undertake NPD projects 
that we are uncertain we can 
successfully complete 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 We usually undertake NPD 
projects that we are certain we can 
successfully complete 
We often develop new product ideas 
for 
emerging or anticipated market needs 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 We only develop new product 
ideas that 
 meet existing market needs 
Most of our NPD projects require us to 
develop 
new knowledge and areas of expertise 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 Most of our NPD projects tap our 
existing areas of knowledge and 
expertise 
We are always experimenting with 
new 
ways of developing new products 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 We always use tried and tested 
 new product development 
approaches  
We frequently undertake NPD projects 
that require 
 us to experiment with new 
technologies 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7 We only undertake NPD projects 
where we can exploit existing 
technologies 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement about 
your company’s new product development: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
We support NPD projects even if they could potentially take away from sales of 
existing products. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We are willing to sacrifices sales of existing products in order to improve sales of 
new products. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We often develop new products that compete with our existing products. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Our investments in current technologies make switching to new technologies 
easy. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We rely too much on our current technologies to switch focus to new 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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 technologies. 
We are reluctant to cannibalize our investments in our current technologies. 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
SECTION III:   NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES 
 
Please rate the extent to which your new products have achieved planned 
objectives during the first 12 months of their life in the marketplace in terms of: 
Not             
At All         
Great 
Extent 
Market share 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Sales 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Profit margin 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Return on investment 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
Compared with your largest competitor’s product(s), to what extent have your 
new product(s) over the past 12 months been superior in following dimensions: 
Not          
At All      
Great 
Extent 
Reliability: our new products are free of errors compared with the competitor’s 
products 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Compatibility: our new products are more compatible with other products than 
competitor’s products 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Uniqueness: our product offers unique benefits to customers not provided by 
competitors 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Productivity: our new products increase a customer’s work efficiency more than 
competitor’s products 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Ease of use: our new products are easier to learn and use than competitor’s products 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Functionality: our new products solve problems customers have with competitor 
products 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Quality: Customers perceived the quality as significantly higher than competitor 
products 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Now we ask that you switch gears and first examine each of the opposite statements below. For each pair 
of statements 
please circle a number that best indicates your assessment of the new products developed by your company 
over the past 12 months compared to existing products in the marketplace. 
Dull 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Exciting 
Fresh 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Routine 
Conventional 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Unconventional 
Novel 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Predictable 
Usual 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Unusual 
Unique 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Ordinary 
Commonplace 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Original 
 
For each pair of statements below, please circle a number that best indicates your assessment of the speed 
of the new product development activities in your company over the past 12 months. 
Usually behind our time goals 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Usually ahead of our time goals 
Slower than the industry average 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Faster than the industry average 
Much slower than we expected 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Much faster than we expected 
Much slower than our competitors 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Much faster than our competitors 
 
 
Please consider your new product development efforts over the past 12 months.  For each pair of 
adjectives below, please circle a number that best indicates your assessment of the resources consumed in 
new product development. 
More than expected 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Less than expected 
Far exceeded budget 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Well under budget  
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 Many resources consumed 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Few resources consumed 
Exceeding plan 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Less than plan 
 
 
SECTION IV: YOUR FIRM’S MARKETPLACE AND POSITION 
 
The following set of questions refers to your company’s overall position in the marketplace. For each pair 
of descriptions, please circle a number that best indicates your assessment of your business’s position in its 
major market. 
 
Our prices are usually lower 
than the industry average 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Our prices are usually higher 
than the industry average 
Our quality tends to be lower 
than the industry average 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Our quality tends to be higher 
 than the industry average 
Our service tends to be worse 
 than the industry average 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Our service tends to be better 
 than the industry average 
We have lower costs 
than the industry average 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 We have higher costs 
 than the industry average 
Our products/services tend to have 
little or no differentiation 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Our products/services tend to be 
highly differentiated 
 
 
The following descriptions characterize four equally effective strategies that organizations can 
use to position themselves relative to their competition.  Please read through each of the 
descriptions and check the box next to the one description that most closely resembles your 
business. 
 
 
 
This organization typically operates within a broad product market domain that undergoes 
periodic redefinition. It values being “first in” with new services and products even if not all these 
efforts prove to be highly profitable. This organization responds rapidly to early signals 
concerning areas of opportunity, and these responses often lead to a new round of competitive 
actions. However, this organization may not maintain market strength in all areas it enters. 
 
 
 
This organization typically attempts to locate and maintain a secure niche in a relatively stable 
product or service area. It tends to offer a more limited range of products or services than 
competitors, and tries to protect its domain by offering higher quality, superior service, lower 
prices, and so forth. This organization is not at the forefront of developments in the industry. It 
tends to ignore changes that have no direct influence on current areas of operation, and 
concentrates instead on doing the best job possible in a limited area. 
 
 
 
This organization attempts to maintain a stable, limited line of products or services, while at the 
same time moving quickly to follow a carefully selected set of the more promising new 
developments in the industry. It is seldom “first in” with new products and services. However, by 
carefully monitoring the actions of major competitors in areas compatible with its stable product-
market base, this organization can frequently be “second in” with a more cost-efficient product or 
service. 
 
 
 
This organization does not appear to have a consistent product-market orientation. It is not as 
aggressive in maintaining established products and markets as some of its competitors, nor is it 
willing to take as many risks as competitors. Rather, the organization responds in those areas 
where it is forced to by environmental pressures. 
 
 
Now please think about the market environment for your firm and indicate 
how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
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 The technology in our industry changes quite rapidly 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Technological changes have provided big opportunities in our industry 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
A large number of new product ideas have been made possible through 
technological breakthroughs in our industry 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
There have been major technological developments in our industry 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
It is very difficult to predict where the technology in our industry will be in the next 
2 or 3 years 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Competition in this industry is cutthroat 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
There are many promotion wars in this industry 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
One hears of a new competitive move almost every day  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Price competition is a hallmark of this industry  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Anything that one competitor can offer, others can readily match  1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
Now, for each pair of statements below, please circle a number that best describe the market for your 
new products over the past 12 months: 
Predictable 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Unpredictable 
Stable market shares 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Volatile market shares 
Easy to monitor trends 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Difficult to monitor trends 
Stable industry volume 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Unstable industry volume 
Certain the selling effort will pay off 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Uncertain the selling effort will pay off 
Sales forecasts are likely to be 
accurate 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Sales forecasts are likely to be inaccurate 
Sufficient information for marketing 
decisions 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Insufficient information for marketing 
decisions 
Confident of results of marketing 
actions 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 Unsure of results of marketing actions 
 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Our performance over past years has been better than that of everyone else in our 
industry 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We have had few serious threats to our position as industry leaders so far 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We have led the market from the start 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
We have a control in our industry 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
Other firms try to follow us in the technology 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
General Questions 
 
1. Number of full time employees in your firm ________ 
 
2. Please indicate how many new products your firm has introduced during the past three years using the 
descriptions below: 
__________ Number of “line extensions” (products not very new to your organization but new to your 
market) 
__________ Number of “me-too” products (products new to your organization but not new to your 
market) 
__________ Number of “new-to-the-world” products (products new to your organization and new to 
your market) 
 
3. Last year’s sales for your firm $______million 
Percentage of sales provided by new products less than 3 years old ________________ 
Percentage of profits provided by new products less than 3 years old _______________ 
Percentage of market share from new products less than 3 years old ________________ 
Percentage of sales growth from new products less than 3 years old ________________ 
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      Please describe your company’s profitability last year: 
 
1. Unprofitable 2. Breaking even  3. Moderately profitable 4. Very profitable 
 
 
4. Please rate your knowledge of new product development activities in your firm over the past year: 
               Little knowledge   0    1      2      3     4      5     6     7     8      9      10   Very High knowledge 
 
How long have you worked in this firm? ____________  
What is your job title in this firm ______________________________________________ 
How long have you held this position? ______________ 
 
5. Your firm’s main industry is __________________________________________________ 
When was your firm founded? ____________________ 
 
6. Is your firm an independent venture   or a subsidiary of a corporation   ? 
Please indicate the type of ownership of your firm ___________________ 
 
 
Thank you again for your valuable inputs to this important research!
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